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The conditions for life on Earth have been in constant flux since the 
appearance of the first single- celled organisms and now the Earth is 
populated by an estimated one to six billion species, according to 
a recent study (Larsen et al 2017). Homo sapiens – a latecomer on 
the evolutionary tree – was merely a marginal species until about 
12,000 years ago when the beginning of a period of climate stability 
(the Holocene) was favourable to the development of agricultural 
societies (Feynman and Ruzmaikin 2007). Currently, life on Earth is 
experiencing a new mass extinction event (Ceballos et al 2015), which 
differs to a normal background rate of extinction that accounts for an 
ongoing adaptation and replacement of species. What distinguishes 
this period of mass extinction from previous ones is the fact that this 
instance is of anthropogenic origin; that is, caused by humans (Wilson 
2016).1 Besides that this makes this kind of extinction conceptually 
different from past extinction events, this causality has also normative 
implications, and constitutes the fundamental problem against which 
the argument for an account of ecological justice is developed 
in this book.
To clarify, regarding species extinctions it is possible to distinguish 
between four different processes of extinction (final, hybridisation, 
transformation, allopatric speciation). Here the primary interest is in 
the kind of extinction that is usually implied in the everyday meaning 
of the term. That is, a final extinction which entails not only the 
disappearance of the species but also of the related phyletic branch of the 
evolutionary tree which stands in contrast to other extinction processes. 
That means that, for example, the disappearance of a species does not 
go hand in hand with the creation of a daughter species (see Delord 
2007). Moreover, the seriousness of this current mass extinction event 
which is linked to its conceptual differences to non- anthropogenic mass 
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the magnitude of mass extinction events in general, generate a need 
to act. That, in turn, is underlined by a crisis terminology and (more 
or less) aptly being termed the sixth mass extinction, or the biodiversity 
crisis.2 To put this into perspective, the previous five most significant 
mass extinction events each led to a reduction of at least 75 per cent 
of the number of species that existed at that point in time (Greshko 
2019). Accordingly, the simple initial intuition is that the current 
mass extinction is a crisis and a symptom of a corrupted relationship 
between humans and the other living beings on Earth. As argued in 
this book, the human takeover of the Earth’s ecological space – its 
resources, ecosystem benefits and actual spaces – that ultimately leads 
to species extinctions constitutes a genuine and non- metaphorical 
injustice; it should be discussed and responded to as a matter of justice.
The current level of species extinctions and biodiversity loss is 
not the sole environmental crisis unfolding at the beginning of the 
21st century. Most prominently, the interrelated problem of climate 
change dominates environmental discourse and media attention. 
However, climate change is only one of several issues that should 
induce a sense of urgency. Besides threatening the lives of nonhuman 
living beings, biodiversity loss is also a serious problem for humanity. 
As Rockström et al (2009, p. 472) have famously illustrated, with their 
framework grounded on the notion of ‘planetary boundaries’, what 
would constitute a ‘safe operating space for humanity’ has already 
been considerably surpassed by biodiversity loss. That makes the 
crisis terminology seem more than rhetoric. So even a reader, who 
is unconvinced by the normative arguments that are developed in 
this book, might out of self- interest and concern for fellow humans 
support the biological conservation agenda that is reinforced by 
its conclusions. What I  aim to add to the conservation discourse 
are reasons to support ambitious biological conservation agendas 
for people open to the idea that nonhuman living beings can be 
morally considerable, while at the same time upholding a strong 
commitment to global justice between humans. Even more, extensive 
conservation efforts should be considered a matter of justice. As with 
any philosophical claim of such sort, this is – of course – a conditional 
statement, based on a set of premises that need to be fulfilled as we 
will see in the following chapters.
Situated in non- anthropocentric philosophical developments, the 
theoretical aim of this book is to develop an account of justice that 
includes nonhuman living beings as holders of entitlements. In other 
words, an account of ‘ecological justice’, as termed by Nicholas Low 




called for in ecological feminist theoretical literature (Plumwood 
2002, Gaard 2017), and these terms will be used interchangeably in 
this book. Although the term ecological justice suggests that its focus 
lies on holistic systems rather than individuals, its scholarly discussions 
range from justice to individuals to justice to broader systems. The 
term interspecies justice might imply a bidirectional justice relationship, 
but it is argued in this book that it also should be seen to only focus 
on humans doing, or failing to do, justice to nonhuman beings; more 
accurately, individual nonhumans (and potentially also as groups) 
instead of attributing justice entitlements to species themselves. Even 
though the term ecological justice (sometimes referred to as ecojustice) 
has received slightly more attention than interspecies justice, the latter 
more accurately describes my relational and global understanding of 
the justice relationship between humans and nonhumans. In a nutshell, 
what is sought is an account of global distributive ecological justice 
to ‘wild’ living nonhuman beings. Thus, four interrelated themes will 
resurface throughout the chapters of this book.
The first theme is the claim that all living beings can be holders 
of justice entitlements including the broad spectrum of life such as 
sharks, pine trees, seahorses or foxgloves. That is the focus of the 
next chapter in which I illustrate why I think that all living beings are 
morally considerable, which is a position usually termed biocentrism. 
Moreover, I will explain why what I call a political non- ranking version 
of biocentrism is a good starting point for trying to develop an account 
of ecological justice. How then to move from acknowledging moral 
considerability to grounding a community of justice is the subject of 
Chapter 3. Despite that there is more to justice than distribution as 
will be discussed later, it is precisely distributive justice that will be 
focused on and, thus, constitutes the second theme. The idea is that the 
human takeover of the Earth that led to the crisis was by no means just 
and that it is foremost a particular kind of injustice towards nonhuman 
living beings; a misdistribution. In Chapter 4, I will introduce the idea 
of ecological space and explain why it is an appropriate currency of 
distribution in the context of ecological justice.
Yet, as already indicated, the focus will not be on distributive 
ecological justice as a whole but rather on a particular justice 
relationship between humans and wild nonhuman living beings due 
to aiming to analyse what just biological conservation would look like 
from this perspective. This is the third theme. In light of the extinction 
crisis this particular justice relationship is of particular interest because 
it is primarily wild nonhumans which constitute species that are 
threatened with extinction.3 In Chapter 9 non- philosophical debates 
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about this question on the so- called ‘Half- Earth proposal’ will be 
considered (Wilson 2016) to think about in more detail what a just 
sharing of habitat on a shared planet would look like. Of course, here 
also considerations of global environmental justice between humans are 
highly relevant and this brings us to the last theme: the environmental- 
ecological justice nexus. No account of ecological justice will be able 
to provide much meaningful normative guidance if it is not possible 
to easily understand its interactions with other global justice demands 
within the human realm, such as particularly in the environmental 
context the demands of environmental justice. Because of this I try 
to develop my account of ecological justice in such a manner that it 
can be put it into conversation with considerations of environmental 
justice. This will become particularly important in the context of 
which currency of distribution is appropriate (Chapter 4) and which 
theoretical premises for accounts of inter- human global justice are 
incompatible with a commitment to ecological justice. Regarding the 
latter one such instance will be focused on by explaining why accounts 
of environmental justice should not be founded on the premise that 
all humans hold a common ownership claim to the Earth (Chapter 8).
Before moving on, I  would like to stress that all the arguments 
in this book are heavily indebted to the pioneering work of other 
environmental political theorists and philosophers whose theories 
and explanations have nurtured the formation of my account, and it 
is hoped that each account has been represented fairly. Particularly 
influential works in book- length renditions have been Paul Taylor’s 
Respect for Nature (1986) in which he develops a biocentric theory of 
environmental ethics; Brian Baxter’s A Theory of Ecological Justice (2005) 
in which he develops a biocentric theory of distributive ecological 
justice; and Val Plumwood’s Environmental Culture (2002) in which she 
further develops her critical ecofeminist perspective. Their influence 
will be notable in my own account of distributive interspecies justice. 
Moreover, as already mentioned, such an account of justice cannot 
exist in isolation but has to be put into conversation with an account 
of environmental justice between humans in order to make sense of 
theoretical, and very real, material conflicts on a finite planet. The 
discussion in this book of this ecological- environmental justice nexus 
builds on a discussion that has already been started by both Low and 
Gleeson in Justice, Society and Nature (1998) and David Schlosberg in 
Defining Environmental Justice (2007).
Now, I would like to introduce the idea of ecological justice further 
by situating it in some of the relevant philosophical literature in the 
next section and then explain why I think that a justice framework, 
INTRODUCING ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE
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in general, and an account of distributive justice in particular is a 
useful theoretical lens for looking at the problem of biodiversity loss. 
The final section provides a short overview of the content of the 
following chapters.
Linking debates in environmental ethics and 
political theory
Ecological justice draws on several distinct bodies of literature while 
the concept itself is more specifically situated in the overlap between 
environmental ethics and environmental (or green) political theory, 
which are fairly independent bodies of literature. On the one hand, 
it draws from work on the notion of moral considerability that has 
been a central focus of environmental ethics. On the other hand, it 
simultaneously draws on the justice concept that is usually situated 
within political thought while also embodying a green critique of 
the most influential non- green theories of justice. Accordingly, it 
has contributed to a heightened level of conversation between these 
bodies of literature, besides being also a concept that social scientists 
are starting to adopt.
The field of Western environmental ethics started to bloom during 
the 20th century; more specifically in the 1970s, when philosophers 
started to engage with environmental problems, and claims emerged 
that these problems necessitated a new – meaning an environmental – 
ethic (Sylvan 2003 (1973)). From that point the field started to branch 
out into debates over theories of value, animal welfare or rights, 
restoration and wilderness preservation (for an overview see O’Neill, 
J.  et  al 2008, Attfield 2014). The debate on theories of value can 
be considered as the foundational issue of this body of literature, in 
which different views of the value of nature, or different justifications 
for environmental protection are grounded and then spill over into 
the other areas of debate – ecological justice included. In particular, 
meta- ethical questions were debated on the nature of intrinsic (usually 
understood as non- instrumental) and instrumental value, such as 
whether intrinsic value can exist objectively (independently of a human 
valuer), as well as more substantial questions such as the location of 
the intrinsic value – that is, what features/ attributes would generate 
such value (see O’Neill, J. 1992, 2001, Norton 2003 (1984), Rolston 
III 2003 (1994)).
Providing normative groundwork for theories of ecological justice, 
the literature on environmental ethics has generated a broad range of 
views on nature; not just in the sense of how the notion of nature 
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itself should be conceived, but primarily regarding the question of 
which entities matter morally speaking – which entities are morally 
considerable or, more broadly, have moral status – when advocating 
environmental protection. Such views range from anthropocentric or 
human- centred perspectives (for example O’Neill, J. 1993b, Hayward 
1997b, Norton 2003 (1984)) to several non- anthropocentric or 
‘physiocentric’ (Krebs 1999) perspectives that differ in respect to the 
degree to which, and what kinds of nature they take into consideration. 
What matters for the purposes of this book is that anthropocentric 
approaches do not provide the necessary normative groundwork to 
justify a theory of ecological justice which necessitates that (at least 
some) nonhuman entities are seen as morally considerable in their own 
right. Accordingly, a non- anthropocentric starting point is required. 
Broadly speaking and simplified, the different non- anthropocentric 
positions are as follows:
Sentientism extends moral consideration to (some) animals (for 
example Singer 1974, 1975, Midgley 1983, Regan 1984, Garner 1996, 
Palmer 2010). This view has been made popular by Peter Singer’s 
(1974, 1975, 2016) individualist utilitarianism, but is still defended 
by philosophers with different traditional commitments in the animal 
rights literature, and more recently by theorists extending justice to 
animals (for example Nussbaum 2006, Garner 2013). What unites all 
these different theorists is a commitment to consider (only) sentient 
beings such as humans and animals morally considerable, and thereby 
of primary concern to any environmental ethic. Singer, drawing on 
Jeremy Bentham, considers the individual ability to suffer pain as 
a necessary criterion for moral considerability, but later refines his 
argument by differentiating between conscious and self- conscious 
beings and prioritising the suffering of the latter. The animal rights 
theorist Tom Regan (1984) provides an alternative individualist 
deontological justification for sentientism by arguing that all beings 
‘subject- of- a- life’ are morally considerable, which in his account only 
includes humans and some animals with certain cognitive abilities, 
such as having beliefs and desires (such as higher mammals). Animal 
rights theorists have comparatively been very influential in arguing for 
the expansion of moral considerability beyond the human realm. So 
much so that concern for animals has reached the domain of political 
theorising (for example Nussbaum 2006, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, Grant and Jungkunz 2016). I will briefly return to the political 
element of this literature in the next chapter.
Biocentrism extends moral considerability to all living organisms (for 
example Attfield 1981, Taylor 1986, Sterba 1998, Agar 2001) and, as 
INTRODUCING ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE
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already mentioned, such views are useful starting points for developing 
a non- anthropocentric account of justice. The biocentric position 
of this book draws particularly on Paul Taylor’s work (1986) but the 
account also differs in some important respects, as will be explored in 
the two following chapters. For example, the argument in this book is 
for a political biocentrism which means that all living beings should be 
included in the community of justice; but that does not preclude other 
environmental entities from having moral status. However, arguably only 
living beings qualify as recipients of distribution. That means that the 
pluralist view of this book is more willing to accomodate some holistic 
perspectives than many biocentrists might be comfortable with. Holism 
or ecocentrism designates a range of views that hold, in addition to 
(or instead of) all living beings, ecosystems, species or the Earth itself, 
as holders of moral status and/or intrinsic value (for example Naess 
1973, Callicott 1980, 2015; Rolston III 1988, 2012). Into this category 
falls, for example, ‘deep ecology’ (as opposed to shallow) which was 
first introduced by Arne Naess (1973) (for a critique of deep ecology 
see Plumwood 2002).4 Another position that falls into this category is 
Aldo Leopold’s famous ‘land ethic’ according to which ‘[a] thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (2003 (1949), p. 46).5
The literature on expanding justice to nature is a bit younger than 
the development of the work on environmental ethics. As mentioned 
earlier, Low and Gleeson are usually attributed with coining the term 
ecological justice, which they defined as ‘the justice of the relationship 
between humans and the rest of the natural world’ (1998, p.  2). 
This means justice to nonhuman beings, which stands in contrast to 
environmental justice which is – if narrowly defined – about justly 
distributing environmental resources among humans. Whereas Low and 
Gleeson distinguished these as justice to and in nature, I deem it more 
accurate to speak of two spheres of justice in nature. It also should be 
noted that Low and Gleeson did not consider ecological justice to be 
directly concerned with questions of distribution, but rather concerned 
with ‘the meaning of the environment in a deeper sense, the sense of 
our moral relationship with the nonhuman world’ (1998, p. 133). To 
be fair, by that time environmental ethicists had already been including 
the notion of justice in their theories (as for example Taylor 1986), but 
not with the ambition of providing a political theory of justice (which 
also Low and Gleeson did not articulate).
To date, the term ecological justice has not spread far in the 
environmental philosophy literature (with some notable exceptions 
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analogous notion of interspecies justice has also been discussed 
in some (animal) ecofeminist writing (for an overview see Gaard 
2017). Yet within ecofeminism, interspecies justice – also sometimes 
discussed as ecojustice – has remained more of a perspective rather 
than having been developed into a theory of interspecies justice. Its 
most extensive philosophical discussion can be found in Plumwood’s 
work (1999, 2002). Additionally, there are works that extend 
justice to nonhumans that do not refer to either of these concepts 
(such as Sterba 2005, Armstrong 2012), and accounts that fall into 
‘animal justice’, broadly conceived (for example Nussbaum 2006, 
Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, Garner 2013; into this category falls 
also Donald VanDeVeer’s (1979) term of ‘interspecific justice’). And 
finally, more recently the broad terms of ‘planetary justice’ (Dryzek 
and Pickering 2019) or ‘multispecies justice’ (Treves et  al 2019) 
also emerged which include nonhumans in addition to present and 
future human generations.
So, conceptually, the debate about the make- up of the justice 
community is an extension of the moral considerability debate. 
Mirroring the debate about moral considerability, positions drawing 
on justice with a range of extensionist agendas have been put forward, 
ranging from sentientist (as for example Benton 1993, Nussbaum 
2006, Garner 2013), to biocentric (as for example Baxter 2005), to 
holistic perspectives (as for example, Schlosberg 2007, Armstrong 
2012, Kortetmäki 2017).6 But this theoretical development has been 
taking place against the backdrop of a longstanding anthropocentric 
paradigm of political theorising (see for example Rawls 1971, 1996, 
Nozick 1974, Walzer 1983, Barry 1995, 1999). One fundamental 
obstacle to including nonhumans into the community of justice is the 
claim that they do not embody the right attributes that trigger moral 
considerability. For example, rationality, moral agency or personhood 
have been proposed as necessary features of moral considerability which 
then are usually taken to exclude (nearly all) nonhumans as subjects of 
justice. Notably, as argued by Immanuel Kant (1997 (1784– 5), 1998 
(1785)), nonhumans – more specifically animals – are merely ‘things’, 
and hence cannot be the subject of moral duties, but such an extreme 
position has been refuted by several philosophical arguments and 
scientific discoveries about the abilities of animals.
From a philosophical perspective, one of several problems with 
such a position is that the rationality criterion does not just exclude 
nonhumans but also many humans such as infants or the severely 
disabled. Thus, not extending moral considerability to (at least) 




duties towards a large proportion of human society. This problematic 
implication is usually called the problem of marginal human cases (see 
Baxter 2005, Nussbaum 2006) and is used as an argumentative route to 
include nonhumans within the realm of morally considerable entities. 
However, the reason for needing a different argumentative strategy 
for grounding the moral considerability of nonhuman living beings is 
explained in Chapter 2.
An argument inspired by scientific discoveries is made by Marc 
Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, who show that some ‘animals have morality’ 
of some sorts in that they ‘feel empathy for each other, treat one 
another fairly, cooperate towards common goals, and help each other 
out of trouble’ (2009, p. 1). This further undermines the claim that 
only humans can be part of the moral community even if one would 
accept the claim that only moral agents would also qualify to be moral 
patients. Consequently, even supporters of the claim that it requires 
moral agency in order to be the subject of moral duties will have to 
accept that this definition might also include at least some animals, 
such as primates and elephants. However, nonhuman life has remained 
outside of philosophical descriptions of the circumstances of justice 
until recently with the emergence of ecological justice, which is an 
attempt to provide a non- anthropocentric redefinition of the notion 
of justice and the circumstances in which it applies.
In contrast to ecological justice, environmental justice has received 
considerable attention by environmental scholars from numerous 
disciplinary backgrounds, and its origins can be traced back to social 
movements in the United States during the 1980s. The initial issues 
of concern for the emerging environmental justice movement were 
the different levels of exposure to environmental risks, such as toxic 
wastes, different social groups had to bear – with poor communities 
and communities of colour suffering proportionally higher levels of 
risk (regarding this local environmental justice debate see Bullard 1993, 
Holifield et al 2010, Walker 2012).The environmental justice concept 
was soon also applied to global justice considerations, especially with 
regards to the quickly growing field of climate justice (for an overview 
see Vanderheiden 2015, Meyer, L. and Sanklecha 2017). In the global 
justice literature, there is also a distinct, but related, body of literature 
on the distribution of natural resources (see Hayward 2005, Pogge 2007, 
Wenar 2008). Even though this literature does not usually refer to the 
environmental justice concept, its primary focus of enquiry – just access 
to environmental goods – also falls under the global environmental 
justice umbrella.
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When aiming to develop a framework of ecological justice, it is as 
useful as it is necessary to keep its conceptual neighbour, environmental 
justice, in sight. As mentioned earlier, by formulating a currency of 
justice – that is, ecological space – which is applicable to accounts 
of environmental and ecological justice, it becomes possible to put 
these two domains of justice into conversation. Despite arguing that 
such a project is an important development of ecological justice 
considerations (for example Baxter 2005, Schlosberg 2007), this 
realm of conflicting duties of justice has been left fairly unelaborated 
besides, for example, arguments that attribute a priori human needs 
larger moral weight or significance than comparable nonhuman needs.7 
However, such a ranking of moral significance will be argued against in 
Chapter 2 by drawing on Plumwood’s (2002) notion of non- ranking. 
The implication is that the broadening of the community of justice 
creates a situation in which moral agents hold duties of justice towards 
other humans and nonhumans which makes it necessary to provide 
an account of how the newly created conflicts between human and 
nonhuman entitlements can be resolved more contextually.
Here an important contextual feature is scarcity of ecological space, 
which will be defined in this book as the (potential) benefits of the 
Earth’s life- support systems and physical resources such as land in 
addition to renewable and non- renewable natural resources. If accounts 
of ecological justice want to provide guidance for how to do less 
injustice to nonhuman beings, then they can only do so by engaging 
with the realities of scarcity that do not resemble the usually assumed 
conditions of moderate scarcity in (ideal) theories of distributive justice, 
where all needs could theoretically be fulfilled. Environmental crises 
such as the current mass extinction are driven by human created actual 
scarcity, and this context therefore needs to be taken into account when 
theorising about ecological and environmental justice – more on this 
in the next section. Hence, environmental and ecological justice do 
not just have to be put into conversation; they have to be put into 
conversation in the context of scarcity.
That actually- existing scarcity has not been highlighted so far in 
interspecies justice theorising is not surprising, because theorists that 
extend justice to nonhumans have gone to great lengths to affirm 
their liberal credentials (for example Baxter 2005, Nussbaum 2006). 
But as Derek Bell (2015) points out, there are several problematic 
features with how liberal theories of justice have conceptualised the 
environment.8 He makes, among others, two points that I  would 
like to highlight. First, Bell points out that liberal theories of justice 





goods, and that these ‘can be maintained indefinitely in the future’ 
(2015, p. 10). As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this is a problematic 
assumption if one takes into consideration the limited ability of the 
Earth to provide resources, ecosystem benefits and so on. Therefore, 
from this perspective, some theories of justice might be over- idealised 
in that they idealise away important features of the world we live in, 
but here I will put aside the debate on the relationship, relevance and 
different conceptualisations of ideal and non- ideal theory in political 
thought. The point is that the actual finitude and scarcity of necessary 
goods are important considerations that theories of justice should 
address. In Chapter 3 a related issue will be examined, namely that 
interspecies justice has a different relationship to scarcity than the one 
that features within intra- human accounts of justice.
The second important problematic feature of how liberal theories 
understand the environment, according to Bell, is that the environment 
is primarily conceptualised as property. As he points out, ‘a theory of 
justice on one planet [that is, environmental and ecological justice] 
should start by recognizing our dependence on the environment rather 
than assuming that we have property rights over it. […] Instead, it seems 
likely to endorse limited and carefully specified use rights’ (2015, p. 11). 
There exist some theories that attribute property rights to animals (for 
example Hadley 2015), but the issue of property rights also deserves 
more attention in the context of interspecies justice. In particular, the 
notion of original ownership that resurfaces in theories of social justice 
has problematic implications and will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Why distributive justice?
At this point, one might want to rewind and ask why it is necessary at 
all to extend the realm of justice to nonhuman beings. What is supposed 
to be gained? My own interest in justice, and particularly distributive 
justice, is based on four pragmatic reasons that I will discuss in turn:
• Justice is a sphere of ethics that is generally considered especially 
weighty in contrast to other moral demands.
• Justice is closely linked to institutional protection and thereby lends 
itself to legal implementation.
• Justice operates on a more collective sphere of action than other 
normative concepts that focus on the actions of individuals.
• Distributive justice is not the only, but arguably the most important, 
domain of a complete theory of justice with regard to the 
environment, due to the materiality of environmental problems.
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Practical usefulness
It is important not to confuse the notions of ethics and justice (Baxter 
2005, Garner 2013). Justice is a specific concept within the broader 
realm of morality because it constitutes a solution to the problems of 
living together in a society, or sharing one planet, that sits within the 
more general realm of ethics. Hence, a theory of ecological justice is 
not an all- encompassing theory of environmental ethics, but rather 
only one area that such a theory would have to cover. This means that 
many questions of interest that fall within the scope of environmental 
ethics do not fall within an ecological justice framework. Why then, 
engage with the notion of justice if it cannot provide answers to all 
issues in environmental ethics? Its benefit is that the realm of justice is 
not only narrower than the notion of ethics, but is also often considered 
to be weightier, more stringent and/ or more effective in providing 
actual protection by being enacted than other normative demands. This 
seems to be a sentiment shared by many environmental philosophers 
who engage with the notion of justice despite other considerable 
theoretical divides (such as Hayward 1997a, Baxter 2005, Garner 
2013, Pepper 2018). Consequently, it has already been argued that 
justice is especially weighty or ‘urgent’ compared to grounding the 
protection of nonhuman beings in compassion or charity (Nussbaum 
2006, Garner 2013), virtue ethics (Garner 2013) or care ethics (Low 
and Gleeson 1998, Garner 2013). For example, Martha Nussbaum 
claims that compassion ‘overlaps with the sense of justice’, but that 
‘compassion by itself is too indeterminate to capture our sense of what 
is wrong with the treatment of animals’ (2006, p.  337). The main 
tenor in favour of justice seems to be because it is considered to be 
obligatory, able to make demands on behalf of far- removed individuals, 
and able to provide universal, relatively unambiguous guidance for 
action.9 Accordingly, it makes sense that environmental philosophers 
would want to cash in on this theoretical prestige in favour of their 
non- anthropocentric theories.
A second point in its favour is its close link to institutional protection. 
For example, Robert Garner, in his A Theory of Justice for Animals 
extensively argues that animals need justice, as opposed to merely 
qualifying as members of the justice community. He claims that 
‘animals need justice because of the high status attached to it’ (2013, 
p. 2) which then, in practice, more likely justifies ‘state enforcement’ 
than alternative non- justice claims. This is because, from a practical 
perspective, he worries that those non- justice obligations can ‘collapse 





is true, then not only animals, but all of nature needs the protection 
of justice, which would entail a more far- reaching extension of 
the community of justice in order to support the development of 
complementary legal rights. Duties of justice towards nature could then 
be inscribed into national laws. Consider, for example, how Ecuador 
has inscribed the rights of Pachamama (the Andean name for Mother 
Nature or World Mother) into its constitution in 2008. In theory, this 
commits Ecuador to extensive state protection of wild nature, while in 
practice Ecuador’s economy still heavily relies on extractive industries. 
Since its implementation, several lawsuits on behalf of nature have been 
filed with mixed success (Kauffman and Martin 2017) and despite some 
setbacks, what has been called Earth Jurisprudence is becoming more 
salient (for an analysis of different cases see Kauffman and Martin 2018). 
For example, rivers such as the Ganges in India or the Whanganui 
River in New Zealand have been attributed legal rights as entities in 
their own right (Ito 2017, Tanasescu 2017).
Nonetheless, as noted by Kortetmäki (2017), non- justice moral 
claims can also potentially be – and have been – inscribed into law, 
such as building or farming regulations for example. But there is 
something special about claims of justice that other moral obligations 
do not share. This is a third and more convincing crucial benefit of 
employing the language of justice as has been concisely summarised 
by Kortetmäki. As she puts it:
[T] he discourse on justice shifts the focus from the individual 
to the institutional sphere […]. Bringing ecological entities 
into the realm of justice significantly increases prospects 
for their effective protection. Focus on the institutional 
realm is crucial […]: large- scale ecological problems cannot 
be sufficiently addressed by focusing on individual- level 
actions. (2017, p. 19)
Her statement nicely illustrates that demands of ecological justice are 
not primarily meant to provide individual guidance on actions, even 
if the justice principles make demands on individual moral agents 
in the end. Because environmental problems such as biodiversity 
loss are collective action problems, justice to – or better in – nature 
has to be done collectively (Baxter 2005). The concept of justice 
implicitly accounts for the need for collective action and thus the relevance 
of structures, institutions and practices in which individual actions 
are embedded which links back to its close relationship to state 
enforcement. That makes justice an intrinsically political concept and 
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is never, in that sense, a private matter. As a consequence, it drags the 
question of power into the limelight giving it the intrinsic potential to 
critique dominant discourses that favour the status quo. Also, within 
environmental thinking more broadly, there has been something of a 
shift from focusing on depoliticised individualised consumer choice 
to a recognition that change requires political engagement with the 
underlying systemic structure of an unsustainable way of economic and 
social organisation (see Chapter 10). Conversely, this means that justice 
is less well equipped than other moral concepts and approaches such 
as care or virtue ethics to provide answers to what constitutes right, 
good or virtuous actions on a more individual level. Thus, it is only 
a part of, rather than a full substitute for, a theory of environmental 
ethics, but ultimately, environmental ethics can profit from concepts 
that can make moral sense of large- scale collective action problems.
When considering these strengths of justice, it seems that 
environmental conservation campaigns could also benefit considerably 
from its use as a rhetorical tool. However, the notions of ecological 
and interspecies justice have not yet spread far from theoretical debates 
into the discourse of conservation practitioners or the general public; 
even though justice is a concept that is not new to social justice activists 
that have been demanding justice for women, people of colour or 
indigenous communities. If the environmental justice movement uses 
the language of justice, it is also time for conservation and animal 
rights activists (regarding the latter see also Garner 2013) to use this 
powerful rhetorical tool, because it can support a shift in the debate to 
an institutional, and collective level. This might help to more effectively 
convert moral claims into international and national laws, because the 
normative pull of claims about injustices outweighs alternative framings 
of environmental problems.10
Theoretical context
Returning to more theoretical considerations, of particular interest is 
justice in terms of distribution due to the materiality of environmental 
problems. To clarify, I do not focus on distribution because I equate 
distributive with social justice, as some other theorists have tended to 
do (see for example Dobson 1998). I merely see the articulation of a 
distributive ecological justice framework as an initial yet important step 
towards a project of defending a more complete theory of ecological 
justice. A more complete theory would have to account for other 
dimensions of justice such as recognition of status (for example by 





environmental decision- making (see Schlosberg 2007, Walker 2012 and 
Kortetmäki 2017 for multidimensional accounts of environmental and/ 
or ecological justice). Moreover, I mainly focus on intragenerational 
distributive justice (with an exception in Chapter 7), and more would 
therefore also need to be said about justice towards future nonhuman 
beings and reparation/ compensation for historical injustices.
However, not all dimensions of justice will turn out to be as 
relevant or appropriate as the distributional sphere. The dimension 
of recognition, for example, appears to be a valuable addition to 
considerations of distribution, and there are features of my theoretical 
framework that point towards this close link between these two 
domains of justice. For example, it could be claimed that it is a matter 
of justice as recognition that humanity recognises the similarities and 
differences between humans and other living beings; that the calling for 
respect for nature by some environmental ethicists (for example Taylor 
1986, Rolston III 2012) is a matter of justice; or that the exclusion 
of nonhuman beings from the realm of distributive justice constitutes 
a methodological misrecognition, and not just the naturalisation of the 
exclusion of nonhuman beings from the realm of political theory that 
will be discussed in Chapter 8. Having said that, justice as recognition 
towards nature will considerably move away from how it has been 
theorised in the human realm which will make it more difficult to 
claim that the argument centres around recognition as a matter of 
justice rather than a different kind of moral demand. In any case, 
recognition should be seen as an addition to and not a substitute for 
considerations of distribution. As Nancy Fraser has already pointed 
out regarding the human sphere, ‘[s] truggles for recognition occur in 
a world of exacerbated material inequality’ (1995, p. 166).11 When 
looking at the current condition of life on Earth it is apparent that 
vast power inequalities exist that translate into vastly unequal access 
to required material goods in the context of more and more severe 
scarcity of these important goods.
As said, not all conceptualisations of justice will turn out to be as 
relevant or appropriate as the distributional sphere. For example, I am 
sceptical about the capabilities approach as a way of framing ecological 
justice as I will elaborate in Chapter 6, despite the fact it has been 
embraced by several theorists who expand the domain of justice 
beyond the human realm (for example Nussbaum 2006, Schlosberg 
2007, Armstrong 2012, Kortetmäki 2017). Contrary to my interest in 
distribution, the academic justice discourse has actually moved away 
from focusing on distribution (since John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 
1971) towards alternative justice frameworks where distribution is either 
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less prominent or dismissed entirely (for example Nussbaum and Sen 
1993, Fraser and Honneth 2003). Nonetheless, there are also current 
counter- discourses in the social sciences and humanities that aim to 
rediscover materiality, such as feminist new materialism (see Coole and 
Frost 2010). Yet, the discursive shift away from distribution has also 
occurred in environmental theorising (see especially Schlosberg 2007). 
For example, Kortetmäki, who draws heavily upon Schlosberg’s work, 
provides an understanding of ecological justice that is fairly dismissive 
of a distributional approach. She states:
The [ecological justice] approach rejects the view that 
justice is primarily about distribution and endorses instead 
the relational view of justice as a matter of relations between 
recipients of justice, where distribution plays a role but is not 
the whole of justice. In other words, the approach involves 
a transition from a distributional to a relational paradigm 
of justice. (2017, p. 12)
It is important to note here how Kortetmäki contrasts a distributional 
with a relational understanding of justice. From my perspective, 
however, these do not embody separate paradigms. On the contrary, 
my understanding of distributive justice is inherently relational and, as 
mentioned earlier, I understand distributive justice as only one part – 
although the most important part – of a more complete framework 
of justice that also accounts for, among other things, participation 
and recognition. Distributive justice, as I understand it, only emerges 
from morally relevant relationships, each of which leads to different 
demands of justice. Because life on Earth constitutes an interrelated 
system it matters in justice terms how the human consumption of 
resources, spaces and environmental goods impacts on the ability 
of – or, in other words, disadvantages – nonhuman living beings to 
survive and flourish.12
Moreover, I do not only understand (relational) justice as pluralist 
in the sense of including considerations of distribution, recognition, 
restoration and participation (and potentially more), but also pluralist in 
that there are different, often overlapping, spheres of justice that need 
to be taken into account. Each sphere – or ‘ground’ (Risse 2012) – of 
distributive justice, for example, applies to a distinct community of 
justice and embodies a distinct set of justice principles. In order to 
determine what would be just, all- things- considered, it is necessary to 




area of concern. In the environmental realm, it is therefore important 
to take into account environmental justice and ecological justice 
considerations that apply to different but overlapping communities 
of justice that put forward different demands of justice that need to 
be reconciled.
More specifically, the ecological justice approach that is developed in 
this book could be understood as justice to wild beings or biological 
conservation justice. Complementary spheres of ecological justice 
where different principles of justice apply would be the human 
relationships with farm animals and crops, garden plants, companion 
animals, city- dwelling species and so on. Thus, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the broader realm of ecological justice that spans a 
set of different justice relationships that ground different communities 
of justice and the different instances of ecological justice that each of 
these communities embodies. For simplicity when developing my 
own position, I use interspecies and ecological justice as shorthand for 
interspecies justice to (more or less) wild nonhumans if not indicated 
otherwise. This division is similar to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s (2011) 
distinction concerning three morally relevant relationships between 
humans and animals when articulating their political theory of animal 
rights. According to them, these are (1) domesticated animals, (2) wild 
animals and (3) liminal animals such as rats and foxes which live close 
among humans without being domesticated. What justice demands 
in these other – less wild – spheres is a question that I cannot answer 
at this point, but it is important to keep in mind that not all human- 
nonhuman relationships can be covered by the same kind of distributive 
justice.13 This is not a new thought; for example justice between co- 
citizens and global justice are also considered separately because of 
the different relationships they cover. Put simply, an account of justice 
trying to address the problem of the current mass extinction will differ 
from an account that explains why factory farming methods should be 
condemned as a matter of justice. That means that different kinds of 
human- nonhuman relations – that is, along different degrees of wildness 
or domestication – have to be acknowledged with different spheres of 
justice under the broader ecological justice umbrella. Of course, what 
constitutes wildness (which should not be confused with wilderness) 
and domestication is contested and usually used imprecisely. Moreover, 
wildness, however understood, is an attribute that nonhumans can hold 
to different degrees (Palmer 2010). Hence, the wild versus domesticated 
dichotomy which I employ here is for reasons of theoretical parsimony 
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Returning to the specific question about distributive justice, Schlosberg 
criticises the distributive focus of theorising about justice regarding 
the environment (such as Dobson 1998, Baxter 2005) arguing that:
[…] given theoretical and [environmental justice] 
movement calls to extend an analysis of justice beyond the 
distributive realm, theories of environmental and ecological 
justice have been disappointing to date. For much of the 
past two decades, most authors in the field have avoided 
an examination of the interface between justice and the 
environment, focusing instead on environmental values or 
ethics. More recently, however, authors […] have begun to 
use the language of distribution to frame sustainability and 
environmental justice. Yet even these authors, dedicated 
to expanding the existing discourse of justice to future 
generations and nature, rarely stray from a distributive 
approach. (2007, p. 121)
He also maintains that ‘[…] once we begin to extend the community 
of justice beyond humans, even when we are exploring loopholes in 
existing distributional theories, we are stepping beyond distribution 
into the realms of recognition, procedural justice, and capability theory’ 
(2007, p. 126).
As I  have said, I  question whether the capabilities approach can 
move beyond the human realm, and I agree that the dimension of 
recognition, for example, is under- theorised regarding their possible 
extension beyond the human sphere. However, even distributional 
ecological justice has received very little attention from environmental 
philosophers and is in dire need of further development and defence. 
After all, the only attempt to provide a systematic theory of distributive 
ecological justice that applies beyond the realm of sentient beings is 
Baxter’s Theory of Ecological Justice (2005).
Even more importantly, I consider distributive justice to be the most 
important building block in a theory of ecological justice because 
of the materiality of environmental relations and problems, which is my 
fourth reason in favour of distributive justice. In other words, even 
though misrecognition and non- representation are also problems of 
justice beyond the human realm, the most fundamental problems that 
these domains of justice appear to point towards are human overuse 
and misdistribution of access to the Earth’s benefits, such as shrinking 
and degrading habitats, climate change and pollution. Accounts of 
distributive justice usually do not only distribute material goods such 
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as resources but also distribute non- material goods such as liberties. 
Nonetheless, because of the materiality of environmental problems, 
and because I understand environmental and ecological justice to be 
primarily about providing solutions to the question of how to share 
the Earth as a material and finite entity, I focus on the material side 
of distributive justice. To limit distributive justice in this manner is 
especially defensible if distributive justice is merely seen as one part of a 
complete theory of justice rather than exhaustive of its full magnitude.
Although distributive justice has been criticised and relegated to the 
fringes of green political theorising about justice, this development 
has been too hasty. Distributive justice can account for living beings’ 
neediness and dependence on a material world that is becoming scarcer. 
It is scarcity itself that constitutes an existential threat to life and it 
is the creation of scarcity by using, misusing, overusing, excluding 
and consuming that becomes the subject of distributive justice. This 
problem of misdistribution then finally culminates in the current 
mass extinction event as a crisis. The threat of increasing scarcity 
and its actualisation have been driving environmental discourses for 
decades (see for example the limits to growth debate [Meadows et al 
1972, 2004]). Even though liberal theories of justice and surprisingly 
also accounts of ecological justice have remained very silent on it, 
the problem of scarcity constitutes a significant problem within the 
environmental realm that justice needs to address. Because of the 
materiality of the problem, distributive justice should be considered 
the main theoretical lens with which to address this issue. Moreover, 
considerations about participation and recognition when applied to 
nonhuman organisms (with perhaps the exception of a few mammals) 
only matter to them if they translate into secured and increased access 
to material goods that ground their lives. Status, or the political 
representation of their interests do not matter in themselves when 
it comes to nonhumans; they only matter as vehicles for receiving 
appropriate treatment, and access to material goods.
Structure of the book
Each of the following chapters discusses a particular aspect of my overall 
argument according to which the current extinction crisis is indeed 
an issue of justice and that a political non- ranking biocentric account 
of distributive ecological justice to wild nonhumans can account for 
this. In Chapter 2 I start by outlining a few premises on which I will 
base my argument in favour of non- anthropocentric distributive 
justice. I  will begin by introducing biocentrism and then explain 
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why specifically I develop a political non- ranking biocentrism that is 
partially inspired by Plumwood (2002) and that rejects the provision of 
an a priori ranking of moral significance of living beings. The crucial 
point is that such a version of biocentrism opens up the conceptual 
space for making justice an important building block within a broader 
environmental ethic.
In Chapters  3 to 6, I  then develop an account of distributive 
ecological justice to wild nonhuman living beings. In Chapter 3 I begin 
with the question of how we can move from claims about moral 
considerability to claims about justice, because moral considerability is 
necessary but not sufficient to ground a community of justice. Thus, 
the question is how we can include nonhuman living beings into this 
community as holders of justice entitlements in their own right. After 
considering questions about the circumstances of justice and about 
how to conceptualise justice itself, I will claim that humans and wild 
nonhuman living beings constitute a community of justice which I call 
a community of fate.
In Chapter 4 I will introduce ecological space as a suitable currency 
of distributive justice in this context by analysing a range of different 
definitions of the concept. I will particularly draw on Tim Hayward’s 
(2005, 2006a) argument in favour of ecological space as a currency of 
justice which is part of the debate about a just global distribution of 
resources between humans. With the aim of providing a theoretically 
level playing field for demands of environmental and ecological 
justice, I propose a specific but broad definition of ecological space 
as the appropriate currency of justice for both spheres which can 
provide in this manner a common realm in which conflicting claims 
can be assessed.
Building on this discussion, Chapter 5 is dedicated to developing 
principles of distributive justice  – not only focusing on ecological 
justice but also proposing complementary principles of environmental 
justice. Particular emphasis is on how these different justice principles 
interact and change when the conventional assumption of moderate 
scarcity in justice theorising – where all needs could theoretically be 
fulfilled – is dropped. The issue of scarcity is a problem that will already 
have been introduced in Chapter 3 because it is one of the matters of 
divergence between ecological and environmental justice theorising. 
Moreover, the problem of scarcity becomes acute if one accepts, on 
the one hand, that natural resources are becoming scarcer, habitats 
are becoming more degraded and ecosystems are being put under 
increasing pressure, and if one simultaneously accepts on the other 
hand, that both demands of environmental and ecological justice have 
INTRODUCING ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE
21
to be acknowledged. By discussing how demands of justice change 
depending on different circumstances of scarcity, I will introduce a grid 
of sufficientarian justice principles that reflect different conditions of 
scarcity. In the last part of Chapter 5, I will then turn to how a duty 
to pursue sustainability is a demand of environmental and ecological 
justice, and also suggest a beneficial theoretical linkage to environmental 
virtue ethics.
Chapter 6 concludes the development of my theoretical groundwork 
by engaging with an alternative theoretical framework for grounding 
ecological justice: the capabilities approach. The capabilities approach 
has proven to be a popular theoretical framework for extending 
considerations of justice beyond the human realm, but I explicitly do 
not situate my theoretical framework in this body of work. Because of 
that I will present and discuss several challenges that cast doubt onto the 
viability of an expansionary project based on the capabilities approach. 
In the end, it will have to be considerably adapted to be able to meet 
these challenges. Yet, because of the theoretical overlap between my 
account and some extensionist versions of the capabilities approach, 
such a development should be embraced, but neither is that something 
that I will attempt myself, nor does my own account rely on the viability 
of the capabilities approach as an account of ecological justice.
In the final Chapters 7 to 10, I will look into some theoretical and 
practical implications that follow from my framework. Starting with 
theoretical questions, I begin with asking whether biodiversity loss is 
an injustice in Chapter 7. I will argue that rather than constituting 
an injustice in itself, biodiversity loss should be understood as an 
indicator for past injustices. Thus, it is the outcome of injustice 
rather than injustice itself which explains how the current extinction 
crisis embodies an injustice. Chapter 8 outlines an implication that a 
commitment to ecological justice has for theorising environmental 
justice. One necessary, but not sufficient, criterium for achieving 
compatibility between my framework of ecological justice and theories 
of social justice between humans is that theories of justice must be 
based on the premise that the Earth is originally unowned. Thus, in 
this chapter I develop a critique of the notion of humanity’s original 
ownership of the Earth that has been influential throughout the history 
of political thought.
In Chapter 9, several of the theoretical themes are brought together in 
order to engage in a more practical debate on just conservation that has 
developed around the so- called Half- Earth proposal for ‘setting aside’ 
half of the Earth for nonhumans, as recently proposed by E.O. Wilson 
(2003, 2016) and several others. A short overview of the empirical 
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debate will be provided, but of particular interest are the normative 
claims involved. Based on the framework developed in the previous 
chapters, I  will argue that the Half- Earth proposal can constitute 
a distributively just compromise between demands of ecological and 
environmental justice on the question of distribution of space in terms 
of habitat, but only if several conditions are fulfilled. Moreover, whether 
it can even constitute an all- things- considered demand of justice is, 
in turn, again dependent on a range of further considerations. In the 
end, the aim is not to have merely effective, but also just conservation 
practices. In the concluding chapter, I will bring the discussion to an 
end by tentatively looking at some implications of my framework in 
terms of how to implement and discharge duties of ecological justice, 
as for example in terms of ecological citizenship.
Notes
 1 As Jeremy Bendik- Keymer and Chris Haufe (2016) put it, industrialism rather 
than humans per se is the relevant driver here. Consequently, as will be seen, 
responsibility is also differentiated.
 2 Of course, there are opposing perspectives that deny the crisis characterisation 
(such as Thomas 2017).
 3 That also applies to many agricultural species, but I exclude this case from my 
analysis because it differs practically and conceptually along several dimensions 
from the case at hand.
 4 Teea Kortetmäki (2016) has pointed towards the similarities between the deep 
ecology and Schlosberg’s (2007) ecological justice framework. I will return to the 
latter later.
 5 Yet the classification of Leopold’s position within holism is controversial (see 
Palmer 2003).
 6 In some of these cases, a centric characterisation might not be fully accurate, but 
it is still useful to use these labels as shorthand to distinguish how inclusive these 
different theoretical perspectives are.
 7 Recently John Dryzek and Jonathan Pickering noted that we still ‘lack an 
overarching term and common framework to encompass both environmental 
and ecological justice, despite the fact that the two are closely intertwined’ (2019, 
p. 67).
 8 This links to the question of whether liberalism that aims for an overlapping 
consensus and impartiality regarding different conceptions of the good is compatible 
with environmentalism in general and a theory of ecological justice in particular 
(see Dobson 1998, Schlosberg 2007). I will put this particular debate aside for now.
 9 I take universal to mean here global and to a degree generalisable, not context- 
independent and encompassing the full ethical domain.
 10 The idea behind this claim is that writers about rhetoric usually distinguish between 
several distinct rhetorical appeals (see Meyer, M. 2017). Put crudely, in the context 
of conservation campaigns the focus lies especially on appealing to social values 
and individuals’ empathy in order to generate support for action based on scientific 













might have diminishing returns of rhetorical impact, the socially shared sense of 
justice – or rather injustice – might be additionally employed by conservationists 
if they enjoy credibility, as organisations, and regarding their scientific claims.
 11 Schlosberg’s (2007) account is probably the most well- known example of trying to 
include nonhuman entities into the realm of recognition justice. He discusses the 
recognising of similarities between humans and nature, the recognition of integrity 
in the sense of recognising ‘nature’s “bodily integrity” ’ (2007, p. 136), and status 
injuries drawing on Fraser’s understanding of recognition justice as focusing on 
social status – in contrast to Axel Honneth’s more psychology- based account of 
recognition, which is as Schlosberg points out, less suited to be extended beyond 
the human realm (for a comparison between the two accounts see Fraser and 
Honneth 2003). However, for a critique of Schlosberg’s interpretation of Fraser’s 
account of recognition see Angie Pepper (2018).
 12 Related to this is the debate between luck and relational egalitarianism. See for 
details on their disagreement Elizabeth Anderson (2010) and Takashi Kibe (2011). 
Note that the adjective relational used in the context of justice differs from theorist 
to theorist. For example, Kortetmäki (2017) differentiates between a distributive 
and a relational paradigm. Thereby, she groups luck egalitarianism and Rawls’ 
difference principle both into the distributive category and understands relational 
justice as being ‘concerned with the social and political relations (and their equality) 
between recipients of justice’ (p. 23). Anderson (2010), in contrast, distinguishes 
between luck egalitarians and relational egalitarians and assigns John Rawls to the 
latter category.
 13 There are several reasons that suggest that justice towards domesticated animals is of 
a different character than towards wild nonhumans (see Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011). To a degree, this is linked to the more general claim that the distinction 
between wild and domesticated is morally relevant (see Palmer 2010, 2012a) and 
that it is appropriate to assume that still a lot of nonhumans are wild in the relevant 
senses (Palmer 2010).
 14 My relational perspective shares similarities (but also differs in several respects 
from) works in animal ethics that highlight the importance of relations (such as 
Palmer 2010, Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011) which is an aspect that deserves 








Political Non- Ranking 
Biocentrism
One of the central questions of environmental philosophy is the puzzle 
about which account of moral considerability of an entity, system, 
process, object or the like is the least likely to be based on anthropocentric 
and/ or anthropomorphic reasoning while still resulting from a human 
perspective. For my specific purpose of developing an account of 
ecological justice, political non- ranking biocentrism is what I consider to be 
the most defensible account of such sort in the context of justice. For 
this, the political constitutes a qualification and non- ranking is a 
specification of the biocentric focus. Granted this will be a very quick 
run- through leaving many open questions. Even though the intention 
is to provide an account of justice, it is the revisionist nature of any such 
attempt to move away from highly anthropocentric but influential shared 
premises in political theorising that necessitates this outline. Usually such 
premises remain tacit within accounts of justice, but I need to highlight 
at least some pragmatic, normative, ontological and epistemological 
premises on which a theoretical framework can be built.
I will focus on three central issues at hand. In the first section I will 
explain what I mean by a political approach to biocentrism, and then 
turn to how I  understand biocentrism more generally in section 
two. More specifically, this latter section will entail an overview of 
my understanding of life and the moral considerability that comes 
with it. Again, this is by no means a defence or full description of 
biocentrism, but the elaboration on a few grounding premises. Then in 
section three I will explain why a non- ranking version of biocentrism 
that does not construct a hierarchy of moral significance is the most 
convincing account of such sort and discuss in the final section what 
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Political biocentrism
In contrast to more holistic accounts, my primary unit of analysis 
are individual living beings. Yet, I am not claiming that a complete 
consistent account of an environmental ethic should be individualistic 
because I see a biocentric account of justice situated within a pluralist 
environmental ethic. My target is instead a political biocentrism that 
can ground an account of justice.1 As discussed previously, justice is 
a specific concept within the realm of a broader ethical theory. What 
I am aiming at is one of the branches of an environmental ethic that 
has not received a lot of consideration so far but has been moving 
more and more into the centre of attention due to the politicisation 
of nature – not merely as being an object, a resource, for political 
discussion but as an intrinsic part of central political concepts such as 
justice. The issue is about balancing the different ways of how justice 
has been conceptualised throughout political thought and aiming for a 
non- anthropocentric reinterpretation of the concept. For this purpose, 
some conceptual gymnastics are necessary, but with the aim to avoid 
any conceptual overstretching.
That means that some central features of how justice is understood 
have to be maintained, such as its implicit individualism with respect 
to recipients of justice, in order to make sure that what we are aiming 
at here is a reinterpretation and not merely an empty conceptual shell 
filled with new meaning. Of course, there is a broad range of different 
definitions and conceptualisations of justice, and it is not the aim of 
this book to provide an overview of its rich history, nor an account 
of ecological justice that is compatible with all plausible meanings 
of justice. Setting aside metaphysical debates about individualism in 
general, and in particular within the different political traditions such as 
liberalism, most influential theories of justice start with the normative 
relevance of the individual and reflect on the claims, entitlements or 
liberties of these individuals. That is not accidental, if one agrees with 
David Miller’s assessment that the often cited sixth- century East- 
Roman definition of justice as found in the Institutes of Justinian as 
‘the constant and perpetual will to render to each his due’ (cited in 
Miller 2017) might constitute a good (or even the best) candidate for 
getting close to the central meaning of justice. This definition clearly 
highlights the importance of the individual within how justice is usually 
understood in terms of giving each individual (usually understood as 
a person) its due (see also Schmidtz 2006).
For me that has three implications worth mentioning at this point 





ecological justice, as I conceptualise it, is a way to normatively assess 
specific relationships between humans and different morally considerable 
entities – entities that can have a wellbeing. As we will see, in this 
context it matters that an entity has a wellbeing and not a particular 
kind of wellbeing. This is where my non- ranking account of moral 
significance will come in which does not preclude the possibility or 
necessity of contextual and relational prioritisation of different entities. 
As we will also see, the scope of wellbeing is, of course, contested as 
well, but this has only peripheral importance for my argument here. 
Important for now is that this relational perspective on justice (as 
elaborated in the previous chapter) focuses on the relationships between 
individuals that ground communities of justice. Thus, individual beings 
matter in themselves but the relationships between entities that matter 
are as crucial a factor to explain demands of justice.
Secondly, this implies that justice, by definition in this context, is 
concerned with wellbeing – broadly conceived. It is a way of negotiating 
individuals’ flourishing (and related interests and needs) in a world where 
these collide and conflict. That limits justice to entities that are alive 
in a morally relevant sense as we will see. Ecosystems, on the contrary, 
rather constitute valuable relationships in themselves (for a somewhat 
similar but also in many ways distinct view on ecosystems see Muraca 
2011). One might reasonably want to attach some kind of value (and/ 
or even some kind of moral status) to such a particular kind of system, 
but the sphere of justice is such a specific area of normative enquiry 
that – at least in my account – it does not allow for ecosystems to be 
owed direct inclusion. Thus, the claim is not that individual living beings 
fully exhaust the realm of moral status (which they might or might not), 
but that they are the kind of morally considerable entities that can be 
part of relationships which can be made sense of in terms of justice.
Thirdly, in terms of distributive justice entities such as ecosystems 
also are analytically difficult to conceive as recipients of distribution 
where goods are distributed to (spatially and to some degree temporally) 
discrete entities. As we will see in the last section, this provides a reason 
for denying ecosystems the status of recipients of justice, even if they 
turn out to be alive in the morally relevant sense. Having said that, 
there are good reasons to attach moral values to nonindividual systems 
such as ecosystems or concepts such as biodiversity, but I am claiming 
that an account of justice part of this broader ethic should be (and 
has to be) individualistic – biocentric individualistic. This biocentric 
account of justice is in turn situated within a pluralist environmental 
ethic. In that sense, justice can shed light on an individualistic element 
within a broader environmental ethic that can appreciate a diverse set of 
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moral status and value. That means that political biocentrism is limited 
to the realm of justice including its entitlements and duties and does 
not constitute a broader environmental ethic which would constitute 
a more ambitious project for which biocentrism might not be able to 
provide the necessary grounding theory. Accordingly, the biocentrism 
that I describe does not claim to exhaust all that is of moral relevance, 
only what is of relevance in terms of justice.
To readers that come from animal rights or welfare backgrounds, 
my approach here will have some similarities (and differences) to a 
related body of literature that has been termed the ‘political turn’ of 
animal ethics or animal rights (for an influential overview see Milligan 
2015). For now, I will highlight two of several interesting features of 
this body of work but I will return to the issue of relationality that also 
plays a role in this literature. Very generally speaking and simplified, 
central to the theoretical accounts that are part of this political turn is 
that political philosophical concepts such as justice, property rights, 
sovereignty or citizenship are introduced into the realm of animal ethics 
(prominent contributions are, among others, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, Garner 2013, Hadley 2015). More specifically, a focus on justice 
is the primary feature shared by these works (Cochrane et al 2018). 
Similarly, I aim to contribute to a wider political turn that is developing 
in the environmental ethics literature more broadly under the heading 
of ecological justice. The focus here has been nearly exclusively on 
justice and I aim to expand on these theoretical efforts (here prominent 
examples are Baxter 2005, Schlosberg 2007).
Moreover, these new works in animal ethics tend to share a 
certain political pragmatism – aiming for real world relevance with 
their suggestions to improve the political standing of animals and 
consequently to improve their treatment by including them within 
such already valued concepts. As I tried to illustrate in the previous 
chapter, the promise of an account of justice that includes living beings 
is that it might be of political rhetorical power for people that want 
to defend their wellbeing. There is also a fairly broad consensus in 
political theorising on considering justice to be a particularly weighty 
moral demand. This philosophical status as well as its intelligibility in 
the language of social movements and policymaking should be utilised. 
Thus, similarly to the political turn in animal ethics, also environmental 
ethicists with biocentric and/ or holistic commitments should aim to 
move into the realm of the political because the treatment of nonhuman 
living beings goes beyond individual encounters but matters in, and is 
contingent on, collective and institutional decision- making.
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Life and moral considerability
Simply put, biocentric positions of different varieties share the 
assumption that living beings are morally considerable. Moreover, 
many of these will be able to agree, as do I, that every being that 
has a life also has a good (Von Wright 1963 (1993)), and to live in 
accordance with this good appears intuitively to be some kind of full 
way of living which constitutes flourishing. Because of that it makes 
sense to consider whether a state of affairs is good or bad for a living 
organism because it is possible to harm or benefit this entity. Yet, this 
view carries already a lot of implicit baggage about what considerations 
should be at the centre of ethical enquiry and about the nature of the 
world around us. This is problematic insofar as this perspective is not 
widely shared and, thus, will need some elaboration. Two questions 
suggest themselves. Firstly, how should life be defined; and secondly, 
how is this definition morally relevant?
A central problem already arises from the fact that the debate 
on how to define life has not reached any consensus, and it seems 
problematic to claim that an entity matters morally if we are not able 
to come to an agreement about the actual entity in question that 
is supposed to be morally considerable. Even more problematically, 
as Edouard Machery (2012) has illustrated, it is futile to wait for a 
single accepted definition of life. On the one hand, he argues that 
trying to develop a definition of life based on its folk concept is not 
compatible with the nature of folk concepts themselves which do 
not constitute definitions. On the other hand, he argues that there 
are good reasons to believe that also no unified accepted scientific 
definition will be reached, due to the fact that different disciplines 
concerned with the definition of life – for example astrobiology, 
synthetic biology or artificial life – have an interest in explaining 
different phenomena. Thus, the question is how severe this epistemic 
problem is for moral theorising. Arguably not very. As Nicholas Agar 
has rightly noted:
it is a mistake to aim at an all- purpose definition of life, as 
there is no reason to expect any single modern account can 
fulfil all of the theoretical interests that arise in connection 
with life. […] Each different plausible naturalization of life 
should build upon an important strand taken from common 
sense so as to establish clear links to central notions within 
a target area. (2001, p.88)
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In the end, as Agar puts it, ‘[i] f an area within the biological sciences 
can have a concept of life finetuned to suit its needs, then why shouldn’t 
ethical theory?’ (2001, p. 89). In other words, depending on the field 
of enquiry different entities might be considered alive, but this diversity 
should not worry us too much because each discipline is looking at 
the concept of life from a different angle and with different aims. 
Moreover, there is still a large amount of convergence on which entities 
count as being alive with disagreement focusing rather on marginal 
cases (such as viruses, products from synthetic biology and so on). 
That it is a malleable concept that consistently escapes attempts to be 
definitionally pinned down does not imply that the conceptual space 
it inhabits is vacant. In the end, conceptual sharpness does not seem 
to be a necessary condition for moral relevance (see also Sterba 1998).
To reiterate, biocentrism, or more precisely biocentric individualism, 
is the position within environmental ethics that has focused on 
individual living beings as loci of moral considerability (for example 
Schweitzer 1923, Goodpaster 1978, Agar 1997, 2001, Sterba 1998, 
2011, Kallhoff 2014, Donoso 2017). Different versions of this 
perspective either implicitly assume a certain understanding of life or 
explicitly defend what constitutes a living being with an immediate 
interest in showing that such an entity is morally considerable. As 
already mentioned, several scholars have supported some version of 
the claim that every being that is alive also has a good (such as Attfield 
1981, 1995, Taylor 1986, Varner 1998, Rolston III 2012). In Holmes 
Rolston III’s words, ‘[e] very organism has a good- of- its- kind’ (2012, 
p. 97, emphasis in original). Similarly, Paul Taylor states that ‘[t]he 
biocentric outlook on nature […] includes a certain way of perceiving 
and understanding each individual organism. Each is seen to be a 
teleological (goal- oriented) centre of life, pursuing its own good in its 
own unique way’ (Taylor 1986, pp. 44– 5). Taylor’s influential account 
describes living beings as centres of life goal- oriented towards their own 
good. From this point of view, life is then a concept that describes the 
goal- directedness of an entity to strive for its own wellbeing, whatever 
that may be. It situates the teleological feature in the living being itself 
and not in the abstract notion of life which means that it does not 
rely, for example, on the claim that nature itself has a telos. On the 
other hand, this is also not a description of some obscure life- force 
that resides in the living being (in the sense of vitalism) but rather a 
normative description of what actual living beings appear to do based 
on a specific scientific account of life as will be discussed later (for an 
overview of different conceptions of life see Agar 2001, Deplazes- Zemp 
and Biller- Andorno 2012).
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What suffices for the purposes of this book is a very broad definition 
of life as a classificatory description which is open for revisions and 
additions. A philosophical concept of life is needed that converges with 
but is also distinct from folk or scientific concepts. Being distinct is 
important to create the possibility to challenge intuitions based on the 
folk concept as well as to challenge implications of scientific definitions 
which might both be morally problematic due to, for example, 
anthropocentrically coloured ideological biases. Conversely, that also 
allows the normative concept to be challenged – and improved – in 
turn. Moreover, a moral philosophical understanding of life needs 
to inspire a moral response by triangulating the concept of interest 
with a range of ‘morally interesting’  – as Agar (2001) would put 
it – descriptions.
First of all, because I am interested in individual living organisms 
these need to be attributed some loose sense of distinctness as 
individual entities. Thus, organisational accounts of life that highlight 
independence in terms of self- organisation are for this purpose a good 
start such as provided by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s 
(1980) influential autopoiesis theory. Generally speaking, all living beings 
are open systems that interact with their environment by exchanging 
energy and matter. What makes them a particular type of open system is 
that living organisms are ‘self- maintaining and self- producing systems’, 
as Maturana and Varela put it. This self- maintenance view is again then 
compatible with Taylor’s philosophical view of living beings as goal- 
oriented centres of life, where self- maintenance is given a normative 
twist by highlighting that such self- maintenance is neither fully random 
nor fully externally driven but directed towards an internal good – a 
process that can be aided or frustrated.
The important normative distinction between living and non- living 
systems is that something  – that is, an object, system or chemical 
process  – that is not alive cannot be harmed or benefited in any 
meaningful way. Of course, non- living entities can be damaged, but that 
should be distinguished from the possibility of harming such entities. 
It is important here to distinguish between living entities  – living 
in the morally relevant sense – and other objects or systems that are 
colloquially also described in similar terms and sometimes treated in 
similar ways. For example, a campfire is in essence a chemical process 
that is made visible by its flames. Linguistically this fire is treated like a 
living entity by being nourished with wood and ‘kept’ alive. The fire 
‘needs’ the fuel and has the ability to ‘grow’ and ‘die’. Yet, despite this 
being a very visible chemical process, such a process in itself does not 
necessarily constitute a living system – a system that has a ‘telos’, in 
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Taylor’s terminology. The important point is that living beings are more 
than just chemical processes or machines (a point heavily discussed in 
the ethics of synthetic biology, see for example Deplazes- Zemp 2012). 
Even though machines – as paradigmatic non- living systems – can have 
a goal – or rather a function – the relevant difference is that machines 
do not have wellbeing that is intrinsic to themselves (for example in 
terms of an intrinsic account of teleology, see Holm 2017); their goal 
can only be instrumental to the wellbeing of some other living entity. 
There is a distinction between ‘other- directed’ and ‘self- directed’ goals, 
and only the latter actually refer to the entity’s own good (Agar 1997, 
2001).2 Taylor (1986) made a similar point claiming that ‘[o] ne way 
to know whether something belongs to the class of entities that have 
a good is to see whether it makes sense to speak of what is good or 
bad for the thing in question […] without reference to any other entity 
[…]’ (1986, p. 61, emphasis in original). He is right in asserting that 
the machines in question do not belong into this category (see also 
Attfield 1995).3
Resuming the discussion about the good, I would like to reiterate 
my initial point that every being that has a life also has a good (Von 
Wright 1963 (1993)), and to live in accordance with this good appears 
intuitively to be some kind of full way of living which constitutes 
flourishing. Thus, flourishing embodies the idea of the good life which 
makes the ability to flourish central to understand what constitutes 
a living being. In the end, the idea of a good held by living beings is 
one way of showing that it makes sense to speak of the wellbeing of 
a living entity in contrast to any inanimate object which has none. 
It is precisely this close connection between life and wellbeing that 
provides the concept of life with the moral force it is often intuitively 
ascribed (Von Wright 1963 (1993)), and consequently life comes with 
a vulnerability to harm. Based on this link it can be distinguished 
whether an organism is merely living, or living well, and this allows 
us to think of its flourishing as a way of describing the good life of 
each individual organism. An implicit premise for this point is that 
the wellbeing in question is of normative relevance, but the burden of 
proof about this matter lies with less inclusive positions.
In the nonhuman case, pinning down what constitutes the good of 
each being is not an easy task, but by setting aside issues such as culture 
which will become more relevant in the human context (Chapter 5) the 
focus lies with nonhuman beings in many cases on the kind of being 
it is – that is, its species.4 Accordingly, it might be easier to tentatively 
generalise what the good of a being is in the nonhuman case and 






for the members of a certain species (Fulfer 2013). For example, with 
regards to (vascular) plants, Angela Kallhoff has listed three conditions 
for plant flourishing which together constitute a description of the 
good life for plants. These are: the ability to react ‘to external stress 
without endangering the overall performance which sustains its life’; 
the ability to accomplish its life- cycle; and succeeding ‘in expressing 
the typical characteristics both of a plant which has specific life- form 
and of more specific organisms, generally fitting its species description’ 
(2014, p. 687). In practice, it might then be necessary to construct 
similar lists of criteria for flourishing for most kinds of living beings. In 
any case, a being flourishes when it lives fully by living in accordance 
with its own good; what kind of good it has depends partly on what 
kind of being it is. Flourishing in this sense has no psychological 
connotations, but rather evokes the metaphor of the flourishing tree 
that grows towards the sun.5 That species membership does not tell 
the full story is something that will become apparent when examining 
what would constitute an interest or need of an individual living being.
For our purposes it seems warranted to keep it an open question 
which entities are alive in any meaningful way and concentrate on the 
instances where we are on epistemically and intuitively firm ground, 
in particular because this question has only peripheral relevance to 
my project of developing an non- anthropocentric account of justice 
as I will explain. Because all living beings – that is, that are living in a 
normatively relevant sense – can be harmed by impeding their striving 
for flourishing, it follows what Kenneth Goodpaster famously claimed 
that ‘[n] othing short of the condition of being alive seems to me to be 
a plausible and nonarbitrary criterion’ for being morally considerable 
(1978, p. 310, emphasis in original). Life in this sense links, by design, 
innately to normatively relevant concepts such as needs and interests 
and making it appropriate to use terms like harming or benefiting in 
this context (see Taylor 1986). Accordingly, the grounding premise 
for what follows is a moral definition of life according to which X is 
alive if it can be harmed or benefited in a way that refers to X’s own 
good. Accordingly, a machine or a mountain are not alive in this sense, 
but also body parts such as livers are excluded. On the other hand, a 
long list of entities is included ranging from bacteria to giant redwood 
trees. The link between life and moral considerability then follows if 
concepts central to morality such as needs and interests are applicable to 
this entity. Many of the biocentric accounts developed so far argue that 
the necessary link between life and moral considerability is provided 
by the concept of interests which are widely regarded to carry moral 
importance. Thus, a few words on the topic of interests and needs are 
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in order because both are contested concepts concerning their shape, 
content and how they can be identified.
Needs and interests
When it comes to interests, examples such as a bee defending its 
hive (for example Agar 2001) are frequently found in the biocentric 
literature to showcase one of the difficulties of identifying what 
constitutes an interest. Similar to other animals that built their homes, 
some bee species build hives in which they live as colonies for the sake 
of storing food and rearing their young. For the purpose of successful 
cooperation there is a clear division of labour inside of the hive. For 
example, worker bees have several tasks, such as defending the hive, 
which can have dire consequences. In the case of honey bees, for 
example, the worker bees can sting an intruder as a means of defence. 
While they can survive stinging a wasp, for example, they cannot 
survive stinging a mammal. Its stinger gets caught in the skin and the 
bee ends up badly injured and dies shortly thereafter. Cases like this 
one illustrate a central problem when trying to make sense of interests 
because the bee does not act solely in its own interests in the sense of 
pursuing its own flourishing, but also according to interests inscribed 
into its genetic make- up that might benefit the species or colony overall 
but not this particular individual, if it makes prima facie sense to call 
both instances an interest.
In their colloquial use, interests are usually connected to the 
existence of certain mental capacities (that is, linked to desires). 
That puts biocentrists that are concerned with interests into 
the uncomfortable position of justifying why it is possible to 
plausibly disconnect the concept from this widely shared sentientist 
connotation. Taylor (1986), for example, did associate interests with 
conscious aims and therefore did not think that having interests 
would constitute a necessary condition for having a good. Thus, the 
bee in this example would not constitute a holder of interests in his 
account. Yet, he argues that something ‘being in an entity’s interest’ 
(p. 63, emphasis added) would be enough to consider whether it 
would be beneficial for a being’s wellbeing as in the bee example. 
I will not say much about this question here, but the literature on 
ethical biocentrism is rich enough to provide a range of plausible 
conceptions of interests such as, for example, a differentiation between 
basic and non- basic interests (Taylor 1986, Baxter 2005) in order to 
be able to differentiate between the importance of different interests 




The bee problem also highlights that it might become appropriate 
to distinguish between relevant interests and non- relevant interests 
in this context. Relevant interests, specifically, can ground moral 
considerability – in that they refer to an entity’s wellbeing – which 
does not apply to every kind of interest that can be identified and, 
consequently, non- relevant interests do not refer to the flourishing of 
the individual itself (Donoso 2017). In the bee example, on the first 
view, the defence of the hive via the individual’s self- sacrifice does not 
appear to constitute a case of relevant interests in that sense, but it could 
constitute such an interest if it could be shown that the continuation 
of this specific bee population is relevant to the individual bee’s own 
internal good.6 That also demonstrates that the species good or, better, 
the good of the colony and typical good life of an individual of such a 
species can come apart. Of course, this means that our initial problem 
just resurfaces about how we can non- arbitrarily describe an individual’s 
own good and its self- directed goals in order to identify the related 
relevant interests. For this purpose, a range of explanatory accounts 
of interests and wellbeing have been proposed such as accounts of 
historically evolved (that is, etiological) biological functions that have 
been used to explain interests (such as Varner 1998) and alternative 
non- etiological accounts of teleology to explain wellbeing (such as 
Holm 2017). Based on what was said earlier about autopoiesis, it is 
clear that I prefer organisational- based accounts, but there might also 
be theoretical space for alternatives (see for a critique of etiological 
accounts McShane 2019). Yet, both interrelated questions, of interest 
and wellbeing (and specifically wellbeing’s relationship to teleological 
organisation), are still a matter of debate and in need of more satisfactory 
arguments for limiting wellbeing to the realm of living beings (for 
discussions of this problem see Holm 2017, Basl 2019, McShane 2019).7
Moreover, despite that having interests constitutes a sufficient 
condition for moral considerability, it does not appear to be a necessary 
condition because also the morally loaded concept of needs can bridge 
the gap between wellbeing and moral considerability. Needs are 
conceptually very closely linked to wellbeing and harm and describe 
the parameters that would enable an entity’s flourishing. As Elizabeth 
Anscombe has claimed regarding an organism that ‘[t] o say that it 
needs that environment is not to say, e.g., that you want it to have that 
environment, but that it won’t flourish unless it has it’ (1958, p. 7).8 
Despite that interests and needs come often in tandem (that is, the 
argument goes, that where there is a need there is also an interest to fulfil 
it, but not necessarily vice versa), an emphasis on needs shifts the focus 
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capacities or the mind itself (compare Agar’s (2001) representational 
account of life or Val Plumwood’s (2003 (1993)) account of weak 
panpsychism). This is also why Alfonso Donoso (2017) argues that, 
in the end, relevant interests should be understood as interests in 
the satisfaction of essential needs and functions. Putting interests 
aside for one moment and focusing on needs highlights also another 
aspect of flourishing – the vulnerability of living beings – and, thus, 
provides another close connection between moral considerability and 
a teleological account of life.9 It seems that the recognition of a need 
on its own seems enough to warrant an appropriate moral response 
without having to evoke any reference to interests.
Returning to the bee example, it seems less plausible to consider 
the bee’s interest to defend its hive despite imminent death (which is 
based on a backwards- looking account of biological function in order 
to explain the interest which I reject) as fulfilling a need in Anscombe’s 
sense because the fulfilment of this function is not something that moves 
this individual living being any closer to flourishing, and neither does 
the frustration of this particular function seem to negatively impact the 
bee’s wellbeing. On the contrary, it shows that the fulfilment of certain 
functions can rather be obstructive to flourishing. If the beehive in this 
example would have never been attacked, we would not think that 
the bee in question would have lost the possibility to fulfil its need for 
‘heroism’ despite having a biological function to do so. Note that I am 
not claiming here that the existence of such functions does not serve 
a purpose, for example in terms of benefiting a population or species. 
As such these functions are not void of instrumental value, but they do 
not seem to be part of the explanation of why the wellbeing of living 
being implies moral considerability as entities as ends in themselves.10 
But it should be noted that this also relies on having already settled 
what constitutes the wellbeing of the bee. A living being might not 
consistently act upon what one would expect to constitute its own 
flourishing, but in general it tends to strive towards that goal. This 
striving is attached to certain needs which can be frustrated. Thus, based 
on such an account of life, it is the needs of a living being that highlight 
its vulnerability which connects its welfare most straightforwardly with 
normatively relevant harm. Most living beings will never flourish, but it 
is the striving for this goal that prompts for being morally considered.11
Non- ranking biocentrism
Provided that this rough sketch of biocentrism is plausible, a few 







on the issue of distributive justice. The first set of premises concerns 
the variety of different arguments that can be made in support of 
biocentrism. As alluded to previously, there appear to be good grounds 
for favouring a non- ranking version of biocentrism which results from 
(1) my commitment to a non- extensionist argumentative strategy and 
(2) the need to balance the emphasis on similarities and differences in 
nature in any biocentric account. I will be drawing here heavily on 
Val Plumwood’s version of critical ecofeminism and will discuss each 
of these points in turn.12
Extensionism
Behind what has been said so far in this book lurks the biocentric 
intuition that is shared by many other theorists: that drawing the line 
of moral considerability between sentient and non- sentient beings is 
too restrictive and therefore morally problematic. Thus, as a matter 
of consistency all living beings have to be included into the realm of 
moral considerability which is necessary but not sufficient to include them 
into the realm of justice. By no means is it my aim to fully exhaust the 
possibilities of all entities that could plausibly hold moral status, but 
it is the nature of justice itself that necessitates drawing the boundary 
around entities that could be considered members of a community of 
justice which generates the need for a political biocentrism. In other 
words, my understanding of interspecies justice is based on the claims 
that (1) moral considerability should include all living beings and that 
(2) in the context of justice this extension needs to be also limited to 
individual living beings.
Despite the need to limit the scope that a specific concept such 
as justice can cover, I  would like to stress that there are different 
strategies for delineating this realm. My rationale for opting for a life- 
centred ethical starting point is not grounded in an extensionist (or 
assimilationist) perspective that fully relies on seeing similarities between 
humans (that are assumed to matter by virtue of having certain morally 
relevant features) and nonhumans, and thereby extends mattering to 
nonhumans as well. That would constitute a ‘hegemonic’ argument 
that does not break out of an anthropocentric logic (Plumwood 
1998b, 2002).13 Plumwood identifies as the central problem here the 
implicit human/ nature dualism that is part of an extensionist argument 
grounding moral considerability. It is important that such a problematic 
dualism has to be differentiated from a less problematic distinction or 
dichotomy, because a dualism contains characteristics that resulted 





ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE AND THE EXTINCTION CRISIS
on existing patterns of difference, rendering these in ways which 
ground hierarchy’ (1993, p. 447). Thus, dualisms can be characterised 
as involving:
• backgrounding: the denial of dependency via treating the other as 
background to the master’s foreground;
• hyperseparation:  the emphasis of differences and the denial or 
downplaying of shared characteristics;
• relational definition: the other defined as a ‘negative’ in relation to 
the master;
• objectification: denial of the others’ own ends as something that 
needs to be taken into account;
• stereotyping: downplaying of differences between the inferior.
(all points from Plumwood 1993, also elaborated in Plumwood 
2002, Chapter 5, drawing on a range of feminist and  
postcolonial scholars)
The normative problem generated by a dualism becomes especially 
apparent when taking into account the implications that follow from 
objectification. As Plumwood states:
[i] n the typical case this involves setting up a moral 
dualism, where the underside is not part of the sphere to 
be considered morally, but is either judged by a separate 
instrumental standard (as in the sexual double standard) or 
is seen as outside morality altogether, part of the realm of 
the “natural and expedient”, of usefulness to the centre. 
(1993, p. 451)
The human/ nature dualism as an exemplary case for moral separation 
constitutes a particular stumbling block for my aims here. An account 
of justice written from a master’s perspective and retaining hegemonic 
argumentation patterns appears quite odd indeed. It could hardly 
constitute a useful account for envisioning a just world, if some basic 
requirements in terms of methodological recognition would already 
be violated by the grounding premises of our account of justice. 
Plumwood herself does not use this specific language of methodological 
recognition, but that seems to be her primary description of doing 
justice to nonhumans (see Plumwood 1999, 2002). That is one of 
the ways in which our understandings of justice diverge, but indeed, 
an account of distributive justice cannot rest on methodological and 
normative assumptions that are problematic in terms of constituting 
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a misrecognition. An extensionist argument falls into such a trap by 
looking only for similarities and working its way out from a centre 
of mattering.
This rejection of an extensionist argument generates the need to 
look anew at biocentrism, despite that others have already covered a 
lot of ground to develop a biocentric ethic (notably Agar 2001) or 
theory of justice (notably Baxter 2005) by employing some version 
of such an argumentative strategy. Because such a strategy more easily 
links commonly held normative intuitions to biocentric conclusions, 
it is a promising approach. Yet, following Plumwood, I aim to build 
my account of justice on a non- dominating starting point which 
necessitates the rejection of an extensionist argumentative strategy as 
much as possible and in consequence the adoption of a non- ranking 
account of moral significance.
Before turning to such a non- ranking perspective, I would like to 
say a few words on the debate that Plumwood’s critique of moral 
extensionism has attracted.14 Crucial is that I do not agree with John 
Andrews’ (1996) charge that Plumwood’s account falls itself into a 
morally extensionist logic (see for a reply Plumwood 1998b). A detailed 
analysis of this concern would take us too far, but as Christian Diehm 
(2010) has argued convincingly regarding one of the main lines of 
critique, Plumwood’s emphasis on continuity – that is, similarities – 
between humans and nature does not constitute an extensionist 
argument but is rather important to deconstruct the dualism in the first 
place. My point is that a balance between appreciation of similarities and 
otherness (in the sense of difference) will leave us with a non- ranking 
biocentric account. The life- focus is a reflection of the appropriate 
appreciation of similarities (compare Plumwood [1998b, p. 409] who 
displays a more ecocentric perspective that goes beyond the scope of 
my definition of wellbeing). The non- ranking specification, on the 
other hand, is a way to appropriately appreciate difference or otherness 
in nature.
Non- ranking moral significance
An important distinction in the context of biocentrism is the distinction 
between moral significance – that is, moral weight or moral worth – 
and moral considerability (Goodpaster 1978). This distinction explains 
why some (non- egalitarian) biocentric theories accord equal moral 
considerability to all living beings – that is, all living beings matter – but 
do not claim that all living beings matter equally (which applies to the 
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of environmental ethics (but also found in sentientist or ecocentrist 
accounts) usually employ some kind of ranking of moral significance 
where humans are attributed the most moral weight. Considering that 
attributing equal moral significance to all organisms might create many 
difficulties to resolve cases of conflict, such a weighting system makes 
sense. However, it also potentially allows anthropocentrism to re- 
enter non- anthropocentric ethical theories through the back door, for 
example most crudely by implicitly alluding to the idea of a great chain 
of being. But of course, most hierarchical accounts are considerably 
more sophisticated than that.15 In contrast, Taylor’s (1986) account of 
biocentrism is the most prominent egalitarian perspective that aims to 
challenge the notion of human superiority. It is egalitarian insofar as 
he attributes all living beings the ‘same inherent worth’ (Taylor 2003 
(1981), p. 83, emphasis in original, also re- stated in 1986). Yet my 
preferred solution to this problem of whether a hierarchy in terms of 
moral significance is troublesome for honouring non- anthropocentric 
commitments is Plumwood’s account of non- ranking which moves 
beyond the notion of biocentric egalitarianism. In her words:
The options of ranking as superior/ inferior or as scalar 
equals leave out a critical further alternative, namely 
not ranking at all. […] [T] here are a number of contexts 
where ranking itself is unnecessary and either logically or 
morally problematic. One of the logical cases is the case of 
incommensurability between beings, where we can neither 
rank as equal nor rank in a hierarchy: between beings with 
very different and only intersecting capacities, ranking is 
not possible in any accurate or meaningful way. (2002, 
pp. 172– 3; see also 1998b, p. 409)
Drawing on Plumwood’s (1998b, 1999, 2002) account, the crucial point 
is that I refuse to provide an a priori ranking of moral significance but 
try instead to provide more context- sensitive principles of distributive 
justice that account for conflicting needs in the context of scarcity. 
What is important about this non- ranking starting point, is that the 
resulting duties, principles and so on are not already intrinsically built 
into an account of moral significance but are developed later on in 
a context- and relation- sensitive manner based on the starting point 
that all living beings are morally considerable, but without having 
predetermined that some entities are intrinsically always more (or 
even equally) worthy of moral consideration than others. Note that 




that diverges from her account in several ways in order to adapt it 
into my theoretical perspective and, consequently, it might not fully 
represent her own stance on non- ranking, moral considerability and 
moral significance. For example, the latter is a term that she rarely uses, 
but I interpret her use of moral worth (such as in Plumwood 1998b, 
2002) as roughly synonymous.16 Let’s review briefly each of the two 
points central to this position.
Plumwood (2002) makes two separate claims about ranking. The 
first normative claim is that, as we have seen earlier, from a normative 
perspective species- ranking and otherising behaviours (in the sense 
of constructing an Other) should be prevented, if possible, in order 
to develop an appropriate interspecies ethic. I argue that it is possible 
to devise an account of ecological justice (at least that is my aim in 
the following chapters) that can provide normative guidance without 
having to rely on an a priori ranking of moral significance and 
thus allows for appreciating otherness.17 Such an account would be 
preferable by relying less on moral reasoning that could potentially 
help to construct a moral dualism. According to Plumwood (2002), 
we should become more suspicious of a ranking (1) the more it relies 
on a broad generalisation, and (2) the closer it is associated with moral 
relevance. Put differently, allowing for contextual variation instead of 
relying on an overarching ranking of moral significance, would be a way 
of maintaining methodological and normative openness on that view.
Her second descriptive claim is that there is also a logical 
incommensurability between different kinds of living beings. I think 
this point is crucial to explain the tension between similarities and 
otherness that an account of moral considerability of living beings 
is situated within. Plumwood’s (2002) take is that the differences 
between living beings imply not only that no ranking can be 
provided in any meaningful way, but also that to ‘rank as equal’ (in 
contrast to Taylor’s position) is not what logically follows from their 
incommensurability. This should not be understood as a challenge to 
but rather a development of the egalitarian position – ‘egalitarian’ in 
the sense of Taylor’s account mentioned earlier and not in the sense of 
an egalitarian distributive principle. As Plumwood puts it, ‘the concept 
of equality is expressible both along the axis of sameness and along that 
of difference. Equality on the axis of the Same yields scalar equality, 
while equality along the axis of Difference yields the completely 
different concept of incommensurability or non- ranking’ (2002, p. 172, 
also in 1998b, p. 409). Put simply, building on Plumwood’s account 
I claim that instead of focusing purely on similarities and arguing for 
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be looking at differences and arguing for a version of equality in 
terms of incommensurability in the biocentric context. Allowing for 
incommensurability puts different living beings on an equal footing 
in terms of their otherness. What follows from my biocentric stance is 
that there are many different kinds of wellbeing. The point here is that 
there are not merely epistemic limits to how well we can understand the 
wellbeing of other lifeforms, despite that it is certainly possible to gain 
some understanding of what their wellbeing requires as discussed earlier. 
Yet, there is a certain sense of difference that obscures meaningful 
commensuration in terms of better/ worse, more/ less/ similarly morally 
significant and so on. The alternative that Plumwood suggests is to 
not provide any ranking. Thus, if this is a viable alternative, then a 
non- ranking version of biocentrism is needed to reflect this condition 
of incommensurability. More specifically for me this means that an 
appreciation of similarities has led to the acknowledgement of equal 
moral considerability of living beings, and an appreciation of differences 
leads to a non- ranking account of moral significance.
The incommensurability, in my account here, refers to the absence 
of a common measure for their moral significance between different 
individuals or kinds of living beings. This incommensurability applies 
to moral significance and not moral considerability because the 
incommensurable kinds of wellbeing (or flourishing) are based on a 
commensurable ground of similarity – that they constitute a form of 
wellbeing. Plumwood’s own position seems to be similar to this as 
she claims that the spread of intentionality (which included, among 
others, goal- directedness for her) throughout nature provides ‘a web 
of difference against an overall ground of continuity’ (2003 (1993), 
p. 134; see also Plumwood 2006). In the following chapters I will focus 
on how this incommensurability of entities with entitlements towards 
commensurable goods (in the form of ecological space) plays out.18
The consequence is that the refusal to rely on a priori rankings of 
moral significance is, on the one hand, a way of accommodating the 
condition of incommensurability and, on the other, a way of honouring 
a commitment to a non- extensionist perspective. That does not imply, 
however, that it is never possible to prioritise some entities over others. 
Rather the non- ranking position aims to minimise ranking and focus 
on the contextuality of conflict cases.19 Plumwood (2002) stresses 
strongly the importance of contextual ethical frameworks as part 
of her counter- hegemonic program and also highlights interspecies 
justice, yet without specifying what such an account should look like. 
This means that there are good reasons to minimise the reliance on 





ruled out. As Ruth Chang (2013) explains, incommensurability does 
not necessarily involve incomparability which keeps open the possibility 
of prioritisation.20 Simply put, it is possible to acknowledge difference 
without being able to measure this difference in a scalar manner but this 
does not preclude, in itself, the option of prioritising some entities over 
others based on additional contextual considerations. The consequence 
is that my position is neither hierarchical nor egalitarian about moral 
significance. Different living beings have incommensurable kinds of 
wellbeing and I am neither claiming that some kinds of wellbeing are 
more morally weighty than others, nor that these kinds of wellbeing 
can be shown to matter exactly to the same degree. Based on this, 
contextual and relational prioritisation of different entities is possible, 
necessary and morally permissible.
My point is that justice is indeed such a contextual ethical concept 
(even when a global justice perspective is taken) that can be helpful for 
making normative decisions and even prioritise some entities over others 
in certain contexts. This does not rely, however, on an account of moral 
significance but can draw on different contextual and relational features 
of the normative conflict at hand. Methodologically speaking, I take 
it that an environmental ethic falls less likely prey to being built on an 
anthropocentric bias if the prioritisation (or ranking) of different living 
beings is, theoretically speaking, clearly separated from its justification of 
why these different entities matter in the first place. Thus, a justification 
of why it is defensible, and even just, to prioritise fellow humans over 
nonhuman beings under certain circumstances should not be built on 
the claim that humans are more morally significant, but refer to the 
specific context of the problem and the relational situatedness of the 
moral agents that are duty holders. The difference amounts to theorising 
about ethics based on a human perspective (that is, epistemological 
anthropocentrism also debated as ‘perspectival anthropocentrism’ see 
Diehm 2010) which is unavoidable, and ethics subservient to the human 
perspective (that is, moral anthropocentrism).
Implications for theorising about justice
So, how can the non- ranking and the political biocentric aspects 
be brought together? Simply put, a commitment to non- ranking 
can be understood as the necessary preamble to an account of 
ecological justice including the principles, duties and entitlements 
that follow from it. It does so by opening up the conceptual space 
for interspecies justice. By rejecting the building of a meta- ethical 
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moral significance, it creates the possibility to look at human- 
nonhuman relationships more contextually without having 
predetermined how situations of conflict should be normatively 
resolved. Related but slightly different problems would arise if one 
would start with a meta- ethical order of sameness. Thus, it allows 
contextual and relational variation to play a significant role in any 
resulting environmental ethic, and distributive justice is one such 
theoretically contextual lens.
Focusing on the political situates biocentrism within an appropriate 
theoretical niche where it can play a useful normative role while being 
protected (to a degree) from challenges from more holistic or sentientist 
ethical accounts by being humbler about its theoretical aspirations 
while explicitly trying to constitute a pragmatic account. In that sense, 
political biocentrism provides an additional contextualisation that is 
compatible with the contextual nature of commitment to an additional 
non- ranking specification of biocentrism. A counter- argument to this 
might be that non- ranking biocentrism does not appear to be a very 
pragmatic stance at all. Indeed, highlighting incommensurability does 
lead us, at first, more in the direction of debates about value theory 
rather than in the direction of considering actual problem cases in terms 
of more widely shared political normative concepts. However, such a 
starting point that does not pre- determine important questions about 
how to prioritise some living entities over others on a meta- ethical 
level gives more space for political theorising about what it means to 
share a planet with other living beings.
Accordingly, based on all of these considerations, it seems justified 
to limit a framework of interspecies justice to biocentrism and not 
broadening it further in line with ecocentric commitments in order 
the keep the implicit individualism that is deeply engrained within 
the justice concept. Yet that goes against a tendency in the literature 
to increase the scope of the interspecies community of justice 
further and further. It should be said that this development does not 
apply to the animal justice literature which, while supported by an 
extensive animal rights literature, remains primarily concerned with 
the wellbeing of sentient animals. More radical theorists, however, 
are exploring more widely drawn boundaries of justice, and are 
thereby moving away from moral individualism. While Baxter 
(2005) still advocates a ‘mixed’ approach in which he attributes 
justice entitlements to individual nonhumans and populations, David 
Schlosberg (2007) and Teea Kortetmäki (2017) include ecosystems 




For example, the reasoning with regards to ecosystems is that, 
according to Katy Fulfer, an ecosystem is ‘a natural environmental 
system composed of abiotic and (sentient and nonsentient) biotic 
entities that interact, support, and depend on each other’s existence’ 
(2013, p. 32). She argues further that ecosystems can be regarded as 
‘organic wholes’ which have value that is not ‘necessarily reducible’ 
to the overall value of its parts (Fulfer 2013). This points to the not 
uncommon claim that ecosystems are more than just the value of their 
parts, but there are also more ambitious interpretations. Freya Mathews 
(1991), for example, has even claimed that not just organisms but also 
ecosystems (and the cosmos as a whole) are self- realising in the relevant 
sense and hence living beings in their own right. Similarly, Schlosberg 
also argues that such ‘[s] ystems are living entities with their own 
integrity’ (2007, p. 148). Moreover, more recently it has been argued 
that one way of conceptualising ecosystems puts them into the same 
category of teleological organisation on which I have relied to explain 
a morally relevant account of life (see Holm 2017). This would indicate 
that they are potential candidates for moral considerability specifically 
as described here, in contrast to potentially holding a different type 
of moral status. So, how do these claims relate to my commitment to 
political biocentrism?
For the sake of argument, let us assume that ecosystems are alive 
in the morally relevant sense – which I doubt. There are two – not 
exhaustive – reasons why I do not consider ecosystems to be appropriate 
candidates for members of the community of justice based on what 
I  have claimed in section one. These reasons are additional to the 
question about conflicting needs that will the topic of Chapter 3.
Firstly, it seems a bit more difficult to define what ecosystems are 
than explained by Fulfer. As formulated by Elizabeth Cripps, ‘individual 
ecosystems are not fixed or finite’ (2010, p. 13). This is a problem insofar 
as one would want to consider them within the framework of distributive 
justice where goods are distributed to (spatially and to some degree 
temporally) discrete entities. Entities do not only need to be morally 
considerable but also be able to be made sense of in terms of justice. 
That most accounts of justice will struggle to accommodate entities such 
as ecosystems does not necessarily spring from their anthropocentric 
nature, but rather seems to be a result of thinking in terms of justice itself. 
Pragmatically, when aiming for a non- anthropocentric reformulation 
of justice, some of its core meaning will have to be retained, and that 
includes a certain individualism as an analytical foundation. Thus, here 
is where my political biocentrism comes in, because I do not claim 
that such an individualism should be defining for environmental ethics 
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as a whole but rather is important for the narrower realm of justice 
that should be situated within a broader pluralist environmental ethic. 
In the end, the aspiration cannot (and should not) be to develop an 
account of justice that can be a comprehensive solution to all issues that 
an environmental ethic has to cover.
Secondly, and relatedly, my understanding of justice is situated within 
the relational paradigm, meaning that a community of justice needs 
to be constituted by a normatively relevant relationship. That means 
that more holistic entities such as ecosystems can remain of (indirect) 
relevance for my account because they might constitute valuable 
relationships in themselves part of the narrative of this broader justice 
relationship. Thus, not constituting an entitlement holder in its own 
right does not necessarily mean to be outside of the realm of justice 
altogether. Moreover, the ‘health’ of ecosystems is also of instrumental 
importance for the living beings they comprise. Claiming that the 
flourishing of living beings matters in terms of justice, therefore, 
also provides a derivative protection to ecosystems from considerable 
anthropogenic influence.
This last point also applies to populations. Most living organisms, 
to differing degrees, have the need to be immersed in a population in 
order to survive and flourish. Thus, populations are of instrumental 
value for the wellbeing of individual organisms. This also does not mean 
that a population lacks some independent value that matters which can 
provide additional reasons for protecting endangered species, but it does 
not matter necessarily within the narrow context of justice. Having 
said that, one way of including populations into an account of justice 
would be to make a case for group entitlements held by populations 
(but not species or ecosystems) which is a possibility that I will not 
explore but would be open to such a theoretical addition. Of course, 
even in my narrower account, how important it is for a being to be 
immersed in a healthy population depends on the kind of being it is. 
For example, Baxter (2005) has claimed that in the case of the ‘merely 
living’ beings (for example plants or some animals such as corals), it 
is not the individual but its respective population that is the bearer of 
claims in the context of justice, because these beings lack individuality 
and sentience. Even though I would argue that members of such species 
can also flourish as individuals and that therefore populations per se 
are not the primary bearers of any justice entitlements, many beings 
are highly dependent on being part of a healthy population. Hence, 
in practice, in many cases it appears necessary to think in terms of 




The implication is that ecosystems (and similar considerations apply 
to similar collectives) are not included in the realm of justice as entities 
that hold entitlements because they do not fulfil a range of necessary 
conditions for inclusion, such as (1)  having a wellbeing. That is a 
contested point, but not decisive as we have seen because ecosystems, 
for example, also do not seem to fulfil the criteria for (2) being part 
of a justice relationship on the same level of analysis as individuals 
and for (3)  being a good candidate for constituting a recipient of 
distributed goods (in Chapter 7 I will provide a few more details on 
why I exclude species).
A benefit of this (political non- ranking) approach to interspecies 
justice is that it can avoid some of the criticism that some feminist 
writers have put forward against some Western philosophical concepts 
including justice. Plumwood (1999, 2002, 2003 (1993)) approvingly 
uses the notion of justice in her work but rejects the (related) notion of 
rights which she thinks is ethically problematic insofar as rights theory 
has propensities for cultural universalism and extreme individualism 
and, in turn, tends to support a moral dualism via, among others, a 
moral extensionism and ethical closeness. This is another way in which 
Plumwood’s and my descriptions of justice diverge. I will point towards 
how my account of justice relates to moral rights in terms of justice 
entitlements in Chapter 5, but to foreclose some avenues of critique 
I would like to highlight a couple of points in defence of the justice 
concept insofar the criticism of rights is also applicable here. On the 
problem of individualism, we have seen that the individualist feature 
embedded in justice discourses should be maintained. As previously 
discussed, the purpose of this is not to argue for an individualist 
environmental ethic, but that justice can shed light on an individualistic 
element within a broader environmental ethic that can appreciate a 
diverse set of moral status and value. Moreover, my account is by no 
means universal in Plumwood’s sense, as it neither aims to exhaust the 
realm of ethics nor claims to be applicable to all contexts. Plumwood 
calls explicitly for attributing context a bigger part in ethics, thus we 
should be letting contextual and relational notions such as justice and, 
in consequence, its entitlements, into the realm of environmental ethics.
Even if that is the case, however, my position still leaves ample 
room for criticism which I  cannot address at this point. One final 
comment on Plumwood’s position within the wider literature is that 
her affirmation of justice (and mine by association) stands in contrast 
to some other ecofeminist writers who sort rights and justice into the 
same undesirable category of abstract principles (for example Merchant 
1996). Crucial for me, is to highlight the significance of the need to 
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find a balance between contextual situatedness and abstraction to such 
an extent that we can start to make sense of large- scale environmental 
and ethical problems. These problems are not merely the sum of 
some individual discrepancies but ingrained in our political and 
social systems. For these problems it becomes necessary to highlight 
that their contextual and relational features are of a systemic nature in 
which individuals are embedded (in terms of interconnectedness). 
Thus, the very contextual and (affectionate) relational focus of care 
ethics, for example, is not able to articulate the full moral story (recall 
also the argument for focusing on distributive justice in Chapter 1).21 
Likewise, also the notion of justice and particularly my focus on global 
justice would never be sufficient. As Plumwood states, ‘[i] nterspecies 
ethics can, for example, involve both more generalisable relationships 
involving considerations of fairness and justice and deeply personal 
relationships involving care, and the conflicts and connections between 
these dimensions’ (2002, pp. 187– 8).
This brings to an end this preamble to my account of ecological 
justice. So far, in the introductory chapter, I have only provided some 
reasons for why it is discursively and theoretically advantageous to be 
able to speak about the current mass extinction crisis as a matter of 
distributive justice. Now I have laid out some theoretical premises to 
explain why I think that it is appropriate to start with political non- 
ranking biocentrism as a perspective on nature in this context. As 
mentioned earlier, I do not aim to provide a full defence of my non- 
ranking biocentric stance at this point which means that numerous 
critics will justifiably not be satisfied with this outline. Yet this is merely 
meant as springboard for the argument in the following chapters. 
Nothing that I have said so far justifies that an account of ecological 
justice can be coherent, explains what it would entail or, indeed, 
constitutes an actual theory of justice. That is the aim of the following, 
starting with how we can move from moral considerability to being 
members of a community of justice in the next chapter.
Notes
 1 This has a slight resemblance to John Rawls’ (1996) political liberalism insofar as 
he explicitly limits the scope and aims of his account. But the analogy does not 
go much farther than that.
 2 Returning to the campfire example, it does not seem appropriate to speak of its 
good life. It is possible to feed the fire to keep it going, but as a chemical reaction it 
does not constitute a system that strives to keep going but rather is merely a process 
that happens to continue if the conditions are right. Maybe that is an intuition that 
needs to be dropped in that that there exist cases such as the Belousov- Zhabotinsky 







see Holm 2017). On the other hand, there might also be more to being alive in 
the normatively relevant way than self- organisation in this very minimal way, and 
there seems to be conceptual space between a normative conception of life and 
one that relies only on the notion of self- organisation because some relevant sense 
of flourishing might be lost. I am not aiming to solve this problem now.
 3 Of course, the developments in artificial life might lead to the creation of machines 
that do have a wellbeing that is intrinsic to themselves, and biocentrists are usually 
open to accepting this hypothetical implication of their position (for example 
Taylor 1986, Sterba 1998).
 4 Undoubtedly there is high variation between different living beings (even sometimes 
between beings that belong to the same species). As I will indicate, such species 
descriptions can only tell a partial story of wellbeing. Moreover, humans are also 
clearly not the only animals where considerations about culture and individual 
choices are relevant for describing an individual’s flourishing.
 5 That does not exclude, however, that sensory and cognitive factors do matter for 
the description of the wellbeing of a living being. These play indeed an important 
role for sentient animals. Thus, the idea rather is that wellbeing spreads throughout 
different living beings, but it will be of different kinds which means that what 
constitutes appropriate treatment will also differ considerably throughout the 
spectrum of life.
 6 That means that we might end up with the possibility of conflicting relevant 
interests.
 7 These questions also link the related problem of individuation. While I do think that 
it is not a major problem to have no conceptual sharpness regarding what constitutes 
an individual, this is also clearly a question that deserves more elaboration. 
Importantly, my account allows for a range of plausible conceptualisations of what 
consitutes an individual and, therefore, does not have to resort, for instance, to a 
simplistic atomistic account.
 8 Of course, needs – including their link to harm – are also contested (see Wiggins 
2005, Hoozer 2008, O’Neill, J. 2010), but their moral force is usually accepted in 
everyday discourse. Moreover, Anscombe’s formulation also specifically connects 
needs to the notion of flourishing, but granted that this is not strictly necessary for 
making sense of the concept of needs as they could plausibly be defined without 
any such linkage.
 9 For example, Kallhoff’s (2014) account of how harming a plant involves obstructing 
its flourishing processes.
 10 Taylor’s (1986) distinction between an organism’s good and its biological fitness 
appears to also point into a similar direction.
 11 The attentive reader will have noticed that I did not mention any links to the 
intrinsic value debate in environmental ethics so far. This is a deliberate omission, 
because I do not think that such engagement would help us to move along in our 
quest for an account of interspecies justice, at this point at least.
 12 I do not aim to provide a detailed critical review of Plumwood’s theoretical position 
and I do not adopt all parts of her theoretical account.
 13 An additional problem is that some extensionist strategies might also be 
anthropomorphising as Kallhoff (2014) notes. Moreover, despite that I will focus 
here on Plumwood’s work, other ecofeminist critiques of moral extensionism can 
be found in Chris Cuomo (1998) and Karen Warren (2000).
 14 For me, from this critique of moral extensionism it does not follow that Taylor’s 
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to rationalism (compare Plumwood 2003 (1993)). But putting debates about 
rationalism aside, more important is here that Taylor’s account of biocentrism 
and more specifically the teleological organisation starting point of biocentric 
arguments that I have loosely adapted earlier is not intrinsically more extensionist/ 
assimilationist (at least with regards to moral considerability) than Plumwood’s own 
position. Also Plumwood (1998b, 1999) herself relies on the teleological account 
to describe how something matters to a non- sentient living being.
 15 This is not the place for a discussion of the variety of arguments that have been 
made in favour of hierarchies. A recent example is Shelly Kagan’s (2019) hierarchical 
account of animal ethics.
 16 Accordingly, my focus lies here on incommensurability of moral significance which 
might differ somewhat from Plumwood’s (1998b, 1999, 2002) original argument 
about incommensurability in terms of value and moral worth.
 17 Note that construction of an Other as part of a dualism is not the same as 
appreciating otherness.
 18 Thus, this focus differs from more widespread uses of incommensurability. Usually 
it is either distinguished between (1) the incommensurability of different values 
(or entities embodying such values) and between (2) the incommensurability of 
different scientific theories. For an overview see Ruth Chang (2013).
 19 To be clear, claiming that contextual prioritisation is possible does not amount to 
the claim that any kind of prioritisation can be justified.
 20 Published in the same year as Plumwood’s Environmental Culture, Chang (2002) 
has also made the case for the idea of being ‘on a par’ as a fourth value relation 
between two entities when making comparisons in addition to the usual ‘better 
than’, ‘worse than’ and ‘equal to’ options.
 21 For a critical discussion of the notion of care from an ecofeminist perspective see 
Sherilyn MacGregor (2004). For an overview of different versions of relational 
environmental ethics see Clare Palmer (2010), because my application of the 
relational specifications differs from how it is usually employed within care ethics 











How can ‘we’ all live well together on one planet with a finite 
amount of ecological space crucial for life? While a mass extinction is 
underway, it seems that the pronoun ‘we’ can no longer merely refer 
to humanity. As previously introduced, over the last two decades a 
new body of literature has sprung up that tries to tackle this problem – 
either directly or indirectly  – via evoking some understanding of 
justice (such as Baxter 2005, Nussbaum 2006, Schlosberg 2007). 
Because an account of justice to nonhumans in whichever form is a 
considerable addition to a position that attributes moral considerability 
to nonhumans, it is met with resistance from outside as well as within 
environmental philosophy. At best it is a widely held suspicion against 
the idea that justice is applicable to nonhumans; at worst it is an 
outright rejection that justice as a concept can expand beyond the 
human community. Thus, after having discussed in Chapter 2 that 
nonhuman living beings are morally considerable, this chapter will 
elaborate on the theoretical basis of interspecies justice to show that 
it is more than just a slogan.
Recall the distinction between ethical arguments and arguments 
about justice; this distinction remains true outside the human realm. 
For example, a convincing argument against fox hunting because it 
causes the foxes suffering does not automatically lead to the claim 
that these animals are entitled to a certain amount of space and food 
in order for their situation to be distributively just. In order to make 
a strong case for ecological justice, it is necessary to maintain a clear 
distinction between the realm of ethics and the more particular realm 
of justice. As previously discussed, this distinction between ethics and 
justice also indicates that a theory of ecological justice is part of, and 
not a substitution for, a more general theory of environmental ethics. 
In other words, all issues of justice are part of the realm of ethics but 
not all ethical considerations can be framed as problems of justice. 
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Consequently, moral considerability is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
criterion for being a holder of entitlements of justice. Taking it as a 
premise that all living beings are morally considerable, I propose that a 
grounded justification for interspecies justice in terms of just biological 
conservation requires an additional four- step argumentative process 
as a method for including all wild living nonhuman beings in the 
community of justice, to which I will turn in a moment.
Because moral considerability alone is not able to ground the more 
specific claim that duties of justice are owed to a certain entity, the 
theoretical move towards grounding a community of justice is a 
crucial feature of accounts of ecological justice. However, that is an 
issue that still requires more elaboration than it has received in the 
ecological justice literature so far. For example, Brian Baxter (2000, 
2005) provides the only elaborate defence of a biocentric theory of 
distributive ecological justice which has inspired my own account, but 
notwithstanding my own position diverges in several respects (see also 
Chapters 1, 2 and 5).
In an initial paper Baxter (2000) combines Brian Barry’s theory 
of justice as impartiality with ecological justice because the question 
regarding membership in the community of justice is separate from 
different ‘substantive theories of the good’, and he expands on his initial 
arguments in A Theory of Ecological Justice (2005). Baxter considers all 
nonhuman living beings to be morally considerable and states that 
‘[w] e need to recognize other life- forms’ claim to a fair share of the 
environmental resources which all life- forms need to survive and to 
flourish’ (2005, p. 4). Furthermore, in contrast to Martha Nussbaum’s 
(2006) account of justice in which she introduced a multitude of 
questions debated in environmental ethics  – ranging from animal 
experiments to eating meat – Baxter makes clear that his account of 
ecological justice is limited to a circumscribed set of questions:
Provided that viable local populations of nonhuman species 
are not destroyed without good moral cause shown, and 
thus provided that existing species are left overall in a 
flourishing condition, it is not a matter of ecological justice 
to resolve issues of meat- eating, domestication, animal 
experimentation and so forth. (2005, pp. 137– 8)
Here, Baxter makes an important distinction between distributive 
justice and ethics, but these arguably appear still to be issues to 
which other dimensions of justice, such as in terms of recognition of 
domesticated animals, might be applicable.
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Despite attributing moral considerability to all living beings, Baxter 
does not consider them to have equal moral weight. For example, he 
grants members of an endangered species an ‘automatic boost’ (2005, 
p. 150) of their weighting. I do not contest that this is an important 
consideration, but I  rather consider endangeredness an additional 
contextual feature that needs to be taken into account instead of being 
built into the moral weight of the individual beings. Moreover, Baxter 
distinguishes between ‘individualised’ living and ‘merely living’ beings. 
Because he deems merely living beings are not individualised enough, 
he attributes their rights to populations, whereas more individualised 
living beings hold justice claims as individuals. Regarding the more 
individualised living beings, Baxter claims that it ‘becomes increasingly 
appropriate to conceptualize the claims of ecological justice in the case 
of such creatures as involving various freedoms, such as that of pursuing 
a distinctive course of action of their own choosing’ (2005, p. 14).
Putting aside discussions about the different biocentric versions that 
Baxter and I propose, the problem is that I am also not fully convinced 
by an argumentative move in Baxter’s theory when he presents his 
reasoning for a biocentric community of justice; for which he appears to 
present three different but connected arguments. Firstly, he claims that 
because it is difficult to differentiate between sentient and non- sentient 
beings due to a ‘continuum of capacities’, all living beings should be 
awarded moral standing because there are good arguments supporting 
the inclusion of all sentient beings. Secondly, he argues that humans 
are in ‘circumstances of justice’ not merely towards each other but also 
towards other living beings on Earth, because of the ability to have an 
effect on the ‘welfare interests’ of each other.1 A combination of these 
two lines of argument (that is, a combination of an argument about 
moral considerability and about the grounding of the community of 
justice) could arguably be sufficient to defend the inclusion of all living 
beings into the community of justice if he would further specify the 
circumstances of justice.
However, Baxter then goes on to argue that ‘making a contribution 
to the sum of environmental benefits’ (2005, p. 84) is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for being a member of the ecological 
justice community (in line with contractarian thinking about justice). 
This argument appears problematic because he connects making 
a contribution to the environmental benefits (that is, resources 
and ecosystem functionings) available with having a distributive 
justice claim to these goods. Intuitively, it appears that the greater 
the contribution by an organism, the greater its fair share of the 
resulting benefits should be if one deems contribution relevant for 
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distribution in terms of desert. This would mean that in many cases 
small, non- sentient organisms would have a more fundamental claim 
to the Earth’s resources than more complex sentient beings such as 
humans, who do not appear to provide much of a contribution at all 
if one discounts certain cultural landscapes. Baxter acknowledges the 
point that humans contribute probably rather little and, thus, rejects 
contribution (as the sole grounding) of an account of ecological 
justice. However, later on he allows for organisms to have different 
moral weights (that is, moral significance on my reading) with more 
individualised organisms having more moral weight than populations 
of less individualised organisms. Even if one accepts the introduction 
of moral weights, which I consider to be a problematic feature of a 
ranking biocentric perspective as discussed in the previous chapter, 
then that at least stands in tension with the relevance of Baxter’s 
necessary condition of contributing to the overall environmental 
benefits. A question lingering in the background seems to be about 
how much and what kind of contributions count as contributions in 
this context. Based on Baxter’s other theoretical commitments this 
argumentative move to include the condition of contribution is not 
unfounded, but I will try to show how it is not strictly necessary for 
a biocentric account of justice.
An alternative account of justice to nonhumans that spells out 
the notion of justice in less detail than Baxter’s is found in Adrian 
Armstrong’s (2012) work that extends the capabilities approach 
beyond animals to include ecosystems and even the whole Earth. 
Armstrong draws on an understanding of justice that is based on a 
revised Leopoldian land ethic: ‘A thing is just when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is unjust 
when it tends otherwise’ (2012, p. 107, emphasis added). Based on this 
perspective, Armstrong proposes Nussbaum- style capability lists which 
he calls ‘consideranda’ for animals, ecosystems and the Earth as well 
as societies, that is, ‘human ecosystems’ (for an overview of Martha 
Nussbaum’s position see Chapter  6). However, establishing moral 
considerability alone cannot be enough to warrant the argumentative 
move from having intrinsic value (when understood as moral standing) 
to being a subject of justice, as Armstrong seems to imply. In general, 
it is the appeal to justice that makes theories of interspecies justice 
more controversial than any theory of environmental ethics, and they 
therefore require additional justification due to the still- dominant 
anthropocentric paradigm in political thought. Consequently, 
Armstrong’s argument seems to stop short of providing the account of 
‘justice for the environment’ that he wants to establish. His reasoning is 
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that ‘in order to take the leap to requiring justice for the environment 
we have to identify a value in the environment that will require a 
relationship of justice’ and ‘only intrinsic or extrinsic value is really 
sufficiently strong to demand justice’ (2012, pp. 111– 12). He does not 
explain, however, how the value found in nonhuman nature translates 
into a community of justice.2
Baxter’s (2005) second argument appears to have the most potential 
for defending the inclusion of all living beings. He refers here to 
the interests and interconnectedness of all living beings which points 
to where, arguably, the essential argument lies for including all life 
into the community of justice, as will be discussed later. I would 
like to build up on these considerations and go step by step through 
the different issues that will have to be settled in order to ground 
a framework of ecological justice. The first step concerns David 
Hume’s ‘circumstances of justice’ (hereafter shortened to CoJ) as a 
foundation for analysing whether the human- nonhuman relationship 
actually falls within these circumstances. They constitute the origin 
story of justice in the sense that they generate conditions to which 
justice can provide answers. Hume probably would have argued 
that the human- nonhuman relationship does not fall within these 
circumstances. The point is, however, that justice is applied as a 
solution to the problems embodied by the CoJ (Hope 2010). This 
means that justice is a contextual concept that aims to solve some 
problems arising from actual circumstances, and hence it stands in 
comparison to some other moral laws which are supposed to have 
a more universal applicability. Furthermore, the CoJ take on the 
function of weeding out all inappropriate theories that cannot make 
sense of these circumstances (Hope 2010). From a pluralist perspective 
this means that there is not one set of universally valid circumstances 
for all kinds of justice, but that depending on the scope of our enquiry, 
different problems/ circumstances need to be taken into account. This 
issue will be discussed in the upcoming section.
The second step is then to outline what constitutes justice, which 
will be looked at in section two. This is difficult because justice is a 
contested concept, but a particular definition has already been partially 
provided in the previous chapters. One’s definition of justice has strong 
implications for what, or who, is included in the community of justice 
and what principles of justice we think apply within this community. 
The third step and the last section is where the focus of the ecological 
justice discussion in the literature has been so far. But only after having 
settled all the previous issues can we inquire into who or what might be 
included into a community of justice based on what we think justice 
 
56
ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE AND THE EXTINCTION CRISIS
is, and what circumstances we need to take into account. Put simply, 
the specific human- nonhuman relationship on which I focus grounds 
specific circumstances of justice, a specific conception of justice and 
a specific community of interspecies justice which I call a community 
of fate, because it constitutes a non- consensual sharing of destiny. In 
the final step we can then start to consider what principles of justice 
apply to this particular justice community, which in this case is limited 
to wild nonhumans. However, this in turn includes so many different 
issues that I will only focus on distributive justice, and Chapters 4 and 
5 are dedicated respectively to the currency of distribution and the 
distributive principles.
Circumstances of justice
To reiterate, an enquiry about justice should ideally start with a 
consideration of Hume’s CoJ (2003 (1739– 40)) as termed by John 
Rawls (1971), because the general exclusion of nonhumans from 
considerations of justice can, among other things, be traced back 
to Hume’s influential postulation of the CoJ which he defined in 
such a manner that the protection of justice became unobtainable 
for nonhuman living beings. The voluntar ian cooperation/ 
contractarian/ proceduralist obstacle to including nonhumans into 
the community of justice indicates that ecological justice needs a 
different conceptualisation of the circumstances and the meaning 
of justice than has been provided by the theories of distributive 
justice of the 20th century. The same applies for the inclusion of 
the capacity to reciprocate. Moreover, interspecies justice also needs 
the concept of justice to be detached from the notion of property 
rights that has been influential since its introduction by theorists 
such as John Locke (2002 (1689)) and Hugo Grotius (2012 (1625)) 
explaining its origin in the ‘state of nature’ (for the latter point see 
Chapter 8).
If justice is supposed to be the solution, then the CoJ embody 
the corresponding problems that cannot be ignored (Hope 2010). 
When looking at a society a prime example of such a problem or 
circumstance would be the limited access to necessary and luxury goods 
for its members in the distribution context. In the context of justice 
to nonhumans a question is whether any theory of ecological justice 
can actually get off the ground by including nonhumans in the CoJ. 
If they are deemed to be outside such circumstances then the whole 
project of ecological justice seems futile, and at first glance this does 
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indeed appear to be a difficult undertaking. As Elizabeth Cripps points 
out, the CoJ as they are traditionally understood do not really match 
up with how ‘natural’ societies function which, as she notes, ‘revolves 
around the sacrifice of the individual’ (2010, p. 14).
Fortunately, the idea of the CoJ and the notion of interspecies justice 
seem compatible, which results from considering the three relevant 
questions in this context which I will discuss in turn. To begin, how 
exclusionary are traditionally conceived Humean circumstances of 
justice towards nonhumans? This is an important question for some 
theorists of social justice who might be reluctant to move away from 
or expand the Humean/ Rawlsian set of accepted CoJ. However, 
how the CoJ have been traditionally understood was a function of 
the issue in question which was how to live well together in a society 
(for example via cooperation). The problem here, on the other 
hand, is a different one from social justice. The starting question for 
ecological justice is how to live well together on one finite planet and, 
then, this sets the problem background for inquiring into what the 
appropriate CoJ, as well as the complementary understanding of the 
nature of justice are in this context.3 As mentioned earlier, justice is 
a contextual concept that aims to solve some problems arising from 
actual existence; from a pluralist perspective this means that there is 
not one set of universally valid circumstances for all kinds of justice. 
Deconstructing the purpose of the CoJ makes this fluidity clearer. 
The CoJ have a dual but interrelated meaning. On the one side, they 
flesh out the context of the problem by adding realistic factors that 
explain the need for establishing rules. On the other side, the CoJ also 
function as parameters that allow justice to be a solution within their 
limits. From this dual understanding follow two further questions that 
need answering.
Secondly, should what CoJ understood as problems have to be 
accounted for in the context of the human- nonhuman relationship? 
If justice is context specific then this is the least controversial question 
to answer because it allows the CoJ to differ in the interspecies justice 
and social justice cases as they need to take into account (potentially) 
different problem factors. The last question then regards how the CoJ 
function as parameters limiting the applicability of ecological justice. 
This issue seems more problematic for establishing interspecies justice 
because, at first glance, the human- nonhuman case is not compatible 
with moderate scarcity – that is, limited scarcity provisioning enough 
for everybody’s needs but not everyone’s wants  – which is a key 
circumstance of justice in Hume’s and Rawls’ theories.
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The traditional circumstances of justice
Hume claimed that ‘limited scarcity’ and ‘confined generosity’ 
were necessary CoJ.4 This means that in situations outside of these 
circumstances (which have upper and lower boundaries) justice would 
not apply. For example, if there were an endless amount of certain 
goods available it would not make much sense to consider how to 
justly distribute these goods. According to Simon Hope (2010), Hume 
clearly excluded nonhuman animals from these CoJ in part because his 
conception of justice was strongly linked to owning possessions. This 
is, however, part of step two of the justification process (that is, what 
justice is about) and thus not relevant at this point, because it can be 
detached from the idea of CoJ (as has also been argued by John Salter 
2012). So far, therefore, it seems that nonhumans might as well be 
within the CoJ because Hume distinguishes between the origins of 
justice – meaning, the CoJ – and who, or what, justice actually applies 
to. It is when discussing the latter that Hume excludes nonhumans from 
the community of justice because they simply cannot own property.
On the other side, however, Hume also adds a less well- known 
condition or circumstance to his list – rough ‘equality of powers’ – 
which is more or less met ‘by the simple fact of human interdependence’ 
(Hope 2010, p. 137). This accordingly excludes animals and other 
nonhuman beings from the CoJ by failing to fulfil this equal- 
powers criterion which, it seems, can only be met by humans. This 
interpretation is also consistent with Salter’s (2012) reading of Hume’s 
‘equality of powers’ passage. In contrast to many critics of Hume (such 
as Barry 1989), Salter claims that the requirement of equality of powers 
does not force Hume to exclude weak or disabled people from the 
domain of justice. Rather, it is a requirement that applies between 
species instead of between individual human beings because – according 
to Salter’s reading of Hume – ‘we develop a self- interested disposition 
to abstain from the possessions of other human beings, including 
those human beings who have no capacity to harm us’ (2012, p. 3). 
Put simply, Hume’s position is to make ‘being human’ the inclusion/ 
exclusion criterion for the kind of beings to which justice can apply 
by framing it as a ‘motivational’ circumstance of ‘equal powers’ of 
some sort. This refers again to his conception of justice that focuses 
on property. Thus, by excluding the content of justice that is focused 
on property from Hume’s considerations of the CoJ, the CoJ appear to 
be also applicable to nonhumans. The only issue that remains is that it 
is not nonhumans per se but the human- nonhuman relationship that 
does not seem to fall within the traditional CoJ. More specifically, the 
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circumstance of limited (or moderate) scarcity is problematic, which 
is where Cripps’ (2010) critique of the CoJ in the context of the 
nonhuman seems to be aimed.
The problem- context
Others, most prominently Rawls, have picked up Hume’s idea and 
modified it slightly. According to Rawls, for example, the CoJ are 
‘conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and 
necessary’ (1971, p. 109). By understanding the CoJ in this manner 
(very similarly to how he understands justice itself), Rawls has excluded 
nonhuman beings from being subjects of justice right at the first step. 
He then carries on and lists some ‘objective’ CoJ (moderate scarcity 
and human similarity and vulnerability) and some ‘subjective’ CoJ 
(mutual disinterestedness and limited knowledge). Likewise, Hope 
(2010) adds his own considerations to Hume’s list. Similarly to Rawls, 
he adds human vulnerability to each other’s actions and ethical variety. 
Considering that the CoJ are contextual, I  would like to propose 
a tentative list of circumstances that would apply to the human- 
nonhuman relationship – more specifically, the relationship between 
humans and wild nonhumans – and thereby start to answer the question 
about which circumstances understood as contextual problems need to 
be taken into account in the case of this particular relationship. This 
list is not necessarily complete, but the following three points appear 
to be issues that theories of interspecies justice cannot ignore.
Firstly, as proposed by Hume and Rawls, ‘scarcity’ needs to be part 
of a list of CoJ. This is as true for ecological justice as for any other 
considerations of distributive justice, but it is especially relevant in the 
context of a finite planet which provides the main problem context for 
interspecies justice. However, the applicability of justice should not just 
be confined to merely limited or moderate scarcity because, arguably, 
(1) the language of justice is applicable to all situations between (but not 
including) extreme abundance and full human societal and ecological 
collapse, and (2) in the case of interspecies justice moderate scarcity 
is a circumstance that is unachievable because of inevitable conflicts 
between humans and nonhumans that do not allow for the (theoretical) 
satisfaction of everyone’s and everything’s needs at the same time.
Concerning the first point it seems intuitive that abundance of 
all kinds of goods undermines the need for distributive justice. This 
circumstance gives the applicability of justice an upper boundary – 
somewhere short of a land of milk and honey and, thus, it has usually 
been regarded as a given in theories of justice (but for a more nuanced 
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perspective on this upper boundary see Chapter 5). More importantly, 
regarding its lower boundary it seems mistaken to claim that it is 
necessary for justice that there is enough to fulfil everyone’s needs. 
The applicability of justice must stretch into a territory where needs 
clash, otherwise we might already be outside the CoJ today or in the 
near future with regard to environmental goods and benefits provided 
by ecosystems, even in the context of social justice. This is a problem 
insofar as one might want to turn to justice for answers particularly 
in these more difficult cases. As has been argued by Donald Hubin 
(1979), the distribution in circumstances of moderate/ limited scarcity 
is merely ‘simpler’ than in more scarce circumstances, but that does 
not mean that distributive justice in circumstances of severe scarcity is 
inconceivable. As Hubin (1979) has rightly pointed out, cases of ‘severe 
scarcity’ are not that rare – even in wealthy societies – as, for example, 
the distribution of donor organs to people with kidney failure shows. 
Therefore, scarcity is a CoJ in the context of ecological justice but it 
stretches into an area of conflicting needs where theorists of justice have 
often been reluctant to enter. Because I consider different conditions 
of scarcity and the principles of distributive justice closely connected, 
I  will elaborate in more detail on the implications of scarcity for 
theorising about interspecies justice in Chapter 5. For now, it suffices 
to say that scarcity in the context of justice should not be confined to 
moderate scarcity only.
Secondly, some sort of confined generosity (Hume) or mutual 
disinterestedness (Rawls) should be kept on the list. The main point 
here is that there are many (potential) conflicts of interest between 
different parties – some of which justice can help to resolve, such as 
sharing limited resources. If people would be generally very keen to be 
generous, there would arguably not be much left for justice to resolve, 
but that does not preclude the need for an account of interspecies 
justice to be supplemented with an environmental virtue ethic, as 
will be proposed in Chapter 5. The same seems true in the context of 
human conduct towards other species where no reciprocity applies. 
Thirdly, Hope’s (2010, p. 14) addition of ‘vulnerability’ to the actions 
of others should also be included. This point is important because 
it stresses the fact that each individual life happens in the context of 
the lives of many other living beings, and each being’s actions can 
causally impact the livelihood of the others. Similarly, Onora O’Neill 
(1996) has made the point that in light of human vulnerability it is 
the function of justice to protect from injury. In contrast to Hope, 
who only considers justice between humans, it is crucial from my 
point of view that not only humans, but all other life- forms as well are 
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vulnerable to the actions of others, such as polar bears suffering from 
anthropogenic climate change – one of environmentalism’s oft- used 
examples. As we have seen, a similar point has been made by Baxter 
(2005) who claims more generally that circumstances of justice also 
extend to other ‘morally considerable’ beings because their ‘welfare 
interests’ can also be affected.
Never- ending conflicts
The understanding of the CoJ as parameters that limit the applicability 
of justice as a solution is challenging in the context of the human- 
nonhuman relationship because the human- nonhuman case as a 
whole is not compatible with moderate scarcity (where all needs can 
potentially be met), which as we have seen is a key circumstance of 
justice in the theories of Hume and Rawls. Including nonhumans 
in the relevant group of beings means that meeting all needs is 
never  – even not theoretically  – possible. This is because living 
beings use other beings as necessary resources for their survival and 
flourishing. For example, salmon is an important source of nutrition 
for some bears. By meeting this need, however, the bear cuts the 
life of the salmon short. There are, of course, on the other hand, 
many examples of plants, bacteria and animals using each other as 
resources without needing to harm their resource, or by even living in 
a symbiotic relationship. Yet, because of the existence of less benign 
relationships, not only does it follow that justice should not be limited 
to moderate scarcity, but rather that in the case of ecological justice 
moderate scarcity seems impossible to achieve. For some theories of 
ecological justice this is a major area of concern, as will be seen in 
the next section. The implication is that ecological justice to wild 
nonhumans can only work with a negative version of justice because 
it would otherwise run into many difficulties by trying to solve deep- 
seated conflicts. This limitation appears to apply in this particular way, 
however, only to interspecies justice to wild nonhumans because of 
its particularity regarding prey- predator relations (more on this issue 
in Chapters 5 and 6).
Even when focusing only on the human- nonhuman relationship 
and thereby excluding all intra- nature relationships from the scope 
of justice, deep- seated conflicts arise. For example, the needs of a 
salmonella bacterium are not compatible with the needs of its human 
host. Hence, deep- seated conflicts between humans and nonhumans 
remain, even though in the grand scheme of things, interspecies 
and social justice are to some extent complementary in their aims 
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(Cripps 2010). This then eases many of the conflicts that persist on 
an individual level when considering at a more societal level how 
to live, and what policies to adopt. For example, policies that aim at 
intergenerational justice between humans usually – but not always – 
also benefit current and future nonhuman beings. In the end, most 
living beings have an interest in humans pursuing sustainable practices 
(in the strong sustainability sense at least). However, as I will argue 
in Chapter  9, this potential convergence of interests should not 
be overstated.
Because of the problem that some conflicts between humans 
and nonhumans will remain, a further, but likely not exhaustive, 
implication follows for interspecies justice. The implication is that 
the residual conflicts that prevent interspecies justice as a whole 
achieving circumstances of moderate scarcity might be circumvented 
regarding the sphere of interspecies justice to wild nonhumans if it is 
differentiated from the other human- nonhuman justice relationships. 
Thus, when focusing on the relationship between humans and wild 
nonhumans only (and excluding, for example, farm animals, crops, city- 
dwelling species and so on) and additionally excluding conflicts where 
humans embody the role of the prey (as for example of the salmonella 
bacterium), then moderate scarcity becomes at least theoretically 
achievable. This qualification supports the necessity to keep distinct 
the different human- nonhuman relationships (recall the discussion in 
the introductory chapter), because different principles and conceptions 
of justice apply to each of these spheres.
In other words, for distributive justice it is important to disentangle 
the different conflicts between humans and nonhumans and inquire 
into their impact on the circumstance of scarcity. If certain human- 
nonhuman relationships are intrinsically constituted by more than 
moderate scarcity, then such a sphere of ecological justice is moved even 
further away from the main justice theorising discourse. Yet, as will be 
elaborated in Chapter 5, moderate scarcity appears at least theoretically 
conceivable if applied to the relationship between humans and wild 
nonhumans which is focused on here. To clarify again, ecological justice 
is an umbrella concept which includes a multitude of different spheres 
of justice. One of these spheres is interspecies justice in terms of just 
biological conservation. In contrast, for example, the relationship between 
humans and the animals and plants used for agricultural purposes is of 
a different kind. Arguably, justice is also applicable in this sphere, but 
the circumstance of moderate scarcity appears to be unachievable due 
to the nature of that relationship.
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The conception of justice
All of this still does not tell us what kind of a solution justice embodies, 
and because justice is a contested concept its content is difficult to pin 
down, as previously discussed. For example, Rawls bases his influential 
theory on what he calls a ‘political conception of justice’ which forms 
the basis of cooperation for a ‘reasonable’ citizen in a liberal society 
(Rawls 1971). He thereby looks at justice with the intention of deciding 
on the most appropriate system of cooperation for a society which 
embodies a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’ (p. 4), with 
justice applying to the ‘basic structure’ of that society. Accordingly, 
one of the main aims of his theory is to determine a just ‘division of 
advantages from social cooperation’ (p. 6) in a fairly closed off society. 
As already indicated, however, considerations of justice are applicable to 
more than this very specific situation envisioned by Rawls. For example, 
there exist extensive bodies of literature claiming that justice also applies 
on a global level (for example Caney 2005, Risse 2012) and between 
generations (for example Gosseries and Meyer 2009). Accordingly, it 
is possible to conceive justice as applicable to many different scenarios. 
They all appear to have in common a connection between everyone 
(or everything) in the in- group where justice applies and an out- group 
where it does not. For Rawls, for example, a delineated liberal society 
constitutes the in- group (or community of justice) which is held 
together by cooperation; or for some cosmopolitans, the common 
humanity of all people triggers considerations of justice in the global 
sphere and excludes all nonhumans from these particular considerations. 
Therefore, what triggers considerations of justice, and thus determines 
the specific nature of justice is interlinked with the nature of the in- 
group that generates justice considerations. This makes it impossible, 
to some degree, to differentiate between what justice is about and the 
in- group in question (see step three), because it is only in reference to 
an actual group of beings that thinking about justice makes any sense.
In step three it is argued that humans and wild living beings on Earth 
form together a justice community that should be understood as a 
community of fate and it is towards this particular community that a 
conception of justice applies in the form discussed here. This means 
that I do not directly argue against other definitions of justice. I merely 
want to claim that what justice is about depends (to a degree) on the 
problem- context to which it is applied, and that in my much broader 
scenario (including all living beings on Earth that stand in particular 
circumstances with each other) justice should be conceived as being 
about enabling flourishing because the potential to flourish based on 
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having a wellbeing is the common feature of all living beings while 
simultaneously also creating the conflicts for justice to address.
Under these conditions, justice’s goal or solution is, more 
specifically, that all living beings that are part of this community 
have the opportunity to flourish after their own kind, as the puzzle 
it addresses is coexistence and not cooperation. There is nothing in the 
circumstances of justice – as defined earlier – that excludes nonhumans 
from the domain of justice, nor is there anything – by definition – 
in this specific definition of justice that discounts (wild) nonhuman 
beings, as all living beings have the innate ability to flourish. Thus, 
my understanding of justice is here very similar to how capability 
theorists (like Nussbaum 2006, Fulfer 2013) and ecological feminist 
theorists (like Cuomo 1998) have defined it. For instance, Katy Fulfer 
claims that ‘relationships and flourishing’ are ‘what we take to be the 
crucial aspect of justice’ (2013, p. 27) and Martha Nussbaum claims 
that the capabilities approach ‘wants to see each thing flourish as the 
sort of thing it is’ (2006, p. 349). Similarly, Chris Cuomo states that 
‘[a] defining feature of ecological feminist thought is its commitment to 
the flourishing, or well- being, of individuals, species, and communities’ 
(1998, p. 62, emphasis in original).
A conception of justice that takes into account different kinds of 
living beings because they are morally considerable as entities that 
strive for their own wellbeing aims to solve the puzzle of coexistence 
of all these individual beings. Very simplified, what (objective) good 
a being has depends partly on its nature as already discussed in the 
nonhuman case in Chapter 2. The matter becomes more complicated 
in the human case where different cultural contexts, and a subsequent 
range of different ‘substantive theories of the good’ (as termed by 
Rawls 1971) are introduced which humans can hold. Even though 
questions about human wellbeing and flourishing bring us onto difficult 
terrain, they are unavoidable as their resolution helps us to understand 
what we, as humans, need (see Biro 2016). The concept of need and 
what constitutes human flourishing, in turn, are then highly relevant 
when one wants to consider how to distribute certain goods – such as 
ecological space – as they influence the strength of claims to certain 
amounts of ecological space which, in turn, have implications regarding 
what claims of distributive justice humans might have towards the 
Earth’s ecological space (see Chapters 4 and 5).
In order to make this understanding of justice – especially in the 
context of interspecies justice – less controversial and more in line 
with the restrictions outlined in the discussion of the circumstances 
of justice earlier, it seems useful to think of it being understandable in 
THE COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE 
65
two ways when applied to wild nonhumans. A positive interpretation 
would require the (active) supporting of flourishing. This is the more 
demanding version which would demand from agents of justice (that 
is, moral agents) the assisting of the flourishing of other beings, even if 
their non- flourishing status is fully independent of the agent’s actions. 
Following this interpretation, agents of justice (humans) would have a 
duty of justice to provide the conditions needed for subjects of justice 
(nonhumans) to flourish.
A negative interpretation would require merely not to inhibit 
flourishing. This interpretation is more in line with definitions of 
justice that see it as a kind of negative duty not to harm (see O’Neill, 
J. 2010), and I assume that harming is prima facie wrong and that it 
is not identical to allowing an agent- independent harm to happen 
(see Palmer 2010). In this understanding, justice merely demands 
humans not to negatively interfere with the lives of wild nonhumans 
by, for example, destroying their habitat. The positive interpretation 
(supporting flourishing by enabling/ creating the possibility of 
flourishing) is very demanding, and following the discussion earlier, 
such a positive interpretation would run into the problem that not all 
needs can be satisfied at the same time when nonhumans are included 
in the scope of justice. As will be elaborated in Chapter 6, this point 
is illustrated by the problems the capabilities approach runs into by 
attempting to support flourishing via capabilities (as seen in Nussbaum 
2006). This problem can be illustrated by the dilemma of the opposing 
interests of prey and predator, since, for example, the flourishing of a 
hungry lion is not compatible with the flourishing of a nearby antelope. 
The negative interpretation avoids this problem, because from this 
perspective it is not a requirement of justice to help certain species 
to flourish if their non- flourishing status is not due to any human 
actions. For example, under this approach there is no need to protect 
the prey from the predator – as long as humans did not introduce the 
predator in the first place by, for example, introducing new species into 
an ecosystem, which would generate additional normative problems 
to consider. The capabilities approach (at least in some of its forms) 
runs into such a problem because its focus lies on enabling capabilities, 
and hence it faces the dilemma that one cannot necessarily enable the 
capabilities of all individual beings (or species) simultaneously (Cripps 
2010). By understanding ecological justice in this way and by limiting 
it to living beings I try to avoid some of the deep conflicts intrinsic 
to some capability approach versions of ecological justice as proposed 
by Nussbaum (2006), who runs into the prey- predator problem, and 
David Schlosberg (2007, 2014) who generates an even more conflictual 
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picture by bringing ecosystems into the scope of justice. However, by 
keeping a commitment to flourishing I believe that my proposal here 
is meant in a similar spirit.
In order to avoid this conflict, I will merely argue for the more 
modest claim that only the negative interpretation of justice as 
flourishing applies to the wild nonhuman living world, compatible with 
what Clare Palmer (2010) calls the ‘laissez- faire intuition’, to illustrate 
the difference between our moral duties to wild and domesticated 
animals.5 This means that in the case of wild nonhuman nature the 
focus is on refraining from injustice rather than providing justice in 
the positive sense. From a pluralist perspective the resulting duties of 
justice that follow from this account are also, at first, only prima facie 
duties of justice as opposed to all- things- considered duties of justice 
that take all different spheres of justice into account. Therefore, the 
resulting duties of distributive ecological justice to wild nonhumans 
that originate from this account have to be put into conversation with 
other duties of justice in order to inquire into what would be all- things- 
considered just. Because of my non- ranking version of biocentrism 
(recall Chapter 2) I need to stress that such a consolidation of different 
demands of justice cannot rest on a ranking of living beings – either 
hierarchically or as equals – in terms of moral significance, but this 
will become more important when formulating appropriate principles 
of justice later on. Moreover, this negative understanding of justice to 
wild nonhumans when formulated into principles of justice does not 
only imply negative duties narrowly understood. The mere avoidance 
of injustice to wild nonhumans will require an extensive restructuring 
of the current modes of economic and social organisation. Recalling 
the distinction between justice and ethics, in principle there is also no 
objection to situate this account of interspecies justice within a theory 
of environmental ethics that deems it prima facie permissible or even 
under certain circumstances requires to assist nonhumans impacted 
by non- anthropogenic natural disasters, such as a volcano eruption.
In this account, justice remains an intrinsically human concept 
and thus only originates with humans as the distributor (or more 
fittingly as the appropriator) and the rest of nature only constituting 
recipients, as justice can only apply to human conduct because it 
is meant as a normative guide for the human perspective (recall 
Chapter 2’s perspectival anthropocentrism). Having said that, some 
evidence suggests that also some other species exhibit morality by 
having, for example, a sense of fairness (Bekoff and Pierce 2009). Yet, 
it would be inaccurate to infer from this that such nonhumans should 
be considered full agents of justice that can cognitively comprehend 
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demands of global justice and, similarly, devising (and dictating) rules 
of conduct for nonhumans would just be part of a hubristic worldview 
that the notion of ecological justice is meant to overcome. (The 
relationship between distributor and resource for distribution will 
be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.) Humans as distributors can either 
(re)distribute what is already in their possession or take something 
away. Regarding ecological space it appears that humans as distributors 
only have the ability to deprive nonhumans because the ability to 
(re)distribute is connected to some conception of ownership, which is 
something that humans do not have over the entirety of the available 
ecological space (see Chapter 8). The negative interpretation of justice 
as flourishing fits into this context by understanding the deprivation 
of ecological space as the inhibition of flourishing, if too much is 
taken by human appropriation.
Connecting justice with flourishing points to a relevant lower 
threshold because living beings have a set of flourishing needs (again, 
recall Chapter 2). For justice it is relevant for a being to get over this 
flourishing threshold as well as the more basic survival threshold, and 
based on the negative interpretation this amounts to the requirement 
not to inhibit (the opportunity of) flourishing. Even though it is 
possible to diminish the flourishing of a being despite the continuation 
of its flourishing status because it is possible to flourish to a greater 
or lesser degree, bringing a being’s situation below the flourishing 
threshold and the less demanding survival threshold is what matters 
primarily for justice here. Accordingly, this already outlines the shape 
of the justice principles that build on this close link between justice 
and flourishing. In this sense, it matters for justice that a being has the 
opportunity to flourish after its own kind, rather than achieving the 
maximum level of flourishing theoretically possible. Because of this 
distinction, I frame the justice requirement as not inhibiting flourishing 
instead of not harming flourishing because the notion of harm is more 
broadly applicable. Meaning that it seems problematic to define harm 
in the sense of a threshold because it does not solely capture everything 
that is regarded as harm (see Hoozer 2008). For example, reducing 
somebody’s level of welfare is also considered to be a harm, but as long 
as it does not drag them below the flourishing threshold this does not 
necessarily have to concern us in the context of justice. I will expand 
on this implicit sufficientarianism when devising the corresponding 
justice principles. To recapitulate, a being can flourish  – more or 
less – after its own kind, and there is a flourishing threshold that can 
be achieved. In the scenario of a community of all living beings – or 
more accurately of humans and wild nonhumans – justice is about 
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not inhibiting flourishing whereby flourishing constitutes some kind 
of full life.
The community of justice
Having laid out some foundations of ecological justice to wild 
nonhumans, we can finally turn to the step of analysis on which 
inquiries of ecological justice have focused primarily: who or what is 
included into the ecological community of justice? In addition to my 
(political) biocentric position, the considerations about the CoJ and 
the negative conception of justice, my main argument for the relational 
basis of this specific justice community is as follows, wherein the first 
three premises are merely a reiteration of one of the points in Chapter 2:
1) being X is alive;
2) all beings that are alive have a good;
3) all beings that have a good can flourish
→ Therefore, X is able to flourish;
4) being Y is an Earthly being. This means the Earth is its only viable 
basis of existence;
5) if Y is also X, then it is able to flourish and it needs the Earth’s 
environmental goods and ecosystem benefits (that is, ecological 
space) to do so;
6) there are many beings of the type XY
→ Therefore, all beings of type XY need to share the Earth.
The sharing of the Earth embodies a relationship of justice which is 
not generated by a semi- voluntary or hypothetical social contract but 
rather by the real world coincidence of simultaneous evolution. It does 
not matter whether one wants to describe the Earth as a lifeboat, a 
spaceship or the like; the basic intuition remains the same – that we 
living beings are a community of fate. This is an active, interdependent 
relationship which is implicit in its being a sharing relationship as 
opposed to mere coexistence, even though the condition of coexistence 
is a necessary prerequisite for this relationship. It is a community of fate 
because it rests on sharing the most fundamental basis of everyone’s 
and everything’s being without giving individual beings a choice in 
the matter. It is precisely because it is a non- consensual sharing of 
destiny that makes it a community of fate. This means that in order 
to live, all beings XY have to share something – the Earth – which 
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that sharing does not imply any form of ownership in this context. 
Hence, justice is not borne out of an ownership relationship here. On 
the contrary, the argument here is that justice can apply without any 
form of common ownership held by all beings towards the Earth (see 
Chapter 8). Rather, the unowned status of the Earth frees the way for 
ecological justice – for life in common.
The notion of sharing re- emerges sporadically in writings about 
interspecies justice (broadly conceived). For example, in an insightful 
passage Plumwood argues the following:
Reductive and Othering modes of conception herald 
other forms of injustice, such as distributive injustice, 
preventing the conception of non- human others in ethical 
terms, distorting our distributive relationships with them, 
and legitimating insensitive commodity and instrumental 
approaches. We must take much more seriously concepts of 
distributive justice for non- humans, as not inferior or lower 
in priority to human justice issues. Interspecies distributive 
justice principles should stress the need to share the earth with 
other species (including difficult and inconvenient ones like 
snakes, crocodiles and bears – animals that are predators of 
humans or of animals under human protection) and provide 
adequate habitat for species life and reproduction. (2002, 
p. 117, emphasis added)
Decades before distributive justice gained traction in environmental 
ethics discourse Paul Taylor had also already stated that:
[t] he principle of distributive justice requires us to devise 
ways of transforming situations of confrontation into 
situations of mutual accommodation whenever it is possible 
to do so. In this way we can share the beneficial resources of 
the Earth equally with other members of the Community 
of Life. (1986, p. 293, emphasis added)
For most people this might not be a sufficient reason to believe that 
justice is supposed to apply in this context, because, while there might 
indeed be a relationship that is observable here it still does not lead 
to considerations of justice. They might simply want to concede that 
it is necessary to at least take nonhuman interests into consideration. 
However, one needs to recall the aforementioned distinction between 
70
ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE AND THE EXTINCTION CRISIS
distributing ecological space to nonhumans and depriving nonhumans 
of needed ecological space. To illustrate, humans do not own the Earth. 
The Earth is not owned but commonly inhabited by all species. Thus, 
by leaving enough ecological space for other species to live and flourish 
we, as humans, do not redistribute from the owners of these resources to 
some needy benefiters, but by taking more ecological space away than 
nonhumans would need we harm them by impeding their functioning 
and flourishing. This deprivation of ecological space that impedes 
flourishing appears prima facie to be an injustice. Whether it actually 
is an injustice is context- dependent as will be explained in Chapter 5. 
Hence, regarding wild nonhumans we can settle on a negative sense 
of justice which only requires us not to inhibit flourishing.
Furthermore, this is a biocentric account which puts life – or being 
alive – at the centre of attention. Even if one denies that being alive 
in a common biosphere primarily characterised by interconnectedness 
while all needing scarce ecological space is a sufficient condition for 
generating duties and entitlements of justice, one might still have to 
grant it some importance in the broader domain of ethics, where life 
is due at least some moral respect (see for example Holmes Rolston 
III 2012). Nevertheless, I want to make here a more specific case: a 
biocentric account of justice. Following the argument set out earlier, 
all living beings have needs which refer to their ability to live and 
to flourish. It is these needs, held by living entities that pursue their 
own good, that are in competition for the Earth’s goods. And it is 
because these needs refer to the same object – ecological space – and 
this object of need is clearly spatially circumscribed and without 
alternative – the Earth – that some kind of sharing arrangement needs 
to be found between all needy beings. Such an arrangement obviously 
cannot be actively negotiated by involving all beings that have a 
stake in its outcome, but from a human perspective the requirement 
is to take into account that all human usage of ecological space has 
an impact on the ability of other beings to live and flourish. The 
nonhuman usage of ecological space influences in turn what there is 
for humans to take (while assuming a finite planet). All living beings 
on Earth – beings that live and do not merely exist, have a good and 
can flourish – do not merely coexist on Earth by living independent 
lives but are bound together by a sharing relationship – a relationship 
that determines their fate. Therefore, the moral considerability of life 
and this sharing relationship that falls within the previously described 
CoJ are together enough to ground a biocentric account of interspecies 
justice to wild nonhumans.
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Returning to the bigger picture, I hope it has become apparent, 
by now, that it is useful for approaches to ecological justice to follow 
a four- step justification process to cover the necessary ground for 
developing a justice framework. This process should help to consistently 
argue for the inclusion of nonhuman beings in the community of 
justice and thus to aid the separation of interspecies justice from the 
more general discussion of environmental ethics. So far, following this 
structure I have illustrated how my proposal for grounding distributive 
interspecies justice to wild nonhumans is based on specific accounts of 
the circumstances of justice and justice itself. The resulting community 
of ecological justice constitutes a community of fate built on a sharing 
relationship. And even though the remainder of this book will focus 
on spelling out this particular distributive justice relationship between 
humans and wild nonhuman beings, it should be clear that justice is 
also applicable to other human- nonhuman entanglements that emerge, 
for example, from farming practices and city living. More enquiry is 
required into these justice relationships as well which are distinct to 
my focus on just biological conservation. Now, continuing to elaborate 
on this account of interspecies justice, I will turn to what constitutes 
an appropriate currency of justice – ecological space – in Chapter 4.
Notes
 1 ‘Welfare interests’ (in contrast to ‘preference interests’) is a concept that Baxter has 
adopted from David DeGrazia (1996).
 2 Of course, Armstrong (2012) might reject the point that justice can be distinguished 
from the broader realm of morality but that would go against a fairly widespread 
assumption in political theorising which has been defended by John Rawls (1971, 
1996) among others.
 3 I borrow here the term ‘problem background’ from Eric Brandstedt’s (2015) 
discussion of intergenerational justice.
 4 This section refers to Hume’s discussion in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals (1751) and A Treatise of Human Nature (2003(1739– 40)).
 5 In many ways my position is compatible with Palmer’s relational account of 
animal ethics, but a significant difference is that my negative interpretation of 
justice to wild nonhumans is relationship based, whereas for Palmer only duties 
to assist must have a relational grounding. Moreover, Palmer considers ‘wild’ 
animals to be ‘outside of the realm of justice’ (2010, p. 89). See also Paul Taylor’s 
‘rule of noninterference’ towards nature which he, however, distinguishes from 
his ‘principle of distributive justice’ which focuses on conflicts of ‘basic’ interests 
only (1986, pp. 172 and 270).
 6 As indicated previously, the justice relationships between humans and domesticated 
or ‘liminal’ species will differ from this case. That does not mean that these 
relationships do not also involve such a sharing component. Rather it means that 
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quality of these specific justice relationships and, in turn, these will impact on the 
overall context of the sharing component in these relationships.
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The Currency of Distributive 
Justice
Having established that it makes sense to speak of a community of 
justice when describing the human- wild nonhuman relationship, we 
can turn to the question of which principles of distributive justice 
follow from this account. However, first we need to establish what 
constitutes an appropriate currency of distribution in this context. 
Or, putting it differently, first we need a clear identification of an 
appropriate metric – that is, a distribuendum – of distributive ecological 
justice, because it is not self- evident what the good that gets distributed 
is supposed to be in this context. Because distributive ecological 
justice has not received much attention to date, the literature cannot 
give us very much guidance on that matter. Brian Baxter (2005) only 
points to environmental resources (with an acknowledgement of the 
ecological footprint concept and the importance of territories), and Val 
Plumwood (2002) refers to environmental resources and land that need 
to be shared between humans and nonhumans. Yet in order to evaluate 
current practices in terms of justice, the currency of justice needs more 
specification if it is to be operationalised in terms of being measurable 
and consequently distributable. Moreover, it also needs to include all 
goods of distribution relevant in the sphere of interspecies justice which 
are not exhausted by the environmental resources concept.
Fortunately, the debate is already more advanced in the realm of 
environmental justice, broadly defined. When writing about global 
distributive justice, Tim Hayward (2005, 2006a) introduces the 
concept of ecological space as an alternative to the global justice 
literature on the distribution of natural resources (see Beitz 1979, 
Pogge 2007, Wenar 2008). Hayward originally defined ecological 
space as comprising ‘all the environmental goods and natural resources 
that play a part in the socio- economic life of humankind’ (2007, 
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pp. 445– 6, emphasis in original), and the concept has consequently 
been adopted by other environmental political theorists (see Dobson 
2003, Vanderheiden 2009, Peeters et al 2015). For example, Steve 
Vanderheiden (2009) has also argued that looking at global justice 
as a problem of how to allocate ecological space has a number of 
advantages. These advantages are, according to Vanderheiden, that it 
highlights the global nature of most environmental harms, allows for 
‘robust analyses’ of intergenerational duties, and crucially ‘the analysis 
of anthropocentric obligations like those inherent in distributive justice 
can be made commensurable with duties of environmental ethics 
insofar as both involve allocating ecological space as the core means of 
satisfying their distinct categories of obligations’ (2009, p. 271). This 
is indeed the important bridge between environmental justice and 
ecological justice considerations that ecological space can establish. 
If environmental justice – which is already clearly established in the 
domain of the political in theory and practice – and ecological justice 
are two sides of the same coin, as I understand their relationship, then 
there needs to be some common ground that these two spheres of justice 
share, and ecological space as a distribuendum can constitute just 
that. This link enables us to then consider the relationship between 
environmental and interspecies justice, and in turn enables a more 
inclusive picture of justice on one planet.
Even though ecological space is a promising concept for theories 
of justice, it also has remained under- specified, and it is attributed a 
multitude of different meanings by different theorists. Thus, some 
analytical clarity is needed and, building on this literature, I will propose 
a definition of ecological space that is useful for our specific problem- 
context. Importantly the resulting definition simultaneously allows 
it to function as a distribuendum for theories of environmental and 
ecological justice. For this purpose, as currency of justice it needs to 
be expanded to take into account environmental benefits and burdens 
beyond natural resources (Bell 2015). In this manner ecological space 
can shed the anthropocentric connotations of its initial interpretations 
without losing its analytical benefits in the sphere of social justice. The 
challenge is that, on the one side, ecological space needs to be a concept 
specific enough in order to be more content- laden than just referring 
to manna from heaven, but also needs to be wide enough to encompass 
more than merely what is valued by humans in order to be applicable 
equally to both spheres of green justice – that is, environmental and 
interspecies theories of distributive justice.
I will refer to ecological space as ES in the following sections. I begin 
with providing a short survey of how the concept of ES has been used 
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in environmental political theory and how it relates to similar concepts. 
Based on this, it is possible to propose that green theories of justice 
should understand ES as the (potential) benefits provided by the Earth’s 
life- support systems (as, for example pollination) and physical resources 
such as land, and non- renewable and renewable natural resources. 
In the second section I will then explain why this is an appropriate 
distribuendum for green theories of justice and indicate how such an 
understanding of ES might be operationalised in order to assess real 
world distribution problems.
Different interpretations of ecological space
The term ES is used in several contexts in ecology, geography and 
political theory. Even though within all these contexts the outer 
structure of the concept remains the same by referring to some 
amount, or range, of ecological benefits and environmental parameters 
via a space metaphor, the actual specific content of the different ES 
definitions varies. As a consequence, ES seems vague, which prevents 
it from being as useful as it could be for green theories of justice. 
However, as already said, if clearly specified it could be a promising 
way to bridge the divide between justice theorising about humans 
and nonhumans. For this purpose, let us survey how ES has been 
understood in the environmental political theory literature and see 
what perspective offers the most potential for bridging the gap. Four 
different meanings predominate:
1) ecological space as what is specifically (and maybe only) measured 
by the ecological footprint indicator;
2) ecological space as environmental services;
3) ecological space as environmental services and (material) goods, that 
is, natural resources;
4) ecological space as describing a species’ ecological niche.
Primarily, the concept of ES has been championed and made popular 
in the field of political theory for more than a decade by Hayward 
(2005, 2006a, 2007, 2015). As mentioned, his target of critique was the 
global justice literature on the distribution of natural resources, and he 
initially proposed ES as an alternative to considering the distribution 
of natural resources because of its closer link to global inequalities 
in wealth.1 In Hayward’s earlier writings on the topic, he focuses 
on natural resources and their human use, and argues that natural 




ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE AND THE EXTINCTION CRISIS
(2006, p.  349) and understood to ‘include environmental services 
and energy’ (2006, p. 357) according to meaning (3).2 In more recent 
work, he also draws on ecological science, and conceptualises ES more 
abstractly, and in less human- focused terms, ‘[a] s what is provided 
for particular species or populations by their ecological niche’ (2015, 
p. 2, emphasis in original). This is meaning (4). In practice, Hayward 
sees the ecological footprint indicator as an appropriate methodology 
for measuring ES usage, which I have categorised as meaning (1). 
According to Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, who developed 
the ecological footprint indicator, the ‘[e]cological footprint analysis is 
an accounting tool that enables us to estimate the resource consumption 
and waste assimilation requirements of a defined human population 
or economy in terms of a corresponding productive land area’ (1996, 
p. 9). For theoretical purposes, Hayward then in turn advocates that 
ES ‘should be conceived as the ongoing initial appropriation of nature 
by humans’ (2006, p. 360), based on which he argues that a Lockean 
sufficiency proviso to ‘leave enough and as good’ should apply to these 
acts of initial appropriation. This then leads him to argue for an equal 
per capita right to ES globally (Hayward 2006a). We will look more 
closely at this specific claim in Chapter 5.3
Yet, returning to the notion of an ecological niche, it seems that 
within Hayward’s own account of ES his linking of this concept to the 
idea of an ecological niche is the feature that does not fully add up. 
On the one side, he paints a resource- based picture of ES with a focus 
on environmental goods and services that humans use (see Hayward 
2005, 2006a, 2007). On the other side, he refers to the concept of an 
ecological niche (see Hayward 2015) which holds several connotations 
in the field of ecology. In ecology, the term ecological niche can 
refer to the ‘recess niche’, the ‘population- persistence niche’, or the 
‘resource- utilisation niche’ (Schoener 2009). Hayward’s understanding 
of an ecological niche is based on the population- persistence niche 
first proposed by G.E. Hutchinson which allows for the distinction 
to be made between a fundamental niche – ‘the general conditions 
functionally required for its persistence and reproduction’  – and a 
realised niche – ‘the actual, realized, circumstances that pertain for a 
given population’ – of a species (Hayward 2015, endnote 7, p. 12). 
This then allows Hayward to nicely illustrate humanity’s unsustainable 
practices as an expansion of their realised niche, which ‘requires large 
and continual subsidies of energy, food and other resources’ (Freedman 
2016 quoted in Hayward 2015, p. 3).
Even though, at first sight, the insights from ecology appear 
to enrich the ES concept, there remains a lingering tension in 
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this two-dimensional understanding of ES. My contention is that 
requiring energy, food and other resources understood as ES in order 
to increase humanity’s realised niche is not identical to understanding 
humanity’s ecological niche itself as ES. Putting it differently, 
Thomas Schoener states that ‘Hutchinson formulates the ecological 
niches as a quantitative description of the range of environmental 
conditions that allow a population to persist in some locations’; 
such environmental conditions being, for example, temperature and 
humidity (Schoener 2009, p. 4). These environmental conditions, 
however, do not play a role in the more resource- based ES definition 
that Hayward initially defended. Hence, it seems that, in political 
theory at least, a choice has to be made regarding what ES refers 
to. For the sake of clarity, it appears that access to certain resources or 
ecosystem benefits such as coal or clean air, which can be deemed useful 
by individual beings, should not be confused with environmental 
conditions, such as temperature, which set the boundaries of where 
and when certain species can persist. Of course, not all environmental 
goods and services have value for all kinds of living beings. Mineral 
non- renewable resources are an example of an environmental good 
that is only deemed valuable by humans; and only during the most 
recent section of human history. If the aim is to consider how to 
distribute ES between people and between species, it needs a more 
singular meaning – not in all fields of enquiry but definitely within 
a theory of justice.
Other theorists have also considered ES as a currency of justice. Like 
Hayward, Vanderheiden understands ES as ‘life- supporting natural 
resource- based goods and services, conceived in spatial terms’ (2009, 
p. 257). That is again meaning (3). He also refers back to the ecological 
footprint as the appropriate measurement of ES (meaning (1)) and 
thereby perceives the ecological footprint to imply ‘a normative ideal of 
global resource egalitarianism’ (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 435). The main 
innovative feature that Vanderheiden adds to Hayward’s perspective 
is that he conceptualises ES as ‘space for autonomy’, within which 
individuals, that is, humans, ‘can act according to [their] own view 
of the good’ (Vanderheiden 2009, p. 257), which introduces a new 
perspective into liberal justice. Hence, both Vanderheiden and Hayward 
argue for global resource egalitarianism by invoking the ES concept. In 
doing so, Hayward puts emphasis on how using ES is a form of ‘initial 
appropriation’; something that libertarians have traditionally (but not 
exclusively) been especially concerned with. In contrast, Vanderheiden 
tries to show how his global resource egalitarianism can be integrated 
into the tradition of liberal justice.
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Another different but related perspective on ES is provided by 
Peeters, Dirix and Sterckx (2012, 2015). They propose an integration 
of thinking about ES and the capabilities approach in order to gain, 
in their words, ‘a comprehensive account of equitable and sustainable 
distribution’ (Peeters et al 2015, p. 481). Their account combines the 
ES idea to account for sustainability and the capabilities approach 
to stress the importance of individual freedom (see Chapter 6 for a 
critique of the latter). A combination of this is what they recommend 
as the appropriate distribuendum in a theory of distributive justice. 
They do not go into details on what such a hybrid currency of 
justice would look like, but in the context of their discussion that 
specifically considers issues of environmental and interspecies justice as 
I understand them – though not labelled by them in this way – it seems 
that they only consider ES as the distribuendum, and the capabilities 
approach merely as a guide on how to distribute ‘the material conditions, 
which ultimately rely on ecological space’ (2015, p. 489, emphasis 
in original). Still, as will be discussed later, it is helpful for analytical 
clarity to keep the means and ends of distributive justice distinct, which 
does not seem to be easily compatible with what Peeters et al try to 
achieve with their hybrid distribuendum. Nevertheless, they work 
with a broad understanding of ES that encompasses all ‘provisional, 
regulating, cultural, and supporting services that ecosystems and the 
Earth as a whole deliver’ (2015, p. 482). That is meaning (2), because 
their focus appears to lie on environmental services rather than 
resources. Regarding measuring ES, they also point to the ecological 
footprint (meaning (1)), but in addition to greenhouse gas emission 
permits and the ‘Safe Operating Space for Humanity’ (see for the 
latter Rockström et al 2009).
A further example of ES being discussed in a political theory 
context is provided by the work of Andrew Dobson. In his 
Citizenship and the Environment, Dobson (2003) argues for ‘ecological 
citizenship’ which gives rise to citizenship rights and obligations for 
(all) humans.4 Based on this position, he argues that ‘obligations of 
ecological citizenship are due to anyone who is owed ecological 
space’ (2003, p. 120), and the main obligation for individuals – that 
is, humans  – to fulfil is to have sustainable individual ecological 
footprint levels that do not exceed the total available ES on Earth 
when aggregated (see meaning (1)). It is important for Dobson to 
distinguish between the causal impacts of individuals’ ecological 
footprints, which bring about obligations of ecological citizenship, 
and the global ‘moral community’ which might generate moral 
prerogatives independently of causation.5
 
 
THE CURRENCY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
79
In all four examples sketched so far, the theorists concerned with 
ES consider it in conjunction with the ecological footprint as an 
appropriate operationalisation. This is because the analysis that 
generates the ecological footprint indicator draws on several categories 
of ES – understood in the literal sense of space as actual sections of the 
surface of the Earth. These are ‘arable land, pasture land, built/ degraded 
land, forest land, productive seas space, energy land and biodiversity 
land’ (Chambers et al 2000, p. 61). Biodiversity land, for example, is 
defined in this analysis as ‘the land needed to ensure the protection 
for the planet’s 15 million, or so, non- human species’ (2000, p. 63).
Of course, there are also other accounts written in the same spirit 
as our four examples that focus on ES, but which do not actually 
refer to the idea of ES itself. Fabian Schuppert’s (2012) argument for 
a universal right to the benefits of life- sustaining ecosystem services 
is such an example. Schuppert emphasises the difference between 
ecosystem services and specific physical resources, and conceptualises 
natural resources in terms of ecosystem services. Ecosystem services can 
be subdivided into the categories of provisioning, regulating, cultural 
and supporting ecosystem services. While supporting ecosystem 
services (as for example soil formation) uphold the other three kinds of 
services, Schuppert deems only provisioning ecosystem services (such 
as generation of wood and so on) and regulating ecosystem services 
(such as pollination and climate regulation) as actual ‘life- sustaining’ 
services towards which his universal right applies (Schuppert 2012). 
This universal right, in turn, would then be a constraint on distributive 
claims towards specific physical resources (for example land or non- 
renewable mineral resources) towards which this universal right does 
not apply. If Schuppert’s account would be framed in terms of ES, 
he might argue that his universal right applies to ES defined as ‘life- 
sustaining’ environmental services in line with meaning (2).
Before turning to more substantive matters, it is useful also to discuss 
briefly the terminology surrounding the ES concept. It has two main 
competitors: environmental space and eco- space, and the similarity of 
their names likely creates some confusion. For one, ecological space and 
environmental space are often used interchangeably (such as in ecology) 
which makes it sometimes difficult to navigate the conceptual waters. 
However, in other discourses environmental space is also the name of 
a sustainability indicator on par with the ecological footprint. In this 
context, environmental space is not a single indicator but rather a ‘set of 
resource consumption indicators’, each with its own yardstick of what 
is considered sustainable (Chambers et al 2000, p. 21). The ecological 
footprint, on the other hand, is an aggregate indicator in which several 
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dimensions of resource use are integrated. Hence, this understanding 
of environmental space embodies a set of measurements that try to 
make claims about sustainable/ unsustainable practices and, therefore, 
operates on a different level than ecological space, which embodies 
a more general idea of the Earth’s capacity, as illustrated by how it is 
employed by political theorists. Therefore, environmental space is an 
indicator – that is, a measuring tool – that stands in contrast to ES 
which is a more general concept that can potentially be measured to 
a degree using such indicators as environmental space.
The relationship between eco- space and ES is less clear. The eco- space 
concept appears in Rafael Ziegler’s work, and it is not immediately 
obvious how he understands its relationship with ecological space. At 
first it seems that Ziegler (2007), who critiques Hayward’s ES proposal, 
equates ES with eco- space. However, in the same paper he traces ES 
back to Hans Opschoor (1992), who originated the environmental space 
indicator, and to reports by the Friends of the Earth, even though these 
reports are also associated with the environmental space approach. This 
confusion is clarified in a later publication in which Ziegler (2009) 
distinguishes between Umweltraum – that is, environmental space – and 
footprint space which is based on the ecological footprint indicator, 
which is in turn usually linked to ES. Hence, it seems that Ziegler 
understands eco- space as a superordinate general concept that spans 
over an array of different sustainability indicators and measurements. 
This is how I will argue ES should also be understood.
A new definition
Given all these different understandings of ES in environmental political 
theory, which definition is the most appropriate? As hinted at earlier 
there are at least two criteria that must be fulfilled. On the one side, 
ES needs to be a concept more specific than manna from heaven, but 
on the other side it needs also to be wide enough to encompass more 
than merely what is valued by humans in order to be applicable to 
environmental and interspecies justice. So how do the four different 
meanings of ES found in the literature help us here?
The problem is that none of these definitions of ES is able to fulfil 
both criteria for the following three reasons. Firstly, if ES is merely 
understood as what is measured by the ecological footprint indicator 
(meaning (1)) then it remains an inherently anthropocentric concept, 
since it only focuses on what is needed by humans and thus it can 
only measure ES in terms of human use. Even though it allows for 
taking into consideration nonhuman interests by setting aside ES for 
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biodiversity as ‘biodiversity land’ (Chambers et al 2000), ES is still mainly 
conceptualised as what is valuable for humans, such as agricultural or 
energy space. In order to also be applicable to interspecies justice, 
the close ties between ES and the ecological footprint have to be 
loosened. This does not mean that ES cannot be operationalised by the 
ecological footprint; rather, ES should be understood as a superordinate 
general concept which spans over an array of different sustainability 
indicators and measurements including the ecological footprint, similar 
to how Ziegler (2009) appears to understand eco- space. Later we will 
look at some ways of how such a wider understanding of ES can be 
operationalised – that is, how ES can be applied to the distributional 
conflicts in the real world.
Secondly, again regarding the second criterion, the concept of 
ecosystem services (meanings (2)  and (3)) is too anthropocentric to 
describe the content of ecological space. This is because ecosystem 
services are usually understood as ‘the conditions and processes 
through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them 
up, sustain and fulfil human life’ (Daily 1997, p. 3). Again, this does 
not help us when aiming to provide a definition of ES that can also be 
meaningful in the nonhuman context. Therefore, an alternative non- 
anthropocentric framing of what is usually understood as ecosystem 
services would be the (potential) benefits provided by the Earth’s life- support 
systems to living beings, as the focus then lies on what is needed by life 
in general, rather than by human life in particular. The qualification 
‘potential’ indicates that what we are after is the full theoretical amount 
of such benefits at a given moment in time, rather than what is actually 
being benefited from at that moment.
Thirdly, from a distributive justice perspective it does not seem useful 
to understand ES as what is provided by each species’ niche (meaning 
(4)). This is because the concept of an ecological niche – as Hayward 
(2015) seems to use it – entails the wellbeing of each species and what 
resources and ‘services’ are needed for the wellbeing of each species. In 
other words, besides the fact that the ecological niche concept makes 
reference to the environmental conditions under which a certain 
species can live well, it also judges what benefits provided by the Earth’s 
life- support systems and physical resources are needed for a species’ 
wellbeing. If, however, ES is supposed to function as a distribuendum 
within a theory of distributive justice, a clearer distinction needs to 
be made between what is distributed and how the distribution should 
look. For the purpose of analytical clarity this seems to imply that the 
ecological niche concept obscures this distinction, and that ES should 
rather be limited to what is needed for wellbeing (the currency of 
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justice). How ES then converts into wellbeing, and how it should be 
distributed, should be an issue addressed by a different part of a green 
distributive justice theory: the principle(s) of justice.
Overall, ES has to be limited to, but also encompass, most that is 
needed for the wellbeing of all kinds of life on Earth in order to fulfil 
the two criteria discussed. This leads to an understanding of ES as the 
(potential) benefits provided by the Earth’s life- support systems (such 
as pollination) and physical resources (such as land, non- renewable and 
renewable natural resources). With the wellbeing of living beings in 
mind, that leads us to also including physical resources in addition to 
system benefits in our definition, because all living beings require some 
amount of land, or three- dimensional space, which counts as a physical 
resource. If that were not the case, then there would be no need to 
debate the size of nature reserves or the amount of private and green 
spaces people living in large cities need to minimise the burden of the 
stress of modern living conditions. Moreover, most humans’ wellbeing 
is dependent on the use of non- renewable physical resources, at least 
for the time being. That does not apply to everyone but many people 
are heavily reliant on this type of physical resources to provide the basis 
for their ability to live a flourishing life and to even survive. Therefore, 
it seems necessary to conceptualise ES as both the benefits provided by 
the Earth’s life- support systems and physical resources, because it can 
then embody the most basic instrumental goods that different kinds 
of living beings need in order to live their lives.
Ecological space as a currency of justice
If  ES, understood in this way, is the appropriate distribuendum for 
green theories of justice, then it is useful to shed some light on the 
different ways in which individual beings can interact with it and thereby 
influence its distribution. I propose that there are at least four relevant 
dimensions in this context: using, generating, degrading and being.6
The using ES dimension is where the focus of discussions has 
been targeted so far; questions of who uses how much and how the 
distributional patterns of ES can constitute fair shares. In the using 
context, Hayward (2015) distinguishes between using, occupying and 
commanding a share of ecological space. Literally, using ES here means 
the use of ES passively or actively by an individual to sustain its body 
and pursue its projects. Occupying and commanding operate on a more 
abstract level and link to property rights. According to Hayward, the 
occupation of ES refers to the normative ability to exclude others from 
a particular share of ES without necessarily having to use it, because 
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it is backed by social norms about holding property. Command of ES 
differs from occupation by implying a potential, rather than an actual, 
occupation of ES by holding ‘a power to create or extinguish rights of 
exclusion’ via, for example, one’s purchasing power (Hayward 2015, 
p. 7). Hayward’s analysis aims at illuminating the different aspects of 
ES distribution between humans, and hence he refers to social norms 
that bring about property rights that translate into occupying and 
commanding ecological space. Therefore, occupying and commanding 
ES refer to actual property rights for Hayward and this nicely illustrates 
one of the ways that ES can be conceptually linked to social institutions. 
In contrast, as I will expand upon in Chapter 8, natural property rights 
that are often attributed to humans are rather problematic if the interests 
of nonhumans are taken into account. For example, accounts that claim 
that humans hold a common ownership of the Earth are problematic 
because they provide normative legitimacy for human occupation and 
command of ES vis- à- vis nonhumans. Hence, when taking nonhumans 
into account, it is not just the actual human use of ES that matters; it 
is also important to consider how such use by humans is supposedly 
supported by claims that attribute vast normatively justified powers to 
humans to occupy and command ecological space.
The second dimension of ES interactions is the generation of 
ecological space. Some parts of ES are constantly renewed – these 
are the aforementioned benefits provided by the Earth’s life- support 
systems. These systems, however, rely heavily on the ‘labour’ of many 
living beings in order to function, like, for example, the degradation 
of waste by billions of bacteria or the provision of oxygen by the 
photosynthesis of plants. Thirdly, as it can be generated, ES can also 
be degraded which reduces the overall amount of ES available and, in 
the most extreme scenario, putting too much stress on the Earth’s 
life- supporting systems can even lead to their collapse. This possibility 
shows that a distinction needs to be made between simple use and 
degrading use of ES which leads to a reduction of available space that 
could be used by future human and nonhuman beings. The use of ES 
that causes degradation, in turn, includes all kinds of ES usage that are 
environmentally unsustainable.
The last notable dimension of ES interactions is being ecological 
space. For example, human bodies are themselves ES by providing the 
habitat of many different species of bacteria which either merely live 
on us, or live in symbiosis with us during our lives. Later on, human 
bodies turn into a different kind of ES that nurtures other living beings 
after death. Acknowledging that humans do not just use but also are 
themselves ES helps to revise the human- nature dualism entrenched 
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in modern Western thinking which perpetuates the degradation of 
ecological space. As Val Plumwood argues, ‘an ecological understanding 
of the self can point towards such reshaping narratives and practices’, 
which she understands as a ‘more fluid and embodied concept of self 
and its boundaries’ (2008, p. 328). One route to such an ecological 
understanding of the self is becoming aware that humans are not just at 
the receiving end of distribution but also instrumental to the flourishing 
of other beings as habitats and food. In Chapter 5, I will explain why 
there are good reasons for excluding human bodies from distribution, 
despite constituting ecological space, but the relevant point here is that 
being aware of humans’ bodies being included into the Earth’s ES as well 
as the generating ES dimension encourages a less dualistic perspective 
of what is perceived as the Earth. In other words, it encourages a more 
ecologically sound imaginary and, similarly, Hayward argues that the 
ES concept ‘can support and inspire a particular way of seeing’ (2015, 
p. 2, emphasis in original). This is useful insofar as both environmental 
and interspecies justice can gain from a non- anthropocentric vision 
of the world.
In contrast to being and generating ecological space, the using and 
degrading dimensions are more immediately practically relevant for 
considerations of distributive justice as they, among other things, can 
be measured, and thus, distributed or ground calls for compensation. 
Therefore, when consider ing whether ES is an appropriate 
distribuendum for environmental and interspecies justice, the focus 
lies primarily on the using and degrading dimensions of interaction. 
For example, distributive justice can make sense of fair shares of ES use 
and the injustice of ES degradation. However, what is considered just 
is in turn informed by an attitude to nature that should be informed 
by the generating and being ES dimensions.
This shows how ES fits into the distributive justice context but, so 
far, I have taken it as a given rather than given reasons for why ES is 
supposed to be an appropriate distribuendum for green theories of 
justice in the first place. Five (not necessarily exhaustive) points give 
us good grounds for focusing on ES instead of potential alternatives. 
Firstly, in comparison to the global justice literature on natural 
resources, ES is more inclusive than only focusing on natural physical 
resources because it better tracks all the environmental goods and life- 
supporting systems that humans and other living beings actually use. 
As has been already convincingly argued by Hayward (2006a), global 
environmental justice should focus on ES instead of natural resources 
because of its closer connection to actual economic value, and hence 
global inequalities. Accordingly, in the case of global environmental 
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justice at least, I will assume that a strong case for ES has been made. 
Regarding interspecies justice, it seems fairly apparent that focusing 
on physical resources alone provides only a limited picture of the 
human- nonhuman distribution conflicts. If the distribuendum of 
interspecies justice were limited in that manner, it could only account 
for the uneven distribution of habitat which does not exhaust the 
relevant distribution conflicts. Having said that, habitat distribution is 
an important conflict within this realm, which is why that is also the 
problem that will be looked at closer in Chapter 9.
Secondly, ES is a broad enough concept to allow for individual 
differences between how it is used by humans. For example, a theory 
can prescribe equal shares of ES for each individual human and would 
still allow people to have different kinds of ES usage as long as their 
usage adds up to the same overall amount. As we have seen, this 
appears to be one of the reasons Vanderheiden (2009) supports ES as 
the appropriate distribuendum between humans.
The third reason is that considering ES as a currency of justice allows 
for maintaining a distinction between resources and welfare; if ES is 
defined as I have proposed earlier. If what is needed for wellbeing and 
the wellbeing of individual living beings are conflated into one single 
currency of justice, then it becomes difficult to distinguish between 
ecological space, which is finite, and the wellbeing of individuals. 
Their wellbeing is dependent on ES but potentially exceeds what can 
actually be provided by the ES available. As discussed previously, how 
ES converts into wellbeing and how it should be distributed should 
be tackled by the principle(s) of justice instead of the currency of 
justice itself. It is important to distinguish between what is – that is, 
ES as the currency of justice – and what ideally ought to be – the ES 
needed for wellbeing. For example, just because there ought to be a 
certain amount of ES to satisfy all relevant needs does not mean that 
the required amount of ES is actually available, which is precisely 
where considerations of justice can come in as a normative guide. 
A distinction needs to be kept between what can be distributed and 
how it should be distributed which links back to the problem of 
scarcity. If what is needed for the minimal wellbeing of individuals 
provides the lower boundary of sufficiency, then the upper boundary 
is given by the available ES (for a range of perspectives on sufficiency 
see Spengler 2016). Both thresholds can then inform the principle(s) 
of justice, but they are not identical. This distinction is obscured by 
the hybrid currency of justice – combining ES with the capabilities 
approach – proposed by Peeters et al (2015) and by Hayward’s (2015) 
conceptualisation of ES as what is provided by ecological niches, 
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because the concept of a niche refers to both – the available ES and 
what resources are required.
Fourthly, and crucially, ES provides a linkage in the form of a common 
ground between environmental and interspecies distributive justice 
when it is understood according to my definition. If environmental 
and interspecies justice are understood as two sides of the same coin 
constituted by ES and symbolising living on Earth justly and sustainably, 
then ES can embody a distribuendum that (1) is applicable to both 
domains; (2) is general enough to cover most interactions living beings 
have with the Earth; and (3) therefore allows for more integration of 
these two domains of justice. In turn that means that ES allows for 
comparisons between these two dimensions of justice and thereby 
enables the analysis of distributional conflicts between humans and 
nonhuman beings.
Lastly, ES – more specifically, the using and degrading interactions 
of individuals with ES – can be operationalised. That is useful insofar 
as it allows theories of environmental and interspecies justice to make 
assessments of actually existing distributional patterns and actual use 
of ES, and then make concrete recommendations to achieve a more 
just distribution. This means that ES is not a sustainability indicator 
itself, but that it can be operationalised via a range of such measuring 
tools which are indicators that can approximate ES.
Operationalisation
As we have seen, most mentions of ES consider it in conjunction with 
the ecological footprint as an appropriate operationalisation. This is 
because the analysis that generates the ecological footprint indicator 
draws on different kinds of ecological space understood as different 
kinds of land use.7 However, the ecological footprint indicator is 
only a useful operationalisation of one of the four dimensions of ES 
interactions; namely the use of ES by humans, due to the kinds of ES 
use it includes in its calculations.8 Because the ecological footprint 
indicator provides a snapshot in time of (some) use, it also cannot 
account directly for the degradation dimension which stretches across 
time. Moreover, it is not able to track all the different kinds of human 
ES use, such as fresh water use (Hoekstra 2009).9 Hence, measuring ES 
via the ecological footprint will not provide all information needed for 
considerations about justice because it is not able to track all relevant 
dimensions of ecological space.
In order to provide a more complete picture, complementary 
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helpful additional indicators, but this is only meant as an initial general 
overview that needs to be developed in order to provide a more detailed 
approximation of ecological space as defined previously. Firstly, the 
HANPP (Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production) indicator, 
complements the ecological footprint by being able to tackle  – at 
least to a degree  – the degradation dimension of ES interactions. 
First introduced by Vitousek et al (1986), it is an ‘aggregate indicator 
of pressure on biodiversity’ by considering how much area is used 
by humans as well as considering how ‘intense’ the use of that area 
is (EJOLT 2013). An important difference between the ecological 
footprint and HANPP is that the HANPP can show how intensely an 
area is used by humans – a way of illustrating ‘human domination’ – 
whereby the ecological footprint measures how much ‘area’ is used 
exclusively by humans (Haberl et  al 2004). Because high levels of 
intense use correlate with degradation of ecological space, the HANPP 
is able to illuminate this particular dimension of ES interactions, and 
this sustainability indicator therefore appears particularly relevant for 
interspecies justice considerations.10
For global environmental justice, in turn, ecological debt can introduce 
the historical dimension of unequal use which the ecological 
footprint cannot provide. According to Paredis et al (2008), a state’s 
(here: country A) ecological debt comprises:
1) ecological damage caused over time by country A in other countries 
or in an area under jurisdiction of another country through its 
production and consumption patterns, and/ or;
2) ecological damage caused over time by country A to ecosystems 
beyond national jurisdiction through its consumption and 
production patters, and/ or;
3) the exploitation or use of ecosystems and ecosystem goods and 
services over time by country A at the expense of the equitable 
rights to these ecosystems and ecosystem goods and services of 
other countries or individuals. (2008, p. 40, emphasis of original 
not retained).
Based on this definition, Gert Goeminne and Erik Paredis (2010) 
provide a ‘quantification methodology’ in order to turn the ecological 
debt concept into an indicator of the unequal historical ecological 
impact of countries. Their methodology, based on material flow 
analysis, tracks ecological footprints and environmental space over 
time to account for usage, and combines these with ‘indicators for 
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pollution, depletion and degradation’ in order to account for ecological 
damage (2010, p. 703, Fig. 1). The resulting metric is able to account 
for ‘ecologically unequal exchange’ (see Martinez- Alier 2002) as well 
as overuse of (some) ES in terms of justice.11
Of course, the reliance on different indicators for measuring ES comes 
with dangers. As Ziegler points out, ‘[t] he shift from disagreement on 
values to agreement on measurements is in practice an empowerment 
of those who set the (measurable) criteria’ (2009, p. 170). Thus, relying 
on measurable indicators generates complicated questions about power 
and epistemology, which will have to be set aside for now because they 
would involve a considerable detour. Keeping the problematic features 
of relying on measurements in mind, the decisive beneficial feature of 
measurement tools for my purpose is that they have the potential to 
give green distributive justice means to make more concrete judgements 
in specific cases and, thus, give it more discursive weight.
Before moving on to discuss what principles of justice follow in 
Chapter 5, I would like to reiterate the key point:  there are good 
reasons for green political theorists to understand ES as the potential 
benefits provided by the Earth’s life- support systems and physical 
resources, such as non- renewable and renewable natural resources. 
This understanding of ES is determined enough to function as a 
distribuendum within a theory of justice, but broad enough to be 
applicable to both environmental and interspecies justice. As we will 
see in the following chapters, ES provides the necessary link between 
these two domains of distributive justice  – their interactions and 
conflicts – to be able get a more complete picture of the distributive 
justice relations that regard the material conditions of life on Earth.
Notes
 1 In particular, Hayward critically engaged with the theories of Thomas Pogge 
who argues for a ‘Global Resources Dividend’ to redistribute wealth globally, and 
Charles Beitz who argues for an ‘international original position’ (see Hayward 
2005, 2006).
 2 Hayward attributes this understanding of ES to work by the ecological economist 
Nicholas Georgescu- Roegen (1976) who called attention to the significance of the 
second law of thermodynamics. As John Dryzek explains, ‘[t] he fact that there is 
only a limited supply of low entropy or order on this planet has major economic 
implications. Low entropy is really the ultimate form of scarcity. It exists in mineral 
structures, concentrated fossil fuels, in ecosystems; but human economic activity 
is running down the supply of low entropy’ (2013, p. 34, emphasis added). Thus, 
this background of the ES concept should be kept in mind with an eye towards 
the problem of scarcity that will be discussed in Chapter 5.
 3 See Ton Bührs (2009) for a critique of Hayward’s proposal. However, Bührs 
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ecological space, ecological footprint) appears to misrepresent Hayward’s proposal, 
because he attributes to Hayward and the ecological footprint indicator the inability 
to make per capita comparisons, which is exactly something that both Hayward 
and the creators of the ecological footprint aim to provide.
 4 Note that Dobson is unconvinced by the idea of interspecies justice and hence 
considers only humans to be part of the ‘citizen community’ (2003, p. 88).
 5 Dobson (2006) understands this to ground a ‘thick cosmopolitan’ theory of global 
justice.
 6 Arguably, there are also additional ways in which individuals interact with ES such 
as maintaining or even strengthening existing ecological space.
 7 For a critique of the ecological footprint indicator see G. Cornelis van Kooten 
and Erwin Bulte (2000) and Nathan Fiala (2008).
 8 The ecological footprint indicator’s usefulness for considerations of ecological justice 
is limited because it is only indirectly related to biodiversity. However, it is used in 
practice as a measure of pressure on biodiversity (Global Footprint Network n.d.).
 9 The water footprint – introduced in 2002 – is a complementary measurement to 
the ecological footprint indicator (Global Footprint Network n.d.).
 10 In addition, BioScore is a ‘biodiversity impact assessment’ tool that was first 
introduced in 2009 and is still being developed (Hendriks et al 2016, p. 4).













The Principles of Distributive 
Justice
In the context of a multitude of environmental crises and in regard to 
considerations about distributive justice in particular, it has become 
apparent that the circumstance of scarcity plays an important role for the 
articulation of appropriate principles of justice. Based on the assumption 
that ecological space is (to a degree) finite, considering different 
scarcity scenarios becomes highly relevant in order for considerations 
of distributive justice to be able to make recommendations for a world 
shaped by scarcity, which in turn is where distributive justice becomes 
most salient. This issue is the focus of this chapter.
Despite the preparatory reflections in the previous chapters, there 
is still a lot of ground to cover. I begin by looking more closely at 
the character of scarcity of ecological space in the first section and 
then turn to the demands of environmental and ecological justice 
in moderate scarcity scenarios. Based on this, I will introduce a grid 
of different principles of justice that follow from different, more 
demanding, scarcity scenarios in section three. Finally, in section four, 
I will sketch some of the theoretical space surrounding this distributive 
justice framework by highlighting, among other things, its links with 
environmental virtue ethics.
Scarcity of ecological space
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is an influential paradigm in political 
theorising according to which distributive justice is only considered in 
circumstances of moderate scarcity where all needs could theoretically 
be met. Yet we also want a theory of justice to account for situations 
where scarcity is more severe. As argued by Donald Hubin, moderate 
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moderate scarcity underlying most theories of distributive justice 
because ‘while goods are assumed to be scarce relative to desire for 
them, they are abundant relative to our minimal needs’ (Hubin 1989, 
p. 185). Thus, Hubin concludes that moderate scarcity ‘might as well 
be called “moderate abundance” ’ (1989, p. 185). Thus, the concept 
of moderate scarcity is actually not really about actual scarcity at all. 
This is troublesome insofar as material scarcity is one of the main 
complications of distributive justice in particular and, in general, a 
major obstacle to achieving some kind of sustainability, an important 
feature of which is the acknowledgment of limits. When also taking 
into consideration that a large number of human and nonhuman beings 
live on this finite planet, dependent on what it provides, then the issue 
of scarcity becomes unavoidable.
Consequently, what are the implications for global distributive justice 
once we stop assuming that we live in a world with abundant, limitless 
resources? Relevant to this issue, Andrew Dobson argues that:
economics has paid much more attention to the distinction 
between, and implications of, full worlds and empty worlds 
than political theory. Economics has its critiques of empty 
world scenarios and has articulated its full world alternatives 
to a degree that political theory has not even begun to 
imagine. So much political theorising is done as if scarcity 
was only ever a local and contingent problem – and this is 
reflected in the fact that scarcity- thinking is confined to a 
relatively small and relatively independent field of political 
theorising:  social and distributive justice. The task for 
political theory is arguably the same as that which [Herman] 
Daly outlines for economics: “As the world becomes full 
of us and our stuff, it becomes empty of what was here 
before. To deal with this new pattern of scarcity, scientists 
need to develop a ‘full world’ economics to replace our 
traditional ‘empty world economics’ ”. What might a “full 
world” political theory look like? (2013, pp. 249– 50; with 
citation from Herman Daly 2005, p. 102)
Dobson might be even too charitable in his assessment of what resembles 
scarcity blindness in political theory. Actual scarcity does not feature in 
most discussions of distributive justice besides being implied in debates 
of intergenerational justice – where current generations might leave 
conditions of scarcity for future generations – or considered in debates 
in bioethics, such as the distribution of donor organs (for the latter see 
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for example Alvarez 2007). It is quite surprising how little has been 
written on the topic of scarcity considering the large body of literature 
on the topic of distributive justice – even if it is only a subsection of 
political theory overall.1 Thus, in light of environmental limits it falls 
to green political theory to urgently fill this theoretical void.
From this follows, as put by Derek Bell, that ‘a theory of justice on one 
planet – that is […] a theory of environmental justice or of ecological 
justice – will be significantly different from theories of justice that 
have dominated liberal political and moral theory for the last fifty 
years’ (2015, p. 2, emphasis in original). In particular, important for 
my argument in this chapter is his claim that:
liberals assume that the environment currently provides 
circumstances of moderate scarcity […] and that these 
circumstances can be maintained indefinitely in the future 
[…]. This assumption reflects the liberal failure to take 
seriously the dependence of the economy on an “earth- 
ecosystem” that is “finite, non- growing [and] materially 
closed”. (2015, p.  10; with citation from Herman Daly 
1995, p. 451)
Hence, based on these assessments of the neglect of political theorising 
of the environmental conditions in which human life is embedded, and 
the acknowledgement that distributive justice is applicable to scenarios 
that are scarcer than moderate scarcity, the conclusion follows that 
it is not only possible but also necessary to consider the impact that 
scarcity has on moral theories and intuitions. In other words, how 
do the distributive justice principles developed under the assumption 
of moderate scarcity change in order to reflect the more conflictual 
reality of actual scarcity?
Before assessing this question, I  would like to return to our 
distribuendum for a moment. As discussed in Chapter 4, ecological 
space is the appropriate currency of distribution for theories of 
environmental and ecological justice, and it should be understood as 
the potential benefits provided by the Earth’s life- support systems and 
physical resources. This definition implies, as we have seen, that living 
beings are themselves ecological space in that they provide the basis 
of life for many other living beings. Trees, for example, constitute an 
important resource for humans. Human bodies, on the other hand, 
constitute an important resource for many nonhuman beings. Among 
these are, for example, certain bacteria that are specialised to live on 
human hosts. In the words of Eileen Crist, ‘[t] here’s ceaseless feeding 
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on one another and on each other’s by- products, as well as co- molding 
of physical and chemical environments in which more life is supported 
to flourish’ (2014, p. 3).
The complexity of this picture of ecological space has two 
implications for how it can be considered as a distribuendum within 
theories of distributive justice. Firstly, as Marcel Wissenburg (1993) 
has pointed out, we need to be aware of the different functions nature 
can have in the domain of distributive justice. According to him, all 
nature can take the function of a resource of distribution – that is, as a 
distribuendum – but nature (excluding humans) cannot be a distributor 
of justice, and only sentient nature can be a recipient of justice. Putting 
aside whether Wissenburg has good reasons to include or exclude 
parts of nature from these functions, his distinction is nonetheless 
important because it illustrates the implicit power relations within 
the justice game. The role or function an entity is ascribed within 
the domain of distributive justice can have considerable implications 
for its existence.
Wissenburg’s denial of the status of distributor of justice to any 
entity other than humans seems to be – mainly tacitly – reflected in 
the ecological justice literature at large. I also accept this assumption, 
because only humans have – at the moment at least – the necessary 
moral agency, due to their cognitive capacities, to act as distributors 
(or agents) of global justice. Justice is a concept that makes sense 
within our human sphere and helps us to understand and order the 
world, but that is not necessarily the case regarding how other entities 
perceive their reality. Moreover, as introduced in Chapter  2, the 
perspectival situatedness of humans particularly implies that we are 
limited to developing an account of the human duties to nonhumans 
and fellow humans. Thus, justice on Earth is about how we humans 
treat others (other humans and nonhumans) but it cannot prescribe 
to the other (other nonhuman species) how to treat us humans. In 
contrast, regarding what gets distributed it becomes unavoidable that 
parts of nature take on the function of resource of distribution.
Secondly, regarding the resource of distribution it might seem based 
on my understanding of ecological space that humans – that is, human 
bodies – should also be understood as part of what is being distributed. 
However, because the human- nonhuman justice relationship is one- 
directional, significant theoretical problems arise if humans as the 
distributor would try to distribute their own bodies.2 There are two 
(main) types of human- nonhuman distribution conflicts regarding 
ecological space. On the one side, there is scarcity of external (to 
humans) resources such as land and benefits provided by ecosystems. 
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On  the other side, there are prey- predator conflicts where humans 
embody the prey and, hence, in some sense one could speak of an 
ongoing scarcity of human bodies because the interests of individual 
predators and prey are never compatible. To some degree this distinction 
is artificial because human bodies are also resources, but it is necessary 
in order to be able to speak meaningfully about different circumstances 
of scarcity, and to obtain principles of justice that provide guidance 
for action in these different scenarios. When considering questions 
of distributive environmental or ecological justice it is the conflict 
regarding external (to humans) goods that matters, because in the case 
of environmental justice there are several reasons why one would not 
want to distribute human bodies based on respecting each individual’s 
autonomy – as ends in themselves and so on – even if they can be 
deemed an ‘environmental resource’ of value to other humans. In 
the case of ecological justice, the one- directionality of the justice 
relationship and the incompatibility of the nature of some nonhumans 
with human wellbeing require that such prey- predator relationships 
are set aside from distributive considerations.
Consequently, humans are not included in the distribuendum 
in either sphere of justice despite human bodies remaining part of 
ecological space. Because of this, I understand scarcity specifically as 
scarcity of external resources from here onwards; all ecological space 
excluding human bodies. All prey- predator conflicts that involve 
humans as prey fall into a different moral category where considerations 
of distributive justice are not applicable. Rather, in these cases it 
would be more useful to turn to considerations about having a right 
to self- defence (see Sterba 1998). This is supported by Paul Taylor 
(1986) who stated that distributive justice (to nonhumans) could only 
apply in circumstances in which the human right – or in his wording 
‘principle’ – of self- defence was not applicable.3
Before turning to the different levels of scarcity of such (limited) 
ecological space, I want to reiterate two important points. Firstly, 
recall that I  focus on the conflict between humans and wild 
nonhumans. This means that farm and companion animals and 
plants, as well as city- dwelling species, are set aside for now because 
they blur the boundary between the human- nonhuman analytical 
distinction by introducing relations shaped by domestication 
(broadly understood), and by constituting different potential justice 
relationships, in addition to the scarcity- related problems hinted at in 
Chapter 3. For example, regarding the relationship between humans 
and farmed species it seems difficult to ever reach a situation where 
all needs could be theoretically fulfilled due to the instrumental 
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nature of the relationship itself, which might make us question 
whether such a relationship can ground justice in the first place (see 
Palmer 2010 and Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011 for animal ethics 
perspectives that discuss the latter). In many cases at least, it seems 
that the flourishing needs of individual plants and animals farmed by 
humans are in conflict with large- scale agricultural practices necessary 
to satisfy human needs. Even when putting this issue aside, demands 
of justice regarding domesticated nonhumans seem to clearly differ 
from what is required with regards to wild nonhumans. It seems that 
these distinct relationships also ground distinct principles of justice 
which have to be kept separate from justice requirements towards 
wild nonhumans. It is important, however, that the distinction lies 
here between different kinds of relationships, which can change 
and have perforated boundaries, in contrast to creating different 
non- changeable categories of living beings. Simply put, a pine tree, 
for example, does not intrinsically belong in either the wild or 
domesticated category. Rather, circumstances such as whether it is 
standing within a part of the Taiga which is not heavily managed, 
or has been planted as part of a managed forest grown for timber 
will situate it within different categories of human- nonhuman 
relationships. The second related point that I would like to reiterate 
is that I maintain an individualist perspective that living beings are 
(to a certain degree) discrete entities that are embedded in wider 
relations (recall Chapter 2). Based on this individualism, and based 
on the distinction between (reciprocal) justice between humans 
and (one- dimensional) justice between humans and nonhumans, it 
remains analytically necessary to distinguish between the human and 
the nonhuman spheres in order to put these two different domains 
of justice into conversation.
Demands of justice under conditions of moderate 
scarcity
Up to now, we have established that a biocentric account of distributive 
interspecies justice is theoretically conceivable and can form the 
counterpart of environmental justice between humans. These two spheres 
of justice are the two sides of the ecological space coin which constitutes 
the appropriate distribuendum for both spheres. This is only the case, 
however, if environmental justice is narrowly understood as the just 
distribution of access to (or use/ occupation/ consumption of  ) ecological 
space. Thus, broader understandings of environmental justice that also 
encompass, for example, justice as recognition or questions about just 
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distribution of environmental bads, such as location of landfills, which are 
often at the centre of concern of environmental justice are set aside here.
Environmental justice principle(s)
The (second) Lockean proviso originates from John Locke’s discussion 
of property in his Second Treatise of Government (2002 (1689)) in the 
context of considering justice in acquisition of natural resources in a 
state of nature. The state of nature is a situation in which everything 
is unowned at first – even though Locke presupposes some degree of 
human common ownership (see Chapter 8). From this starting point, 
the question arises: what kind of acquisitions are just in such situations? 
Locke answers this question by providing three provisos or principles 
that regulate just acquisitions. The second principle is Locke’s famous 
sufficiency proviso which requires that ‘there is enough and as good left 
in common for others’ (2002 (1689), p. 13). Locke himself concluded 
from this that no strong limits have to be put onto acquisitions (of 
land). This is because, among other reasons, during his time the large 
land mass of the ‘New World’ was still up for grabs because indigenous 
communities had not ‘acquired’ the land in the relevant sense according 
to Locke. Of course, such a colonial perspective (towards other humans 
and nature) is problematic for several reasons, but we will have to set a 
critical discussion of the implicit premises of Locke’s view aside for now 
(for a critique see Plumwood 2006). A non-anthropocentrically adjusted 
account of ecological space in combination with Tim Hayward’s (2005) 
conceptualisation of its use can move beyond this limitation.
As we saw in Chapter 4, Hayward builds on this framework by 
conceptualising the use of ecological space as a recurring act of ‘original 
appropriation of nature by humans’ (2005, p. 10).4 This means that ‘using’ 
ecological space is a form of appropriation because it excludes others from 
occupying this particular ecological space. Because, in theory, all units of 
ecological space are equally ‘good’ (Hayward 2005), it is only the ‘enough’ 
part of the proviso that does any work. Accordingly, Hayward concludes 
that there needs to be ‘as much and as good’ (2005, p. 10) ecological space 
left for others – that is, other humans – because in practice ‘enough’ and 
‘as much’ lead presently to the same outcome (Hayward 2006a).
Leaving aside whether one wants to follow the move from 
sufficientarianism (that is, the focus on enough) to egalitarianism (that 
is, aiming for as much in terms of equal shares), this approach is very 
promising. I will not provide a full defence of why Hayward’s approach to 
environmental justice is preferable to any other theory of environmental 
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amended by dropping the Lockean common ownership starting point 
for instance – what I consider two necessary criteria for theories of 
environmental justice in order to be compatible with a theory of 
ecological justice. These are firstly that it focuses on ecological space as a 
distribuendum (Chapter 4), and secondly that it does not rely on claims 
about the human common ownership of the Earth in order to ground 
its global justice demands (Chapter 8). Moreover, Hayward’s account 
produces a parsimonious principle of justice that aids decision- making 
by illustrating when it is acceptable, in justice terms, to use some 
ecological space. However, when it comes to how ecological space should 
be defined, we have seen in Chapter 4 that instead of Hayward’s own 
definition it is more consistent for both considerations of environmental 
and ecological justice to define ecological space as the potential benefits 
provided by the Earth’s life- support systems and physical resources such 
as land, non- renewable and renewable natural resources.
Hayward’s pragmatic argumentative move from enough to as much 
might not satisfy everyone, but considering an ever more crowded 
planet, the benefit of keeping the enough/ as much distinction might 
be negligible. This would be good news insofar that the necessary 
sufficiency threshold of humans seems difficult to determine in practice 
which is a problem that we have encountered already. For example, 
are we interested in enough for survival, or enough for a good life? 
What is a good or flourishing human life? How dependent is a good 
human life on environmental goods and benefits? Also, different 
people will need different levels of ecological space to fulfil the same 
needs, as well as reasonable people might disagree about what their 
basic – that is, fundamental, minimal – needs are. Hence, Hayward’s 
approach allows us to leave many difficult questions unanswered as he 
circumvents questions about what constitutes a good human life and 
how to account for individual and cultural variety.
However, taking claims to ecological space by nonhumans into 
account makes a difference regarding whether one claims that enough 
or as much should be left for other humans, because it impacts on the 
overall amount of ecological space that humans in total could possibly 
appropriate. In other words, if one assumes that the ecological space 
on Earth is finite, that every human has the same claim to a share of 
ecological space and that there are probably too many humans for 
these shares to be very large, then there might not be a big difference 
between claiming that every individual human should get enough for 
a flourishing life defined as X – where X stands for a theory of human 
wellbeing – or that every individual human should get an equal share of 
ecological space.5 This is especially the case if equal shares would provide 
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each human with less than enough because there would be no more 
ecological space left to distribute – as long as one does not prioritise 
the wellbeing of some humans over others. If claims by nonhumans are 
taken into account then the as much version of environmental justice 
would require that the overall available ecological space is divided into 
two sections – one for humans and one for nonhumans. The size of 
each section would then be determined by the demands of ecological 
justice because the as much version of environmental justice would 
remain silent on this matter (if it lacks a direct link to a theory of human 
wellbeing). It only determines the size of each individual human’s share 
relative to other humans, and remains silent on the question of how large 
the overall amount of ecological space required by humanity is in the first 
place. Thus, only the demands of ecological justice would determine 
the overall amount of ecological space that could be distributed by the 
as much environmental justice principle.
Of course, for everyone that takes human needs seriously that would 
be a very troubling implication of introducing demands of interspecies 
justice and, because of that, we are going to adopt an account of 
environmental justice that can bring more to the table. In contrast, 
putting claims of nonhumans into conversation with an enough version 
of environmental justice would create more engagement between the 
demands of environmental and ecological justice. This is because this 
version of environmental justice requires that humans get enough 
ecological space to secure their X which might be – and quite likely is – 
much more than would be compatible with the maximum ecological 
space demand of ecological justice on the first view.
Therefore, it seems that Hayward’s move from enough to as much is 
more problematic than it first seems if nonhumans’ interests are taken 
into consideration. This suggests that the sufficientarianism embedded 
in the Lockean sufficiency proviso should be maintained because of 
the normative significance of individuals being able to live flourishing 
lives, and proposes that environmental justice requires that humans leave 
enough and as good ecological space for other humans; even if enough 
might not be achievable in practice at this moment in time (due to 
the current socio- economic arrangements), and even if it is difficult 
to achieve a consensus on what constitutes enough. Although it is not 
my aim to answer the question of what enough means in the human 
context, it is an important question nevertheless and we will return to 
this question in the last section. Even if enough is understood in terms of 
flourishing – that is, enough for individuals to flourish – complementary 
to my understanding of ecological justice, questions remain about what 
constitutes and what is needed for human flourishing. As previously 
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mentioned in Chapter 3, it might be even more difficult to determine 
what constitutes human flourishing than to (roughly) assess what is 
entailed in the flourishing life of a nonhuman being. Furthermore, 
human flourishing could be understood in terms of capabilities – that 
is, having opportunities for different human functionings – (Nussbaum 
2006, Sen 2017 (1993)), basic/ minimal/ fundamental human needs or 
rights, or in terms of a ‘decent living standard’ (Rao and Min 2017). 
Of course, based on what has been discussed so far it should be clear 
that I am leaning towards a needs- focused account. Yet in order to 
determine what constitutes a plausible account of enough, a consensus 
is neither necessary nor sufficient. As we will see, not all theories of 
human wellbeing will be acceptable candidates for a theory of green 
distributive justice even if a contractarian theorist, for example, might 
deem them an acceptable outcome of a hypothetical agreement. My 
position here does not rely on contractualist reasoning. Moreover, a 
range of different descriptions of enough will be logically consistent 
with our other commitments to social and interspecies justice (this latter 
point links to Steve Vanderheiden’s [2008, 2009] argument in favour of 
ecological space as a distribuendum that we looked at in Chapter 4).
However, even if the question of what constitutes human flourishing 
is settled, the difficult issue remains of how much ecological space such 
an understanding of human flourishing translates into, which again is 
highly dependent on the different modes of needs provisioning that turn 
different parts of ecological space into human welfare. For example, 
Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) list of capabilities does not constitute a 
concrete list of material goods that are needed to bring about these 
opportunities, probably because, among other considerations, there are 
many empirical factors that mediate the relationship between human 
flourishing and the material basis that enables that flourishing. Because 
these are difficult questions and out of the scope of my narrower 
enquiry, I understand the Lockean sufficiency proviso in the context 
of environmental justice as requiring leaving enough ecological space for 
other human beings to lead a flourishing life defined as X. Maintaining the 
sufficientarianism seems important in order to preserve the normative 
force of the proviso, because what makes the normative work here is the 
commitment to leave enough for every human being to fulfil X (where 
X can stand for a range of interpretations of human flourishing) instead 
of leaving an equal amount of ecological space which might not suffice 
for the most frugal human life which will become more important 
in scarcer scenarios. However, in the moderate scarcity context, by 
definition, it is possible to fulfil this demand of environmental justice, 
and it is accordingly appropriate in precisely this context. But note 
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that this principle of environmental justice can only create pro tanto 
demands of justice. In other words, they are not all- things- considered 
because, among other relevant spheres of justice, ecological justice 
considerations are not taken into account. Therefore, let us turn to 
the question of what principle(s) of justice follows from interspecies 
justice; at first in the context of moderate scarcity.
On a final note before moving on, for practicality and simplification 
it could be assumed that people’s sufficiency thresholds are normally 
distributed globally. Based on this assumption we can distribute equal 
shares of ecological space to ‘standardised’ people. Each standardised 
person has the same sufficiency threshold which is based on the average 
threshold of all people. Based on this, one would reach a similar 
conclusion to Hayward with regard to the distribution of ecological 
space: every standardised human has a claim to an equal share of – 
overall finite – ecological space which should be at least enough to 
fulfil X under conditions of moderate scarcity. Yet, standardising people 
in such a way strips them of their material and cultural context in a 
way that obscures normatively relevant factors, so we should use such 
simplifications with caution.
Ecological justice principle(s)
As we have seen so far, how interspecies justice has to be theorised 
differs in several ways from how we understand social justice. One such 
reason is the ecological realities of nonhuman life which will provide a 
ground for being suspicious of the capabilities approach in the context 
of ecological justice in Chapter 6 and which has led to the narrowing of 
ecological justice to wild nonhumans to not inhibiting the flourishing 
of others in Chapter 3. Fully independent from human interferences, 
many nonhumans do not flourish. Accordingly, neither can it be the 
objective of ecological justice to try to achieve the flourishing of all 
individual beings; nor can it be assumed (as for environmental justice) 
that there theoretically being enough ecological space to satisfy all 
individual needs is able to hypothetically translate into the flourishing 
of all individual living beings. Rather, ecological justice in the negative 
sense can only ever be about removing anthropogenic hindrances to 
the flourishing of individual beings in the sense of providing a window 
of opportunity for nonhumans to flourish. The question about which 
nonhuman individuals are then actually able to survive and flourish 
is outside the scope of interspecies justice – at least in the context of 
the human- wild nonhuman relationship. Now we can finally move 
to the fourth step of defending an account of interspecies justice that 
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refers to this particular community, after having discussed the first 
three steps in Chapter 3.
Complementary to Hayward’s proposal of environmental distributive 
justice by adapting Locke’s sufficiency proviso to the context of a finite 
planet, I want to draw on Hayward’s analysis in order to propose a 
principle of ecological justice. Correspondingly, in the domain of 
ecological justice as well, the argumentative move from ‘enough and 
as good’ to ‘as much and as good’ does not seem warranted primarily 
for two (but not exhaustive) reasons (compare with Taylor’s [1986] 
argument for equal shares). Firstly, even though it might make sense 
to distribute ‘as much’ ecological space between humans, this does 
not easily translate into also providing every individual living being 
with the same amount of environmental goods and benefits. Claiming 
that a butterfly and a bear are entitled to exactly the same amount of 
ecological space does not make much sense. Besides, to claim that 
all beings are entitled to exactly the same amount brings us into the 
terrain of policing nature; a practice clearly outside the jurisdiction of 
ecological justice (see Chapter 6). Our principle of ecological justice 
should not interfere with the lives of nonhumans if it builds on the 
non- interference understanding of justice.
However, this is an oversimplification, because it is also possible to 
distribute equally according to need rather than only equal shares more 
simply. Still, because my negative interpretation of ecological justice 
requires not to inhibit flourishing, it aligns more closely with the original 
formulation to leave enough and as good as they have the same non- 
harming tenor that involves a lower threshold. By applying the original 
sufficiency proviso to the domain of ecological justice, and keeping in 
mind that justice is about enabling flourishing as far as possible within 
the circumstances given and that the scope of ecological justice stretches 
over all living beings part of this community of justice, the proviso 
becomes to leave enough ecological space so that other wild beings can flourish. 
That other beings can flourish means that they have the opportunity to 
do so without being deprived of this opportunity due to anthropogenic 
influences. Thus, the requirement is not to remove all potentially existing 
obstacles to their flourishing which would be practically impossible.
As with the environmental justice principle, this principle of 
interspecies justice only creates pro tanto claims of justice because 
other justice considerations have to be taken into account as well. 
Both these principles of justice are based on the assumption that we 
find ourselves in circumstances of moderate scarcity (where all needs, 
but not all wants can potentially be met) and, as such, these principles 
are achievable under these conditions and can therefore constitute 
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justifiable moral demands. In the context of moderate scarcity, it is 
possible in theory for an agent to act according to these two principles 
of justice simultaneously if needs are understood in terms of flourishing. 
Note that I distinguish here between the circumstance of pro tanto 
moderate scarcity which only applies to one particular sphere of justice, 
such as interspecies justice, and all- things- considered moderate scarcity 
which is a scenario in which both demands of environmental and 
ecological justice can in principle be fulfilled.
Based on this account of moderate scarcity we can then think 
about more conflictual situations where all needs cannot be met 
simultaneously. Because justice is also applicable to circumstances of 
more severe than moderate scarcity (recall Chapter 3) and because the 
current situation of life on Earth does not seem to fall into the moderate 
scarcity scenario, it becomes particularly relevant to ask what justice 
demands in these scarcer circumstances. Accordingly, two additional 
scarcity scenarios will be spelt out in the course of the next section.
To reiterate, under conditions of moderate scarcity environmental 
justice demands to leave enough and as good ecological space for other 
humans that allows every individual human to have the material basis 
for a flourishing life. Interspecies justice, on the other hand, requires that 
humans leave enough ecological space so that other beings can flourish 
in the context of moderate scarcity. If the combination of these two 
demands of justice pushes justice out of the realm of all- things- considered 
moderate scarcity, then the resulting conflict raises the question of how 
to justly distribute ecological space in a way that accounts for both 
environmental and ecological justice demands, if circumstances are not 
materially abundant enough to act according to both these principles 
that were developed under the moderate scarcity paradigm.
Different levels of scarcity and the demands of justice
In Chapter  3, we looked at the circumstances of justice that can 
apply to the particular justice relationship between humans and wild 
nonhumans. These were scarcity, confined generosity and vulnerability 
to others’ actions. Among these the circumstance of scarcity is a special 
case, because ‘moderate’ scarcity is not the only level of abundance of 
goods where considerations of distributive justice can apply (Hubin 
1979). Thus, I regard considerations of what justice requires in the 
relative abundance of moderate scarcity as only one out of three 
scenarios where considerations of justice are applicable.
Hume (2003 (1739– 40)) already noted that considerations of 
justice cannot apply to extreme scenarios of scarcity or abundance. 
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That is, neither in circumstances of full abundance – illustrated, for 
example, by a land of milk and honey – nor in circumstances that 
are so dire that they lead to social and environmental collapse, is it 
useful to think in terms of distributive justice (McKinnon 2012). 
Either goods are so abundant that distributive considerations are not 
necessary, or they are so scarce that there is hardly anything left to 
distribute in a meaningful manner. Arguably, in all scenarios that fall 
in between these circumstances we are able to contemplate what a 
just distribution of goods might be. However, as argued by Robert 
Goodin, moderate scarcity should also include cases where all ‘wants’ 
could potentially be met, because also in this case a just distribution 
has to first be put in place before ‘at that point considerations of 
justice would indeed be rendered irrelevant’ (2001, p. 204, emphasis 
in original).
The space between the two extremes is not fully occupied by 
moderate scarcity alone. In Bell’s words, ‘a theory of justice on one 
planet must take very seriously the possibility of circumstances of 
extreme scarcity, in which it is impossible to meet even the most 
basic needs of everyone on the planet’ (2015, p. 10). For simplicity, 
I have divided the range of different levels of scarcity where justice is 
applicable into three scenarios: moderate, significant and severe scarcity 
(see Table 5.1). As we have already looked at moderate scarcity, we can 
now turn to the two alternative scenarios; both embodying all- things- 
considered levels of scarcity where human and nonhuman needs are 
taken into account.
Significant scarcity
I understand circumstances of significant scarcity as a scenario 
where only the survival threshold – that is, a threshold in terms of 
fundamental or minimal needs, rather than full flourishing needs 
(however defined) – can be theoretically achieved for all human and 
nonhuman beings simultaneously, and there might also be some extra 
ecological space that would allow some beings (human or nonhuman) 
to achieve flourishing. Consequently, the demands of justice need 
to be adjusted in order to be theoretically achievable in this scenario 
while remaining demanding enough and thereby leaving a certain 
amount of ecological space outside of their scope. Hubin (1989) 
points out that more benign circumstances of scarcity are merely a 
subcategory of more dire circumstances and, thus, the principles that 
apply to these more benign situations are also derived from more 
general principles that similarly apply to more severe situations. With 
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Situation Justice Applicability & Principles
Full 
abundance
A ‘land of milk and 
honey’




Needs (and maybe also 
wants) of all human and 
wild nonhuman beings 
can be met but are not 
met yet. This means 
that all beings can 
potentially reach their 
flourishing threshold 
(excluding prey-
predator conflicts etc.). 
Distributive justice applies.
Ecological justice principle: leave 
enough ecological space so that other 
(wild) living beings can flourish (in 
terms of fulfilment of flourishing 
needs).
Environmental justice principle: leave 
enough ecological space for the 




Only the survival 
threshold can be 
theoretically achieved 
for human and 
nonhuman beings 
simultaneously. There 
might be some extra 
ecological space for 





principle: minimisation of humans 
inhibiting the survival needs of wild 
nonhumans → no anthropogenic 
species extinctions.
Environmental justice principle: leave 
enough ecological space so that at least 
other humans’ fundamental needs (in 
terms of X) can be met.
(continued)
this framework in mind we can reassess the reasoning behind the 
justice principles that apply to moderate scarcity and investigate on 
what they are grounded.
To reiterate, not to inhibit flourishing should be considered the 
appropriate understanding of justice within the domain of interspecies 
justice. This, in turn, translates into the principle of leaving enough 
ecological space for other beings to flourish under circumstances of 
moderate scarcity, because all living beings need the Earth’s goods 
and system benefits to flourish and consequently have to share them. 
As mentioned earlier, we can distinguish between a flourishing and 
a survival threshold for each individual being; survival being an 
obvious precondition for flourishing. The existence of a community 
of fate encompassing all living beings does not hinge on these beings 
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them sharing the most fundamental necessities of their existence. If 
ecological justice is about not inhibiting flourishing, then we run 
into difficulties in this scarcer scenario, but if circumstances make it 
impossible to have a good life, having a life appears to be second best 
from a justice standpoint that sees all beings having the opportunity 
to flourish in more benign circumstances. The desirable outcome 
in circumstances where the best option  – an opportunity for a 
good life – is not available for all beings appears to be at least an 
opportunity to be alive. Consequently, we still have an ecological 
community of justice in circumstances of more dire scarcity than 
merely moderate abundance because at the most fundamental layer 
the justice community remains unaltered.
From this follows a principle to guide human action according to 
which humans should leave enough ecological space for other (wild) living 
beings to survive.6 Furthermore, as survival is a necessary criterion 
for flourishing, the fulfilment of this principle is also a precondition 
for satisfying the justice principle that applies in circumstances of 
moderate scarcity. However, this principle does not account for the 
Scarcity 
Level
Situation Justice Applicability & Principles
Severe 
scarcity
Not all beings can 
reach their survival 
threshold.
Distributive justice applies.
Ecological justice: humans should only 
take as much ecological space as their 
own fundamental needs (in terms of X) 
require → minimise extinctions.
Environmental justice principle: leave 
enough ecological space so that other 
humans’ fundamental needs (in terms 
of X) can be met.
→ Duty to pursue sustainability 
policies based on both environmental 
and ecological justice.
→ Chapter 9: The Half- Earth 
proposal as a pro tanto just 
compromise (regarding physical space 
distribution only) between demands of 




Societal and ecological 
collapse.
Distributive justice does not apply.
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extra ecological space available (if there is any) under circumstances 
of significant scarcity. The question here is whether we can justify 
hindering the flourishing of some beings for the sake of the flourishing 
of some humans. The human species (or some individual humans 
at least) is in a unique position of power and, arguably, one of the 
functions of justice is to mitigate power asymmetries which are part of 
the problem background, which brings ecological justice as a possible 
solution to the foreground. Does the flourishing of human beings 
while non- humans cannot flourish constitute therefore an unjust 
abuse of power?
From my non- ranking biocentric perspective (Chapter 2), no form 
of life is superior to any other in terms of moral significance – they 
are merely different. If survival is all that is achievable for the entirety 
of living beings, then this perspective is (pro tanto) indifferent to 
which of these beings receive the additional resources needed in 
order to flourish. If human usage of the additional ecological space 
would be deemed unjust it would imply that humans can only do 
justice to nonhumans in a situation of significant scarcity by refraining 
from using more ecological space than needed for their survival so 
that other beings can flourish instead. However, even though such 
self- restraint might be deemed virtuous, it is not required in order 
to do justice. Neither the biocentric perspective on which the 
conception of interspecies justice as flourishing rests by putting life 
in the centre of attention, nor the notion that justice is a solution to, 
among other problems, the condition of power inequality, requires 
such self- restraint. In a situation where only the survival threshold 
is achievable for all living beings, justice is the solution that aims to 
enable all beings to reach this threshold and thereby works against 
power asymmetries that undermine this goal. Accordingly, it is only 
towards this particular goal that power asymmetries are part of the 
problem background in the context of significant scarcity. Therefore, 
human flourishing in the face of other beings simply surviving is not 
an abuse of power but merely one particular distributional pattern 
among several (such as the human virtuous self- restraint scenario) 
which appear equally (pro tanto) just.
So, this is a (pro tanto) acceptable outcome. It is acceptable because it 
allows for the survival of all living beings that are part of this community 
of justice, which is the maximum that can be achieved for all living 
beings simultaneously in these circumstances. Because flourishing 
is not open to all beings in this scenario, a non- ranking biocentric 
position remains neutral. That follows directly from my commitment 
to refusing to compare in moral significance terms the ways in which 
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different living beings flourish, as they simply flourish differently. As 
previously discussed, I do not subscribe to an egalitarian biocentrism 
that considers all living beings to hold the same moral significance. 
Rather, I adapt Val Plumwood’s (2002) account in which she advocates 
a ‘non- ranking’ alternative to ranking all beings as equals. About 
scarcity, Plumwood says the following:
[n] on- ranking, as the meta- ethical principle of minimising 
ranking and dealing with conflict and scarcity of resources cases 
contextually in ways that avoid invariant categories and type 
ranking between broad classes of beings, is also applicable to 
interspecies ethics, comparisons and choices. Non- ranking 
is a much more plausible way to interpret the concept of 
interspecies egalitarianism than ranking as equal in a scale 
of moral worth. (2002, p. 174, emphasis added)
Accordingly, she concludes that ‘[n] on- ranking is a counter- hegemonic 
virtue’ (2002, p. 174). In other words, in order to avoid considerations 
of distributive justice to be tainted by anthropocentrism via rigid ‘type 
rankings’ of living beings, I consider ‘non- ranking’ as the appropriate 
antidote. As suggested by Plumwood, scarcity of resources has to be 
dealt with contextually. For me that means that the context of global 
scarcity of ecological space has to be seen through the lens of the 
human-nonhuman justice relationship and the overlapping justice 
demands on this issue, without assuming that environmental justice 
considerations can, by default trump demands of ecological justice, 
due to the exceptional human moral standing.
Similarly, on the other side of this coin, my commitment to a non- 
ranking account of moral significance has the advantage that it does not 
have a built- in rigid egalitarianism in terms of equal moral significance 
superseding relevant contextual features that would make it often 
logically problematic to prioritise human over nonhuman claims 
when similar interests are at stake. Thus, non- ranking biocentrism 
does not commit us to the claim that all ecological space has to be 
distributed equally between humans and nonhumans, but rather 
points to the importance of contextual and relational situatedness. 
Significant scarcity is such a relevant context. However, regarding 
the extra ecological space that might be distributable in this context, 
non- ranking biocentrism again does not commit us to an egalitarian 
distribution if other relational factors (besides of the ecological 
justice relationship) come into play, such as the environmental justice 
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relationship, which is a relevant relational factor to take into account. 
In contrast to interspecies justice, the bi- directionality of this justice 
relationship, as well as it not being limited to a negative understanding 
of justice, might also involve positive duties of redistribution in 
addition to a demand to not inhibit the fulfilment of fundamental 
(and flourishing) needs. Thus, to put the demand of ecological justice 
in circumstances of significant scarcity into more general terms that 
do not entail a necessary priority to human claims to flourishing, 
but allow for accounting for the relational situatedness of agents of 
justice, the principle to leave enough for other beings to survive can 
be reformulated into demanding the minimisation of humans inhibiting 
the flourishing and survival of nonhumans.
In practice, both formulations – to leave enough for other beings 
to survive or to minimise the human inhibition of the flourishing and 
survival of nonhumans  – translate into zero anthropogenic species 
extinctions. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the extinction of a 
species is not an ecological injustice in itself but rather an indicator of 
past injustices – that is, anthropogenic biodiversity loss is the outcome 
of severe injustice – because it is the consistent inhibition of flourishing 
and survival of many individual living beings of a species which then 
cumulates in the overall extinction of that species. However, as will also 
be discussed, this claim needs one qualification, which is that while 
anthropogenic biodiversity loss is always problematic, it might not 
always be unjust. Biodiversity loss is always troubling, independently 
of whether it is an injustice or not, because it is always a loss of a 
unique way of life which is valuable in itself. Whether it is also unjust 
depends on whether humans cannot do otherwise. Setting aside for 
now questions about historical injustices for which current humans 
might still hold moral responsibility, current humans do not commit 
an injustice if their taking just enough for their fundamental needs 
(however defined) means that some nonhumans might not get enough. 
In contrast, in the case of significant scarcity it is theoretically possible 
to satisfy all the fundamental needs simultaneously. In consequence 
this then translates into a demand of ecological justice not to cause 
any species extinctions.
Mirroring the interspecies justice demand, the environmental justice 
principle turns into leaving (at least) enough ecological space so that other 
humans’ fundamental needs (defined in terms of X) can be met in order 
to account for conditions of significant scarcity. As with ecological 
justice, this is due to (1) it having become impossible to actually leave 
enough for the flourishing of all others, but because (2) the satisfaction 
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of humans’ basic needs is a precondition for human flourishing, 
environmental justice demands that these needs are met.
Before turning to the circumstance of severe scarcity, I would like 
to note that, even though it is justifiable to allow humans to flourish 
while nonhumans merely survive, it is not warranted to prioritise 
human flourishing over nonhuman survival in order to increase the 
total number of people able to flourish. According to several biocentric 
positions (such as Baxter 2005), it is problematic to fulfil less ‘essential’ 
needs if that means that more fundamental needs of others, including 
nonhumans, cannot any longer be fulfilled and, according to the non- 
ranking perspective, no kind of wellbeing is intrinsically worse or 
better than any other. However, this remains a pro tanto claim because 
contextual and relational situatedness might, on the contrary, lead us 
to conclude that some (human) flourishing might be prioritised over 
the survival of (nonhuman) others in some situation. However, as it 
stands, interspecies justice demands the prevention of anthropogenic 
species extinctions under conditions of significant scarcity. What is 
important is that the normative context is decisive and not any meta- 
ethical commitment to a ranking of living beings.
Severe scarcity
In circumstances of severe scarcity, not all beings can reach their 
survival threshold, meaning that not all living beings are able to 
satisfy their most fundamental needs. Accordingly, the justice 
principles that were applicable to significant scarcity need to be 
revised again. As indicated earlier, it is not the purpose of a non- 
ranking biocentric account of global ecological justice to decide who 
or what specifically lives or dies. Moreover, it depends on whether 
humans can do otherwise in order to assess whether anthropogenic 
biodiversity loss embodies injustice rather than simply tragedy. Under 
conditions of severe scarcity humans are not able to avoid causing the 
extinction of some species, which, if caused by humans, functions 
as a practical marker of the inhibition of flourishing and survival 
needs of individual nonhumans, while humans cater only to their 
own most fundamental needs. Accordingly, such extinctions are – at 
least in this regard – not unjust.7 However, all additional unnecessary 
anthropogenic extinctions continue to be indicators of injustice (see 
for more details Chapter 7).8 Hence, interspecies justice requires in 
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as their own fundamental needs require, which translates into an 
obligation to minimise anthropogenic extinctions.
In circumstances of severe scarcity, the complementary environmental 
justice principle remains unaltered as the requirement to leave enough 
ecological space so that other humans’ fundamental needs (in terms of X) can be 
met. That environmental justice does not reduce the demandingness of 
its demands in more scarce circumstances than significant scarcity seems 
to follow from two considerations that have already been discussed. 
Firstly, according to my non- ranking biocentrism, it is not required 
that humans put less weight on their own basic needs than on the basic 
needs of nonhumans. Accordingly, distributive interspecies justice 
remains – at least when excluding other considerations of justice – 
silent in this sense on the question of who or what loses out under 
conditions of severe scarcity.
Secondly, in my discussion of ecological justice I  claimed that 
ecological justice to wild nonhumans is a negative sense of justice in 
that its focus rests on refraining from inhibiting flourishing, rather than 
providing flourishing. Environmental justice, however, as a dimension 
of social justice between humans, is not limited in the same way, as 
I indicated earlier. Based on this, in this scenario agents have a duty not 
to interfere with other humans’ fundamental needs in terms of access to 
ecological space, and potentially a duty to help other humans to access 
the ecological space that they require to satisfy their fundamental needs 
if the situation allows for it. Of course, that presupposes a particular 
understanding of the human global environmental justice relationship 
which I cannot give appropriate treatment here. However, at least 
prima facie there are some indications supporting this position, because 
the make- up of the human community of global environmental 
justice is constituted differently than the community that grounds 
ecological justice. For instance, human needs are – in principle at 
least – not mutually exclusive. Accordingly, this bi- directional justice 
relationship differs from ecological justice in terms of what appropriate 
principles of justice apply to it, because on a more fundamental 
level it also differs in terms of the circumstances and the specific 
conceptualisation of justice. So, in principle, it is not inconsistent to 
simultaneously acknowledge, for example, a community of interspecies 
justice that applies to the problem of coexistence and a community 
of global environmental justice that also includes a mutual- support 
element based on the relational story that grounds this community of 
global justice.
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Sustainability
In both more- than- moderate scarcity scenarios, but especially in 
circumstances of severe scarcity, the principles of justice discussed so 
far do not appear to be all that follows from distributive environmental 
and ecological justice. In addition, both spheres also generate a strong 
duty to pursue policies to promote sustainability. That is because 
both environmental and interspecies justice do not only demand 
that their scarcity- scenario- specific principles are satisfied, but also 
that an overarching principle is satisfied that is independent from the 
specific circumstances of scarcity and operates in the background. This 
additional requirement of justice becomes apparent when taking into 
account that justice aims at normative problem- solving for collective 
action underpinned by the value of the wellbeing of the entities in 
question. Accordingly, an account of justice can provide an answer to 
the problem of how to normatively take into account the potential 
flourishing of a range of entities with competing needs. This further 
demand of justice requires that action is taken to move from severe, to 
significant, to moderate scarcity levels in order to create an actual 
window of opportunity for the flourishing of all living beings within 
the possibilities of prey- predator relations and so on, if one understands 
the flourishing of life as holding the ultimate value which justice aims 
to promote. This means that both environmental and ecological justice 
do not only demand that their scarcity scenario- specific principles are 
satisfied, but also entail an obligation to pursue policies geared towards 
sustainability in order to move up on the scarcity scale to more benign 
circumstances that would provide more material support in terms of 
ecological space for wellbeing. In a similar context, Bell points out 
that ‘[i] f justice on one planet requires anything, it must require that 
we avoid circumstances of extreme scarcity’ (2015, p. 10). Thus, also 
a non- utilitarian understanding of justice as flourishing is invested in 
creating circumstances in which flourishing is actually possible.
Of course, sustainability is a heavily contested concept, but according 
to some interpretations of strong sustainability it reflects the aim to 
reduce scarcity of ecological space, even if usually not framed in 
ecological space and/ or scarcity terms (see for an overview of the 
sustainability discourse Dresner 2008, Dryzek 2013). How to achieve 
this goal is an empirical question, but it should be noted that not all 
policies under the umbrella of the sustainability discourse qualify as 
appropriate means; only the policies that can be shown to actually 
work towards satisfying this demand of justice while not undermining 
other circumstance- specific requirements of justice. In practice, it 
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will involve the implementation of policies that change the course of 
current modes of production and consumption, social provisioning 
structures and technology, population growth and so on, in order to 
achieve more benign conditions for life on Earth. Despite sustainability 
being a heavily contested concept and being attributed a multitude 
of meanings, the debates around these issues are very relevant for this 
overarching question about how to decrease scarcity.
Moreover, in addition to this further duty, note that the other 
demands of environmental and ecological justice elaborated so far 
also have an built- in notion of sustainability because we have been 
primarily concerned with the just use of ecological space (although 
by definition, non- renewable resources are an exception to this). In 
contrast, as introduced in Chapter 4, degrading use does not account for 
limits to what can be used to the same degree. On the one hand, this 
degrading use would conflict with this particular duty of sustainability 
and would be unjust in this regard and, on the other hand, it also 
generates additional questions of restorative justice and justice to future 
generations which we will have to set aside for now.
Further implications and considerations
Until now, we have surveyed what green distributive justice demands 
under different conditions of scarcity, but before we can move on 
I would like to clarify three further points. First, as discussed, the 
circumstances of significant and severe scarcity are where the real 
conflicts between environmental and ecological justice lie. Even though 
I am interested in the distribution of ecological space to individual 
beings, these conflicts should not be understood as a utilitarian battle 
of numbers – that is, in terms of sum ranking – where billions of 
nonhumans outweigh the interests and needs (or value) of seven billion 
humans and counting, for two main reasons (more on this issue in 
Chapter 7). Firstly, based on my non- ranking biocentric stance, scarcity 
conflicts have to be dealt with contextually and cannot be categorically 
resolved by adding up and then comparing the moral weight, value or 
the like of either party at a more abstract level of analysis. Secondly, 
utilitarianism has been already subjected to a lot of criticism over the 
years, such as Martha Nussbaum’s convincing defence against utilitarian 
sum- ranking. She points out that utilitarianism ‘has no way of ruling 
out in advance results that are extremely harsh toward a given class 
or group’ (2006, p.  342).9 And indeed, in the case of introducing 
biocentric ecological justice into what we need to take normatively 
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harsh’ against humans, which clearly overshoots the initial goal of 
defending a biocentric version of ecological justice. Furthermore, 
as already indicated, it is more fruitful to understand (distributive) 
environmental and ecological justice as spheres of justice that interact on 
a more abstract level with many other spheres of justice – for example, 
other domains of distributive justice that intersect with procedural 
justice such as fair trade, and other dimensions of justice such as justice 
as recognition – within a wider all- encompassing theory of justice in 
which no particular sphere dominates what all- things- considered can 
be deemed just.
Entitlements and duties
This brings me to my second point, because a few more words are 
required in order to explain what I mean by duties and entitlements 
that follow from these principles of justice and specifically the 
principles of ecological justice. To clarify, they are conditional on 
certain circumstances, and this conditionality applies to their content 
and to their coming into being. Recall that being morally considerable 
is not sufficient for holding justice entitlements and generating the 
complementary duties of justice held by humans. Whether these 
entitlements come into being is a matter of circumstances that 
are external to the morally considerable entity itself, and we have 
discussed what these circumstances of justice are in Chapter 3. Thus, 
for example, I am not claiming that a pine tree holds natural rights or 
that if living bacteria would be found on Mars that that would make 
them immediately holders of a set of justice entitlements. I am not 
ruling out the possibility that an account of nonhuman natural rights 
might be plausible, but developing an account of justice is a more 
modest affair, only aiming for an account of conditional entitlements. 
Their complementary duties of justice are circumstance- specific 
moral demands which are contingent on several factors. From my 
relational understanding of justice, what these different circumstances 
of justice amount to is a description of a justice relationship primarily 
characterised by interconnectedness, which in addition to the moral 
considerability of all living beings generates the justice entitlements. 
So, the duties of justice that I argue for are borne out of the justice- 
related arguments in addition to a commitment to biocentrism in the 
context of interspecies justice.10
Even after fulfilling all necessary premises, the justice entitlements 
that I have outlined remain pro tanto entitlements – or as Brian Baxter 
(2005) would put it ‘prima facie rights’ – due to the pluralist nature 
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of justice itself. Once again that means that despite my focus here on 
distributive justice, justice is multidimensional and, therefore, demands 
of distributive justice must be put into conversation with justice in 
terms of recognition and participation, and all of these have a time- 
dimension which also asks about reparations and future generations. 
In addition to these dimensions of justice, there are also different, 
but often overlapping, spheres or communities of justice, each of 
which with its own set of justice principles. Among these, ecological 
justice is only one sphere. More precisely ecological justice is the 
overall denomination of a set of justice relationships between humans 
and nonhuman nature and each relationship, by virtue of its unique 
features, establishes a different set of justice principles that reflect this 
particular relationship. However, as mentioned earlier, I use it here 
to primarily denominate the human- wild nonhuman relationship. 
In consequence, entitlements and duties of distributive justice, in 
my account, are not independently valid from other moral demands 
(despite of their weightiness), in particular from other demands of 
justice, and thus can, all other things being equal, justifiably be defeated 
under certain circumstances without requiring restitution.11
In combination with my claims about limiting justice to living 
individual entities this implies that even if sophisticated products of 
developments in Artificial Intelligence technology or synthetic biology 
would turn out to be alive in the morally relevant sense, and thus have 
a wellbeing that requires being considered, this does not mean that they 
are part of this particular community of justice, because they are not 
wild in the sense used here. Other justice considerations might apply 
to them under the umbrella of a life- focused account of justice, but 
because moral considerability is not a sufficient criterion for grounding 
a community of justice, it does not necessarily follow that such entities 
are covered by considerations of justice at all. Therefore, in order to 
determine what would be just, all- things- considered, it is necessary 
to take into consideration all relevant dimensions and communities of 
justice that apply to an area of concern. The upshot is that the moral 
considerability of living beings in addition to a justice relationship only 
leads to conditional and pro tanto entitlements and duties of justice.
Environmental virtue ethics
Finally, I would like to return to the question about human wellbeing 
that I have kept separate until now by simply stipulating that one can 
choose nearly any theory of human wellbeing and insert it into the X 
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of that theory is one of the factors that influence which scenario of 
scarcity we currently find ourselves in and, thus, it seems that not 
every theory of wellbeing is as good as every other. For example, 
if the theory requires large amounts of ecological space for human 
flourishing and fundamental needs, even a small human population 
will create circumstances of severe scarcity. In principle, even a very 
demanding hedonist theory of human wellbeing that requires Western 
consumption levels of material goods might be compatible with the 
structure of my argument, but not with its underlying normative 
commitments. This means that the distributive justice approach that 
I have laid out so far also seems to be closely linked to environmental 
virtue ethics approaches and virtue theory more broadly in two 
regards, which makes its substantive content not compatible with such 
a demanding theory of wellbeing.
Firstly, an attitude of humility created by a deeper understanding of 
humanity’s place in the biosphere should be understood as a central 
environmental virtue. This can create the necessary motivational 
grounding for agents to take the demands of ecological justice seriously. 
That also links back to the recognition of being oneself ecological space 
that we looked at in Chapter 4. Accordingly, the virtue of humility (or 
a similar virtue that situates humanity as part of the biotic community) 
functions as a necessary condition for understanding the demands of 
interspecies justice by, for example, regarding oneself as part of ecological 
space which creates the basis for enacting these demands by self- limitation 
and respect for other living beings. Humility can be understood in this 
context as a necessary ‘virtue of justice’ in order to lay the necessary 
societal foundations for enacting justice. This terminology comes from 
Onora O’Neill’s discussion of the links between justice and virtues. In 
O’Neill’s words, ‘[v] irtues of justice embody principles of justice in 
characters and lives […]. The virtues of justice include justice itself, as 
well as varied forms of fairness, of toleration and respect for others, of 
fidelity and probity, and of truthfulness and honesty’ (1996, p. 187).12
Secondly, the virtue of humility has taken a prominent position in 
several accounts of environmental virtue ethics. In this context, a virtue 
of humility is not just required to bring about ecological justice, but 
in an eudaimonistic environmental virtue ethic it is an intrinsic part 
of human flourishing; that is, human flourishing requires practices of 
nature conservation.13 This implies that a hedonistic theory of human 
wellbeing sits uncomfortably with interspecies justice in particular, 
and an environmental virtue ethic more broadly. As a concequence a 
very materially demanding account of wellbeing is incompatible with 
the wider moral framework, in which a theory of ecological justice 
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is embedded, when linked to an account of environmental virtue 
ethics which understands an attitude of domination towards nature 
(Plumwood 2003 (1993)) and false modesty (Frasz 1993) – that is, an 
overly misanthropic attitude – as the corresponding vices to the virtue 
of humility. Linking ecological justice to such an account of virtue 
ethics means that it can no longer remain fully neutral between the 
different conceptions of the human good.
In the end, not only would my own account of interspecies justice 
benefit from a linkage with environmental virtue ethics, but potentially 
the latter would also benefit from such an alliance. As put by Robert 
Hull, ‘a review of the [environmental virtue ethics] literature leaves one 
with the impression that the moral force of EVE [environmental virtue 
ethics] does not reach that of an imperative to green states of character 
and corresponding actions’ (2005 p. 100 – 1). A complementary account 
of duties of justice to nonhuman beings could provide such a moral 
imperative for green action that EVE might lack on its own.
This chapter has covered a lot of ground, so let me summarise the 
three main points to keep in mind before we move on to discuss 
the capabilities approach in Chapter 6. Firstly, despite that scarcity is 
not usually front and centre in discussions of distributive justice, it 
is precisely the scarcity of ecological space that drives our thinking 
about what constitutes the demands of environmental and interspecies 
justice. Depending on which circumstances of scarcity we find 
ourselves in – either moderate, significant or severe scarcity – different 
principles of justice apply. Limiting my discussion of ecological justice 
to the relationship between humans and wild nonhumans, I argued 
that, under conditions of significant scarcity, the ecological justice 
requirements translate into zero human- caused species extinctions, 
and that under conditions of severe scarcity, ecological justice requires 
the minimisation of the anthropogenic rate of species extinctions. Yet, 
in all more- than- moderate scarcity scenarios there is also a demand 
to reduce the levels of scarcity to more benign conditions for life on 
Earth. In essence, that is a duty to pursue sustainability. Secondly, duties 
and entitlements that follow from these different justice principles 
are conditional  – depending on different circumstances of justice 
and so on – and pro tanto – depending on other demands of justice 
with which they have to be put into conversation. Thirdly, such an 
entitlement- based account that draws on a non- ranking account of 
biocentrism is not compatible with utilitarian sum- ranking decision- 
making but, arguably, it can and should be complemented with an 
appropriate environmental virtue ethic within a broader pluralist 
theory of environmental ethics.
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Still, several relevant issues have been set aside of which I will only 
scratch the surface. For example, I have set aside the issue of who 
might hold responsibility for generating scarcity, and who is responsible 
for the shift from moderate to significant or severe scarcity. Such 
responsibilities for historical injustices  – such as by also benefiting 
from past injustices that others have committed – will have an impact 
on the conclusions reached up until now regarding what would be a 
just distribution, in that the all- things- considered demands of justice 
might be even more demanding for (some) currently living humans 
than pictured here. Related to this, it should be noted that the group 
of humans is, of course, a simplification that needs considerable more 
thought, especially when it comes to which groups and institutions 
should be primarily responsible for discharging duties of ecological 
justice, which is an issue we will return to in the last two chapters. 
Another related but distinct question is the issue of reparation which, 
for example, might take the form of aiding nonhumans to adapt to 
changing habitats and environmental conditions. If due, that would 
potentially increase the demandingness of duties held by some currently 
living humans further.14
Notes
 1 Some examples of such exceptions are Eldar Sarajlic (2011) who wrote on the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis, and Robert Goodin (2001) who provides a 
detailed analysis of the circumstance of moderate scarcity. Yet to put this lack of 
discussion of scarcity into perspective, the widely read entry on distributive justice 
in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy does not even mention the word ‘scarcity’ 
in its 2017 version (see Lamont and Favor 2017). I will not provide an analysis of 
how scarcity has been employed in the literature about justice.
 2 This being a one- directional relationship in terms of duties does not imply that it 
is also a monological relationship in terms of communication.
 3 Cases where nonhumans use human bodies without any harmful or even beneficial 
impact on their host do not fall into either of these categories. These cases do not 
have to concern us here, but they are relevant for generating awareness of being 
ecological space as argued in Chapter 4.
 4 This wording brings to mind Eco- Marxist perspectives that connect the 
environmental crises to capitalism’s origin in ‘primitive accumulation’ (see Lievens 
2010). Thus, in such a framework the problem could be framed as capitalism’s 
misuse of ecological space by over- appropriation of nature, driven by its need to 
accumulate.
 5 I use the phrase ‘flourishing in terms of X’ in order to leave open the question 
about what constitutes human flourishing. For now, I assume that every theory 
of human wellbeing which is able to distinguish between some kind of human 
flourishing and a more minimal account of human basic/ fundamental needs is 
permissible. Moreover, in order to not fall into the universalist trap, the account of 
environmental justice has to be open for variation between different understandings 
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 6 For a different argument that reaches a compatible conclusion see James Sterba’s 
‘principle of disproportionality’ (2005, p. 294).
 7 See Sterba’s (2005, p. 292) ‘principle of human preservation’ for a related point in 
the context of conflicts.
 8 That raises the question of whether it is possible to cause the extinction of a species 
without undermining the flourishing and survival of its individual members. If 
that is an actual possibility, then not all anthropogenic species extinctions that are 
caused in circumstances that are less scarce than severe scarcity, or are not necessary 
extinctions in circumstances of severe scarcity, embody indicators of injustice. 
I am sceptical about whether such scenarios exist, but if they do then they are 
exceptions that – in practice – should not heavily impact on what can be deemed 
just or unjust practices. The possibility of this problem hinges on the question of 
what constitutes the flourishing of nonhuman beings (see Chapter 2).
 9 See also Robert Garner’s (2013) critique of utilitarianism’s potential to constitute 
a theory of justice for animals.
 10 These entitlements can be understood as a type of moral right. Rights have not 
featured much within the ecological justice literature (excluding sentientist focused 
accounts) so far, but Baxter’s theory of justice is probably the best example of an 
account of ecological justice that embraces rights language in the justice context by 
attributing (justice) rights to sentient individuals and rights – sometimes referred to 
‘right- like claims’ – to populations of ‘merely living’ organisms (2005, p. 129). Of 
course, moral rights are another contested concept. Yet on the other side, duties 
held towards nonhumans appear especially weak if nonhumans as recipients are not 
conceptualised as holding rights in terms of claims, privileges or entitlements and, 
according to Angie Pepper (2018), being a bearer of moral claim rights is what 
constitutes a recipient of justice. Generally speaking, an account of moral rights that 
includes nonhuman living beings as rights- holders necessitates a broader ‘interest 
theory’ or a similar promising alternative as opposed to a narrow ‘will theory’ of 
rights (see Feinberg 2007 (1974)). Without engaging in such debates about their 
nature, I assume for my purposes here that some version of an interest theory is a 
plausible conceptualisation of the notion of rights. To clearly differentiate between 
moral rights in general and what I consider to be a subcategory of rights of justice, 
I refer to the latter as entitlements rather than rights. This more clearly delineates 
them from other kinds of rights such as natural or legal rights. In any case, I take 
it for granted that the rights question will need more elaboration than I provide 
in this section.
 11 Assuming that the status quo has not been reached in a morally neutral manner, 
restitution is an additional requirement driven by the demands of compensatory or 
reparatory justice.
 12 See also John Dryzek and Jonathan Pickering’s (2019) discussion of ‘ecological 
reflexivity’ as an important virtue on which justice rest on in the context of the 
Anthropocene.
 13 For concise overviews about environmental virtue ethics see Hull, R.  (2005) 
and Ronald Sandler (2016) and for a detailed discussion of ‘humility’ see Lisa 
Gerber (2002). In addition for a discussion on the link between the virtue of 
‘resourcefulness’ with the literature on ecological citizenship which is central to 
Chapter 10 see Hayward (2006b).
 14 On the possibility of having duties of reparatory justice or ‘reparation- like special 













Ecological Justice and 
the Capabilities Approach
Since Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) influential inclusion of animals into 
her version of the capabilities approach (CA), the CA has developed 
as the most influential theoretical framework for thinking about the 
extension of justice to nonhumans (for example Schlosberg 2007, 
Armstrong 2012, Fulfer 2013, Kortetmäki 2017). Yet this discursive 
paradigm has moved the discussion away from questions of distribution 
which, as already mentioned, are especially salient in the environmental 
context. Because it has become so influential, I would like to explain 
why I do not frame my own account in terms of capabilities – in 
particular because the CA could provide us an account of wellbeing. 
Let us begin with a quick survey of the literature that extends justice to 
nonhumans within this framework (see for a more extensive overview 
Holland and Linch 2016).
Initially proposed by economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (1999, 
Nussbaum and Sen 1993), the CA has been extensively developed by 
Nussbaum (2000, 2006, 2011) and it was quickly adopted by a number 
of contributors – often referred to as capability theorists. Rather than 
focusing on the distribution of some material goods themselves, the 
focus of the CA lies on the functionings – that is, doings and beings – 
and the capabilities – that is, opportunities or freedoms to achieve these 
functionings – of humans. The provision of these capabilities, which 
require different inputs depending on the individual in question, are 
at the heart of its concern. In other words, capability theorists are 
concerned with the opportunities that individuals need to live fully 
functioning – or flourishing – lives. The main departure from Sen’s 
less- specified initial framework was Nussbaum’s proposal of a ‘set of 
human capabilities’; each of which should be enabled for each person 
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to at least a minimum threshold as a matter of justice. She lists the 










• control over one’s environment (politically and materially) (2006, 
pp. 76– 7)
Moreover, central to Nussbaum’s version of the CA is that she 
understands it as a sufficientarian – that is, minimum threshold- based – 
account of justice within the Rawlsian understanding of political 
liberalism. Based on this theoretical framework, she extends justice 
to nonhuman animals. So far that sounds fairly compatible with what 
I am arguing. Yet, as we will see, there are some problems that the 
CA faces that make me question its feasibility to ground a theory of 
interspecies justice. But let us first continue with the overview.
Nussbaum justifies this extension by referring to the centrality of 
dignity and flourishing within her understanding of the CA. For 
example, she claims that the CA ‘wants to see each thing flourish as 
the sort of thing it is’ (2006, p. 349), and the focus of the CA lies on 
the ‘well- being and dignity of the individual creature’ (2006, p. 357). 
Surprisingly, she then limits the extension of justice to sentient animals 
by introducing an additional sentience criterion. Modelled on her 
list of central human capabilities, Nussbaum proposes an animal 
capabilities list that draws on the same capability categories. She claims, 
for example, regarding the first capability of ‘life’, that ‘all animals 
are entitled to continue their lives’ (2006, p. 393); or, regarding the 
capability to have ‘control over one’s environment’, she takes it to mean 
in the animal case to be (1) ‘part of a political conception that is framed 
so as to respect them’, (2)  to be granted ‘respect for the territorial 
integrity of their habitat’, and (3) to have the ‘the right of labouring 
animals to dignified and respectful labour conditions’ (2006, p. 400).
Others – most notably David Schlosberg (2007, 2014) – have taken 
Nussbaum’s account as a starting point and argued for an even more 
extensive expansion of the community of justice as well as broadening 
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the ecological justice discourse beyond distributive justice. For example, 
Schlosberg gives an account of the community of justice that includes 
ecosystems in addition to living beings. Moreover, he inquiries into 
how procedural justice regarding environmental decision- making 
(that is, participatory justice), justice as recognition in the sense of 
misrecognition of nature and the CA could extend to his broad 
justice community. It should be noted, though, that Schlosberg limits 
himself to pointing towards how the justice discourse should be 
expanded, instead of arguing ‘for a single, all- inclusive, holistic, theory 
of environmental and ecological justice’ (2007, p. 8). His main focus 
regarding interspecies justice lies on showing how concepts of justice 
employed by environmental justice movements could also be applicable 
in the nonhuman realm. Regarding the CA, Schlosberg expands upon 
and simultaneously heavily criticises Nussbaum’s extension of the CA 
to animals. Teea Kortetmäki, in turn, builds on Schlosberg’s analysis 
and proposes ecological and environmental justice to be understood 
as a ‘broad [discursive] framework’ (2017, p.  11) which ‘combines 
two different approaches to justice – the capabilities approach and the 
trivalent or three- dimensional conception of justice’ (2017, p.  12); 
the latter she understands as including considerations of distribution, 
recognition and representation.
On first examination, the CA (as framed by Nussbaum) has a lot of 
intuitive force in the domain of ecological justice, arguably because 
of its close connection to the concepts of needs and flourishing. 
However, accounts of interspecies justice based on the CA have been 
met with powerful criticism which leads me to conclude, in addition 
to the points I will raise now, that the project of expanding the CA 
into the nonhuman sphere will require considerable adjustments, and 
consequently the task of developing interspecies justice should rather 
be left to less anthropomorphist approaches. Instead of reiterating most 
of the criticism already brought against – mainly Nussbaum’s version 
of – the CA (see for example Ilea 2008, Cripps 2010, Wissenburg 
2011, Hailwood 2012, Garner 2013, Kasperbauer 2013, Keulartz 
2016, Melin and Kronlid 2016), my aim here is to add to the critique 
from the perspective of what I consider to be necessary features of a 
defensible account of interspecies justice to wild nonhumans. This 
does not imply that the CA is not appropriate for matters of social 
justice; only that it does not seem to provide the necessary conceptual 
framework for a theoretically robust and practically useful theory of 
interspecies justice. For example, I will omit the CA’s Rawlsian legacy 
embodied by the need for consensus – found in Nussbaum’s account 
and criticised by Ramona Ilea (2008), and return to Chapter 2 for a 
124
ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE AND THE EXTINCTION CRISIS
critical engagement with Schlosberg’s definition of ecosystems which 
has also been discussed by Elizabeth Cripps (2010). In general, the 
reasons why I deem Schlosberg’s extension of moral considerability 
to ecosystems problematic are also applicable to the account given 
by Adrian Armstrong (2012). Although Armstrong extends the CA 
even further than Schlosberg to include ‘Gaia’ or the ‘whole Earth 
ecosystem’, I do not find his argument convincing based on the grounds 
for excluding even more limited systems, such as ecosystems, from the 
realm of justice.
In the first section, I will elaborate on why the CA is problematic in 
the sphere of nonhuman nature due to, among other things, its focus 
on dignity, and then turn to its relationship with predation. Based on 
my defence of ecological space as an appropriate distribuendum of 
ecological justice (Chapter 4) and the important distinction between 
wild and domesticated nonhumans, I favour an account of distributive 
ecological justice which is more limited than what has been proposed 
by capabilities theorists so far. I will elaborate on these latter points 
in the second section.
Concerns
Because Nussbaum’s and Schlosberg’s accounts are the most influential 
extensionist accounts within the CA and have been drawn on by other 
theorists, I will primarily focus on these two theoretical frameworks. 
My first concern regards the notion of dignity within the CA.
Dignity and nonhumans
Angela Kallhoff (2014) claims that applying the concept of dignity 
to plants is a case of human anthropomorphism – it does not respect 
the otherness of plants. Be that as it may, worries like this one target 
positions like the CA which leans strongly on the concept of dignity. 
At least in its Kantian sense, dignity is a very human- specific concept 
because it is owed only to autonomous rational agents (Hill 1992). If 
we understand dignity in this way, it is indeed not a useful concept to 
apply to other organisms such as most nonhuman animals and plants 
in particular. Nevertheless, it is not accurate to accuse Nussbaum’s 
extension of the CA of applying a Kantian conception of dignity to 
nonhuman beings. Nussbaum strongly criticises a Kantian approach 
to dignity that distinguishes ‘between personhood and animality’, and 
she claims that – on the contrary – it is a fact that human dignity is 
‘the animal sort of dignity’ (2006, p. 132) which implies some kind 
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of neediness. She then goes on to claim that ‘nonhuman animals are 
capable of dignified existence’ and the denial of this by human acts 
‘appears to be an issue of justice’ (2006, p. 326).
Despite this differentiation and the claim that the CA ‘wants to see 
each thing flourish as the sort of thing it is’ (2006, p. 349), Nussbaum 
reserves justice only for sentient beings in the end. It appears that even 
though Nussbaum argues that the concept of dignity is fundamental 
for her theory of justice, she weakens her own commitment to the 
importance of dignity in order to exclude non- sentient beings from 
the justice community. If dignity triggers considerations of justice, 
and nonhuman beings have dignity, then the question arises why the 
additional requirement of sentience for being part of the community of 
justice applies only in the nonhuman case, and not in the human case. 
This is especially puzzling because she not only attributes dignity to 
sentient beings but to all living beings – that is at least my interpretation 
of the following passage: ‘It is the animal sort of dignity, and that very 
sort of dignity could not be possessed by a being who was not mortal 
and vulnerable’ (Nussbaum 2006, p.  132). Jeremy Bendik- Keymer 
confirms this claim by clarifying that indeed ‘[h] aving dignity, for 
Nussbaum, is no longer sufficient to make one a subject of justice. The 
reason why is that all forms of life have some kind of dignity, but not 
all forms of life deserve justice’ (2014, p. 175). He further adds that 
‘[t]here are many kinds of dignity, but not all of them deserve justice. 
[…] Nothing unfeeling or unmoving deserves justice’ (2014, p. 180). 
This is because, according to Nussbaum, only beings that intend to do 
certain movements have ‘a stake’ in their existence and only sentient 
beings ‘care about the damage done to them’ (Bendik- Keymer 2014, 
p. 182). Or as Nussbaum clarifies herself, in her view ‘[t]he notion of 
justice is conceptually bound up with the idea of experienced harm 
and thwarting’ (2011, pp. 158– 9).
So somewhat similarly to my own account, Nussbaum distinguishes 
between moral standing in terms of dignity and ‘deserving’ justice. 
Yet, instead of making particular justice- related considerations trigger 
who or what is included in the community of justice, she makes 
sentience the criterion of being a recipient of justice. However, this 
is congruent to her understanding of justice itself – a concept highly 
interlinked with sentience (see Bendik- Keymer 2014) and in that sense 
a justice- related reason. Despite that this does not seem fully sufficient 
for grounding an account of justice per se, based my conceptualisation 
of justice at least (Chapter 3), I would also contest that ‘having a stake 
in one’s existence’ is only exhibited by sentient and moving beings 
(Chapter 2). Consequently, it remains unclear to me how this emphasis 
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on sentience allows for the exclusion of non- sentient beings from justice 
instead of starting with a (political) biocentric standpoint. Surprisingly, 
Bendik- Keymer goes as far as claiming – with Nussbaum’s approval – 
that Nussbaum is a ‘biocentric individualist’ (2014, p. 176, emphasis in 
original). If that is the case and there are indeed features of Nussbaum’s 
theory that suggest such a perspective, which generate in conjunction 
with sentientism the inconsistencies noted earlier, then it is even less 
understandable why she insists on excluding non- sentient nonhumans 
from the protection of justice, even though she grants these nonhumans 
‘respect’ because, at least from my perspective, the political, in terms 
of justice, does not stop at sentientism but can reasonably extend to a 
wider set of wellbeing.
But not all forms of respect are equal. As put by Bendik- Keymer, 
‘[r] espect- worthiness that generates claims is different from respect- 
worthiness that does not’ (2014, p.  183). Even though Nussbaum 
attributes ‘respect’ to all nonhumans it seems to be of a second- class 
variety. Consequently, even though non- sentient nonhumans are 
attributed dignity and are considered worthy of respect, both of which 
are important concepts in Nussbaum’s CA in the human context, dignity 
and respect turn out to be less relevant for determining which living 
beings are awarded the protection of justice. This locates Nussbaum’s 
extension of the CA firmly within sentientism (despite that her broader 
ethical commitments appear indeed biocentric) and illustrates that a 
conception of interspecies justice does not necessarily have to rely on 
an account of dignity. Yet this is problematic for Nussbaum insofar as 
her account of the CA relies on dignity as a grounding concept, which 
puts a strain on the relationship between her understandings of justice 
in the human and the nonhuman spheres.
A related position is Katy Fulfer’s (2013) ‘relational’ description of 
dignity that links to interdependence and neediness, and includes also 
non- sentient life in the community of justice. For that she draws on 
Nussbaum’s account while also simultaneously proposing a definition 
which is quite removed from Nussbaum’s own understanding of dignity. 
I will not analyse her position in detail here, but particularly interesting 
regarding justice is that her account does not appear to fully resolve 
the inconsistencies in Nussbaum’s account because for Fulfer too, the 
bestowing of dignity on nonhuman beings does not appear to really 
trigger considerations of justice. It rather appears that in her account 
it is the ability to flourish and the agency of non- sentient organisms 
which humans interact with which does the main conceptual work, 
as illustrated by the following passage: ‘Instead of framing a disjunctive 
standard that highlights sentience or cognitive capacity more generally, 
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Nussbaum could consistently (and should) define the standard for 
inclusion in the community of justice on the basis of flourishing’ 
(2013, p. 27).
The question therefore arises whether the concept of dignity is 
required in the context of interspecies justice. In neither Nussbaum’s 
nor Fulfer’s work does dignity really aid their accounts of interspecies 
justice. Furthermore, the relational component of Fulfer’s account 
does not need to be framed in terms of dignity. Interdependence 
could ground a relational account of justice between beings with the 
capacity to flourish independently of a conception of dignity. Maybe 
Schlosberg’s version of the CA can help by providing a way of avoiding 
the issue of dignity. Instead of dignity, Schlosberg (2007, 2014) prefers 
the term ‘integrity’, because he claims that it is more appropriate in the 
context of ecosystems as well as applying to organisms. According to 
him, integrity ‘requires us to think about the autonomy and unfolding 
of potential, and of the ethical issues of interrupting that life process. 
Integrity, in this sense, is a state where functioning remains; a violation 
of integrity undermines function and is the definition of injustice’ 
(2014, p. 81, emphasis in original).
As noted by Kallhoff (2014) integrity is not necessarily valuable 
in itself, and it is not fully clear how Schlosberg’s use of integrity 
does amount to more than flourishing; it is the flourishing of these 
ecosystems that his description of integrity seems to lead to in the 
end. For example, when explaining his understanding of integrity, 
Schlosberg refers to the following passages:  ‘every natural entity is 
entitled to enjoy the fullness of its own form of life’ (Low and Gleeson 
1998, p. 156 cited in Schlosberg 2007, p. 136) and ‘[n] eed understood 
in terms of conditions necessary for living well or flourishing is a 
concept applicable not only to all animal species, but to plant life as 
well’ (Benton 1993, p. 212 paraphrased in Schlosberg 2007, p. 137). 
Neither of these two passages and the sections they originate from refers 
clearly to any concept of integrity, but both arguably refer to some 
notion of flourishing. Then, further into his discussion, Schlosberg 
criticises Nussbaum’s use of dignity and claims that a ‘conception of 
integrity or of flourishing […] would be better choices than the term 
dignity’ (2007, p. 146). Either this means that these two concepts are 
interchangeable to some degree to him, or that he is still open to the 
idea of flourishing playing a more central role in a theory of justice.
Overall then, the concept of dignity is quite central in Nussbaum’s 
version of the CA, and both Fulfer and Schlosberg draw on 
Nussbaum’s conceptual framework. When applied to nonhuman 
beings, however, each of these accounts runs into problems or 
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discharges the notion of dignity, which suggests that dignity might 
not be able to perform the same normative work in the nonhuman 
realm as it might with regard to social justice, and that its proposed 
alternative integrity – at least for now – does not necessarily constitute 
a conceptual addition to the debate that generates more normative 
pull than the notion of flourishing.
The predation problem
A second problem faced by the CA is its uneasy fit with the gruesome 
realities of prey- predator relations.1 Justice to nonhuman beings is 
neither about policing nature nor about providing an authoritative 
external standard for the conduct for other species. As previously 
discussed, it determines how we as humans think we should conduct 
ourselves while being immersed in a multitude of relationships with 
other species. It is here, however, where the CA (on some accounts 
at least) runs into difficulties. On the one side, it would appear 
that a capabilities theorist would want to argue that it is part of a 
predatory wild animal’s capabilities list to prey on other animals; 
hence we need to allow this behaviour to avoid non- flourishing 
lions or bears and so on. On the other side, however, being eaten by 
another animal is surely not part of the flourishing of an individual 
gazelle or salmon, which may justify considering the protection of 
these animals from predators.
Nussbaum tries to solve this problem by tentatively opening up 
the possibility of policing nature by suggesting that the ‘conception 
of flourishing is thoroughly evaluative and ethical; it holds that the 
frustration of certain tendencies is not only compatible with flourishing, 
but actually required by it’ (2006, p. 366). This is supposed to be true 
not only for humans but also for animals. Hence, she argues that 
‘[r] espect for nature should not and cannot mean just leaving nature 
as it is, and must involve careful normative arguments about what 
plausible goals might be’ (2006, p. 369). As a consequence Nussbaum 
argues ‘for the gradual supplanting of the natural by the just’ (2006, 
p. 400). She does not follow this argument to the extreme, however, 
by suggesting something along the lines of denying all predatory 
animals’ ‘harm- causing capabilities’, because she acknowledges that 
predatory animals might suffer otherwise as ‘there is no chance that 
education or acculturation would remove this pain’ (2006, p. 370).2 
Her proposed solution is rather, for example, to give the predatory 
animal an appropriate toy to ‘play’ with instead of another animal to 
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in more general terms her solution is one of ‘paternalism’ that also 
aids other species when they are in dire circumstances which are not 
of human origin.
Nonetheless, even though Nussbaum’s paternalistic attitude towards 
nonhumans might not be regarded problematic from all green 
perspectives, her insistence on improving nature is not what ecologists 
usually have in mind when lobbying for action (Wissenburg 2011). In 
addition, Nussbaum’s approach has been strongly criticised by some 
political theorists (such as Schlosberg 2007, Cripps 2010, Wissenburg 
2011), mainly because applying justice in the sense of a duty of human 
interference into relations between wild animals appears nonsensical. 
What worries me in particular is that Nussbaum’s attitude towards 
improving nature appears highly anthropocentric by implying a sort 
of human exceptionalism which sits uncomfortably with the virtue of 
humility, as discussed in Chapter 5. Because of the implicit domination 
attitude in this perspective, it seems at odds with a commitment to 
ecological justice in terms of just biological conservation. Merely 
attributing respect to nonhumans (via dignity) is not necessarily enough 
to avoid this implication.
According to Simon Hailwood, the predation problem is actually 
not a problem intrinsic to Nussbaum’s CA. Rather, ‘[h] er predation 
problem is caused by an external assumption [the improving attitude] 
that is inconsistent with the capabilities approach’ (2012, p.  297). 
This is because Hailwood argues that this attitude is inconsistent with 
Nussbaum’s understanding of animal dignity. Hence, he claims that 
the CA can be rescued if it is detached from ‘an unqualified improving 
attitude towards nature’ (2012, p.  306). He proposes that either a 
restriction of scope – for example by ‘viewing wild predation as outside 
the circumstances of justice’  – or of content  – by only accepting 
negative duties not to undermine flourishing and not positive duties 
to protect prey animals – can solve this problem (2012, p. 308).
I will return to Hailwood’s point about scope later, but I  agree 
with Hailwood that restricting (at least) its content is one successful 
argumentative route for a non- contradictory account of ecological 
justice. In the previous chapters, I  argued that regarding wild 
nonhumans, interspecies justice can only include negative duties not to 
inhibit the flourishing of nonhumans because of the issue of predation, 
among other things. But besides that the predation problem is not the 
only one faced by the CA, I maintain that it is more intrinsic to the 
CA than Hailwood acknowledges. To clarify my point, let us return to 
Schlosberg who makes an attempt to rid his work of the paternalism in 
Nussbaum’s CA. He claims that ‘[t] he point is not to lay out the ideal 
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form of protection of the capabilities of all; the goal is a framework of 
justice that can address the human undermining of the basic needs and 
functionings of the worlds in which we live’ (2014, p. 83). He points 
here to an inherent problem within the CA; its inbuilt paternalistic 
tendency. There is a difference between enabling capabilities as far as 
human action as the moral agent is concerned, and protecting everyone’s/ 
everything’s capabilities which goes further than refraining from 
impeding on capabilities. In the context of interspecies justice it seems 
enough for humans not to ‘stand in the way’ of a being’s flourishing – 
that is, restricting its ‘content’ on Hailwood’s (2012) account. This is 
at least the case regarding wild nonhumans. However, by protecting 
flourishing via protecting capabilities, as is the aim of Nussbaum’s 
CA, humans take a stronger interest in other beings’ flourishing, and 
this leads to the prey- predator dilemma without necessarily being 
committed to solving this problem by improving nature.
The real world does not allow the protection of all capabilities of all 
beings at the same time. There are always conflicts, such as between 
prey and predator, at the individual level in which the predator wants 
(and needs) to eat the prey, and the prey wants to stay alive. It is not 
up to humans or justice to solve these unavoidable conflicts, and it 
is not a matter of justice how animals or plants conduct themselves. 
Nussbaum seems to disagree with this claim, however, due to her 
goal to make nature more just. But because it is impossible to ensure 
the flourishing of all beings, it seems that not only an ‘improving 
attitude’ towards nature, but also a related (but distinct) paternalism, 
which appears conceptually entangled with this version of the 
CA, leads to the prey- predator dilemma in Nussbaum’s account.3 
Hailwood seems to understand what I have termed paternalism as a 
feature of Nussbaum’s improving attitude and therefore detachable 
from the CA as such. Still, it seems that Nussbaum’s improving 
attitude which requires all ‘natural’ to become ‘just’ is distinct from 
a more general commitment to protecting capabilities found in the 
CA. Maybe this feature can also be detached from the CA when 
applied to wild nonhumans, and retained when applied to some 
domesticated nonhumans where protecting capabilities does not 
necessarily run into this particular problem in the same way (while 
generating a new set of issues to consider). I will return to this last 
point in a moment. In any case, Nussbaum’s version of the CA can 
only be redeemed in this regard if it is altered accordingly. As argued 
by Cripps, Schlosberg’s position – in his earlier writings – also entails 
the capability theory’s focus on protecting capabilities; the resulting 
situation being ‘one in which justice, understood as the positive 
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guarantee of some threshold level flourishing for all, is ruled out by 
the very nature of its subjects’ (Cripps 2010, p. 15). The issue is with 
how the CA defines justice itself as more than merely non- harming 
negative duties. Thus, its definition of justice stands in tension with 
the actual existing relationships between living beings. Consequently, 
the problem is not merely based on an external assumption found in 
Nussbaum’s account (which is supported by Clare Palmer’s (2010) 
reading of Nussbaum’s theory). If that is the case, then the predation 
problem might be intrinsic to the CA after all.
Even though Schlosberg tries to address this issue, he has not 
managed to satisfactorily resolve this inconsistency in his own theory. 
This is because he proposes that ‘[t] o be food for others is the essence 
of functioning for some beings’ (2007, p. 151). From this perspective, 
it is part of the gazelle’s flourishing to be eaten by the lion. This 
approach would clearly solve the issue of conflicting interests (if such 
functionings can be translated into interests) because for both – prey 
and predator – predation is essential to their flourishing. As Cripps 
(2010) points out, Schlosberg’s argumentation makes sense when we 
consider lions and gazelles as species. Gazelles as a species might benefit 
from the population control that results from the lions’ predation, 
and more generally, the ecosystem in which these species exist also 
benefits from the population control mechanisms that prey- predator 
relationships generate. However, it is unclear how an individual gazelle 
is supposed to flourish by being eaten – pain and premature death 
are usually not part of any being’s interests (recall Chapter 2). Hence, 
on the individual level, the conflict of interest remains. Moreover, 
Schlosberg also generates, by the inclusion of species and ecosystems 
into his theory, conflicts between species, ecosystems and individuals 
(Cripps 2010). In reply, Schlosberg (2014) stresses the point again that 
eating a being does not necessarily undermine its functioning. This 
is indeed sometimes the case but still primarily a point that rather 
applies on a systems level. A being’s life project usually includes a full 
lifecycle – that is, a normal lifecycle based on what kind of being it is. 
Premature death by predator appears clearly to undermine this project 
even if the being in question is not conscious.4 Consequently, the CA’s 
uneasy fit with prey- predator relations appears to remain within these 
versions for now, which undermines its potential suitability as a theory 
of interspecies justice towards wild nonhumans.
Related to the predation problem is the question of self- defence. 
Because the CA oversteps the boundaries of how justice is usually 
understood, it imports problems into the sphere of justice which I am 
reluctant to include – at least with regards to distributive justice. For 
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example, discussing the ‘capability of life’ in Nussbaum’s account, 
Marcel Wissenburg notes that ‘[e] ven the choice between killing 
the tiger that attacks you or being killed by the tiger should at least 
be considered a moral dilemma’ on that account (2011, p. 394). If 
this reading of Nussbaum’s CA is correct then it demonstrates how 
ambitious this account is regarding the range of issues it applies to. For 
example, a question about self- defence becomes an issue of justice, 
rather than merely one of what would be morally right or at least 
permissible actions to take in such a situation. However, as we have 
already discussed in Chapter 5, there are good reasons for excluding 
self- defence from the realm of questions that justice can address which 
goes back to the important distinction between ethics as a broader 
concept and justice as a more specific one. More specifically, my 
interest lies primarily in distributive ecological justice and I therefore 
consider questions around self- defence, whether against another 
human or nonhuman, to be outside of the realm in which accounts 
of distributive justice can provide guidance. Otherwise we would be 
committed to an account that would aim to distribute the bodies of 
the distributors. This narrows the range of questions which my account 
of interspecies justice can answer, but it also makes it more efficient in 
providing real world guidance on what constitutes a just distribution 
of ecological space instead of generating an array of moral dilemmas. 
In other words, Nussbaum’s version of the CA is too broad in that it 
is applicable to too many issues; it generates considerable problems 
at least in one interpretation of her account (what shall I do when 
I am attacked by a tiger?) and remains fairly vague on questions of 
distribution. A narrower account of distributive justice is, then, more 
apt to provide principled recommendations for just actions.
Benefits of a more limited account
Moving on from problems of extensionist accounts of the CA that 
could potentially be rectified, I  would like to discuss two further 
points that illustrate the advantages of a narrower distributive justice 
approach for developing a framework of interspecies justice. These are 
the advantages that follow from (1) framing some problems in terms 
of ecological space rather than capabilities, and from (2) emphasising 
different justice relationships. As we have seen, in a wider context, the 
CA is part of the departure of political philosophy from considering 
justice as being synonymous with distributive justice. Even though the 
CA does have some distributive justice features on some accounts, it 
is arguably not a pure version of such a perspective. Because of this 
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particularity of the CA, its interpretation differs from author to author, 
either as an approach of distributive justice; as an approach including 
several considerations besides distribution, such as recognition; or as a 
fully distinct and novel approach towards justice. As argued previously, 
I focus on distributive justice because the materiality of environmental 
problems points towards issues of misdistribution and distributional- 
conflicts that cannot be ignored. In contrast, in a distributive justice 
context the CA is less effective in providing guidance regarding the 
distribution of scarce resources than an alternative approach that focuses 
on the distribution of limited material goods.
With that in mind, the problem with the CA concerns the 
distribuendum at its heart, if the CA is understood (roughly) as an 
account of distributive justice.5 In distributive terms the CA focuses 
on the just distribution of opportunities for engaging in activities or 
reaching certain states of being (that is, functionings). In contrast, 
I argue for an approach that focuses on the material means for – the 
potential of – wellbeing, and I have proposed ecological space as the 
appropriate distribuendum for theories of environmental and ecological 
justice (Chapter  4). Even though capability theorists have tried to 
incorporate considerations for sustainability into their theories (see for 
example Holland 2008), the CA cannot straightforwardly account for 
environmental limits in space, resources, benefits provided by ecosystems 
and so on. In contrast, engaging with issues of environmental limits and 
scarcity of necessary goods is more direct via theories of justice that 
are able to clearly distinguish between the limited material means that 
are distributed, and the ends of distribution, which is the flourishing 
of individuals. The actual material means such as ecological space are 
only of second order importance (via conversion factors that reflect the 
ability of individuals to turn material means into functionings) within 
accounts of the CA, because they are part of what creates capabilities 
instead of what gets distributed itself. That is not to say that the CA 
could not be adapted to address how scarcity of ecological space is 
constricting capabilities, but with regards to interspecies justice in 
particular, the distribution of actual resources, and access to ecosystem 
benefits in terms of ecological space seems more relevant than the 
distribution of opportunities. Thus, there is a conceptual difference 
between distributing material means for the purpose for allowing for 
flourishing opportunities and the opportunities themselves (Chapter 4).
In other words, I think that there is a relevant difference between 
the common intuition of ‘letting wild nature be’  – the so- called 
laissez- faire intuition (Palmer 2010) – that is reflected in my account 
of interspecies justice, and distributing freedoms and opportunities 
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to nonhuman beings (and ecosystems). It seems that capabilities do 
not hold the same value in the nonhuman context as in the social, 
where it matters to humans that they have certain opportunities 
conceptualised as certain freedoms even if they choose not to 
engage in the related actions. Sometimes the ‘laissez- faire intuition’ 
is conceptualised as not infringing on the freedom or autonomy of 
nonhumans, however such freedom and the related opportunities 
differ conceptually from the role they play in the human context. 
This seems especially true for versions of the CA that also include 
non- sentient beings and/ or ecosystems in the group of recipients 
of justice (such as Schlosberg 2007, Fulfer 2013). For example, it 
might make sense to speak of the flourishing of an ecosystem, but 
what matters is that the ecosystem is ‘healthy’ and not that it has the 
opportunity in terms of freedom to reach that healthiness. Or with 
regards to plants, it matters for a tree to have access to soil, nutrients 
and water and so on – that is, ecological space – in order to be able to 
flourish, but the plant’s opportunity to flourish (in terms of not being 
constrained by anthropogenic factors) should not be construed as a 
liberty. Necessary ecological space – if available – is always converted 
into an improvement of wellbeing by nonhuman non- sentient beings, 
potentially hindered only by illness, interference by other organisms 
or natural disasters, among other things. The focus here lies on the 
availability of ecological space that opens a window of opportunity 
for flourishing and not the presence of alternative options. Thus, the 
conceptual framework around freedoms and choices of the CA that 
makes it intuitively powerful in the social justice context weakens 
its applicability to the nonhuman sphere.
Andres Melin and David Kronlid (2016) point out that Nussbaum 
herself is ambiguous in her use of the capabilities terminology in the 
nonhuman sphere, which hollows out the capability concept – for 
example by referring to mere ‘abilities’ to perform certain actions as 
capabilities – as well as being at odds with the usual emphasis on free 
choice; previously an important feature of capabilities in Nussbaum’s 
own account. Alternatively, in the nonhuman sphere, the CA could 
shift focus from a metric of capabilities to functioning (as proposed 
by Melin and Kronlid 2016); a start of which can, arguably, be found 
in a more recent remark by Schlosberg:  ‘Harm, and so injustice, is 
the interruption of functioning, the thwarting of a living process. 
Such harms can be done to sentient animals, as well as nonsentient 
nonhumans and ecological systems’ (Schlosberg 2014, p. 81). Hence, 
a conceptual move to functioning might be useful to capability 
theorists expanding their framework beyond the human sphere, but 
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whether a CA that emphasises opportunities in the human sphere can 
be consistently combined with an account of ecological justice that 
focuses on functioning remains to be established.
Another point  – that requires more differentiation but does not 
constitute a problem intrinsic to the CA applied to interspecies justice, 
but is predominantly a feature of Nussbaum’s version so far – is the 
question of which kind of nonhumans are covered by an account of 
ecological justice. A distinction that can be made between wild and 
domesticated nonhumans and their different relations to humans (often 
encountered in recent writings about animal ethics; see Palmer 2010, 
Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011) has not received much attention in the 
interspecies justice literature so far, although it seems highly relevant 
for meaningfully defining the scope of interspecies justice. Nussbaum 
(2006), for example, extends her list of capabilities to all kinds of 
sentient animals. Even though she acknowledges that, depending on 
the relationship these animals have with nonhumans, this has different 
implications for what could be considered just treatment, her inclusion 
of all these different human- nonhuman relationships under a single 
justice umbrella – that is, only one capabilities list applicable to all 
sentient nonhumans  – seems problematic. As pointed out earlier, 
Hailwood (2012) has argued that the prey- predator dilemma in 
Nussbaum’s version of the CA could be rectified by limiting its ‘scope’ 
by excluding ‘wild predation’ – that is, in effect wild animals – from 
the circumstances of justice as an alternative to limiting its content. 
This implies that Nussbaum’s CA might end up as a justice approach 
only towards nonhuman animals which are ‘close to humans’. That 
might be a good account of what we owe domesticated animals but 
does not help us much to establish interspecies justice in terms of just 
biological conservation. More fruitful seems to me to be the distinction 
between different kinds of justice relationships, where justice to wild 
nonhumans has a different content and structure than justice to more 
domesticated nonhumans. Ecological justice then functions as an 
umbrella concept that has to be subdivided into several communities 
of justice such as the human- wild nonhuman justice relationship that 
I focus on here (Chapter 1).
Summing up, we have covered some of the problems that I consider 
challenging when the CA is extended to nonhumans. Note, however, 
that the literature discussing this topic is more extensive than what we 
have looked at here. Yet I think that this little detour was necessary 
because the CA has become a popular route to justify the extension of 
justice to nonhuman beings, and I have remained sceptical about this 
development. On the one side, the CA approach faces problems in the 
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nonhuman realm because of its focus on dignity and its problematic 
entanglement with prey- predator relations. On the other side, the CA’s 
broad focus imports problems into the realm of justice (such as the 
self- defence dilemma) and it is less efficient in answering distribution 
questions, in which I am primarily interested. As a result, I believe 
that an account of ecological justice is more likely to be consistent 
without the conceptual framework of the CA but I would welcome 
developments that would be able to show otherwise because my 
account shares many similarities with the CA as indicated earlier. 
Now, having laid the main foundations of our account of interspecies 
justice, we can turn to thinking about how biodiversity loss fits into 
this framework in Chapter 7.
Notes
 1 The problem of predation is part of a larger debate in the animal ethics literature. 
For an overview see Jozef Keulartz (2016).
 2 See Wissenburg (2011) for an illustration of what extreme consequences would 
follow if Nussbaum’s claims would be brought to their extreme implications.
 3 This is not to say that it would be impossible to theoretically circumvent the prey- 
predator dilemma, because all capabilities might be protected if all currently wild 
animals were put into humane zoos, but it becomes impossible if nonsentient beings 
are also included. In the end, eating – even if heavily controlled – and being eaten 
will always cut short the flourishing of some living being, even if they are ‘merely’ 
nonsentient.
 4 Cripps (2010) also points out that the introduction of the notion of ‘risk’ might be 
helpful for salvaging Schlosberg’s account because only the risk of, for example, 
being eaten by a predator, leads to the use of certain capacities of individual prey 
animals such as speed. Yet, as I will discuss later, I do not think that this line of 
argument helps Schlosberg’s account much because it glosses over the difference 
between ‘capabilities’ and ‘abilities’. Put simply, I do not think that there is good 
reason to suggest that an individual animal that does not have to run fast (and, 
hence, never does) flourishes less than an individual animal that exercises its ability 
to run fast in order not to be eaten.
 5 For example, on Schlosberg’s (2007) reading the CA is a separate sphere from 
the realm of distributive justice. However, because I am setting aside for now all 
complementary realms of justice and focusing exclusively on distribution, my 










The current mass extinction is a crisis in progress, and the window of 
opportunity to dampen its magnitude and consequences is closing (see 
Ceballos et al 2015). From a practical perspective this poses the question 
of what could be done about it; for example, what conservation 
practices (including changes to economic and social systems) might be 
most effective? We will return to this in Chapter 9, but now, I would 
like to focus on an underlying theoretical question: is biodiversity loss 
in itself an injustice? And if so, to whom or what is it an injustice? That 
is a narrower question than asking whether the current extinction crisis 
constitutes an injustice as we will see. Yet, considering the severity of 
the current rate of species extinctions, it is surprising that this general 
route of enquiry has received little philosophical attention. Even 
though there is a fairly widely shared belief by conservation biologists 
and environmental ethicists that species extinctions are morally wrong 
(see for example Soulé 1985, Cafaro and Primack 2014), this intuition 
has usually not been framed in terms of justice. An exception to this 
is, for example, Philip Cafaro’s account (2015) who calls the sixth 
mass extinction an injustice and an ‘interspecies genocide’ but without 
grounding this claim in a particular theory of justice. This means that 
I am after the possibility of framing the extinction of a species as a 
matter of justice which does not preclude, of course, that there are other 
additional non- justice based grounds for morally problematising the 
extinction of a species, such as in terms of collective responsibility for 
its loss (see for example Oksanen 2007). Accordingly, the wrongness or 
badness of anthropogenic extinctions does not hinge solely on whether 
it can be framed as an injustice.
In the context of climate change, a lot has been written so far about 
doing justice to future generations. Yet whether the impact of climate 
change on nonhuman life is an issue of interspecies or animal justice – 
or of ethics more generally  – has mostly been excluded from the 
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discussion so far (with some notable exceptions, such as Attfield 2011, 
Nolt 2011, Palmer 2011, Cripps 2013). This comes as no surprise when 
considering that climate change has been described as the ‘perfect moral 
storm’ (Gardiner 2011); even when only considering humans. Whether 
justice is applicable to nonhumans is a highly controversial issue in 
its own right. Nevertheless, climate change will have considerable 
consequences for many individual nonhuman beings, populations and 
species, and thereby contributes to the problem of biodiversity loss. 
Of course, climate change alone is often not considered the main or 
only driver of biodiversity loss (see Noss et al 2012) and, accordingly, 
I will focus on land- use change in Chapter 9. Nevertheless, the non- 
anthropocentric climate change ethics literature can help us when 
thinking about whether biodiversity loss – whether caused by climate 
change or otherwise – is a form of injustice. Particularly because the 
biodiversity loss question involves a time- dimension as it might involve 
injustices that requires us to look back or into the future.
Drawing on the climate justice literature reveals that there are several 
angles from which one can consider whether justice can be done in the 
sense that it is applicable to future and present generations of humans 
and nonhuman living beings. From a harm avoidance perspective there 
appear to be four different lines of enquiry that are most obvious. For 
a start, we can consider whether the concept of justice is applicable 
to our relationship with future nonhuman individual beings. Next, 
however, it might also be the case that any relevant harm from a justice 
point of view is actually located in our relationship with currently 
living nonhumans. Thirdly, we can inquire whether harm to future 
nonhumans in terms of biodiversity loss should instead be considered 
at the species level in the sense of potentially doing an injustice to 
species themselves. And fourthly, harm to future nonhumans might 
only indirectly be a matter of interspecies justice as the injustice might 
partly or mainly lie in our relationship with future human generations, 
thereby excluding nonhuman interests from the relevant considerations.
Especially in the specific context of climate change, one could also 
inquire whether a duty to aid adaptation is applicable to the human- 
nonhuman relationship. Besides adaptation and harm avoidance, the 
issue of burden sharing is also extensively debated in the climate 
justice literature. When considering nonhumans, the question of 
burden sharing appears to be mainly an issue regarding justice to future 
beings, with a focus on rectification or reparation justice and how 
the consequences of human environmental change and destruction 
are supposed to be shared by the biotic community as a whole. 
For example, here a question would be whether compensation for 
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nonhuman beings is appropriate due to the negative consequences 
of anthropogenic climate change and other human activities that 
have caused, among other issues, habitat loss, which has led to more 
difficult living conditions and species extinctions (some of these issues 
are discussed in Palmer 2010).
Instead of discussing all of these problems, I  will focus on one 
particular case – biodiversity loss from the harm avoidance perspective – 
and thereby explore whether the harm of human- caused species 
extinctions can be considered an injustice (if it constitutes a harm 
at all) and not merely something that is morally lamentable or even 
morally neutral. Let us consider several possibilities in turn. First in 
section one, we will examine whether such an injustice might be 
part of our relationship with future or current nonhumans as well 
as future human generations. Yet, maybe such an individual focus is 
too narrow, and maybe – in contrast to what I have argued so far (in 
Chapters 2 and 3) – an injustice can rather be found at the species 
level. We will see that from both perspectives it is difficult to consider 
biodiversity loss an injustice rather than considering it a moral wrong 
more broadly. However, in section two, we will see that biodiversity 
loss should be considered as the outcome of injustice rather than an 
injustice in itself. For simplicity I  use biodiversity loss and species 
extinctions interchangeably indicating the final extinction of one or 
several species (thus, not necessarily amounting to a mass extinction 
event), even though I am aware that both are contested concepts with 
distinct meanings which are not fully synonymous. Because of that, 
in section three, we will look briefly at one particular critique of 
biodiversity as a concept central to biological conservation and begin 
to think about the normative implications of my position sketched so 
far for population sizes – another very contested area of debate.
The recipients of justice
As we have seen, it is possible to extend the scope of justice to include 
non- sentient living organisms at least in terms of distributive justice 
towards wild nonhumans. From a starting point that justice is a 
context- specific concept that applies as a solution to certain problems/ 
circumstances, living beings need to share the Earth in order not only 
to live, but also to live a good life. However, my argument appears 
to only hold for currently living organisms and hence it does not 
provide much insight into whether future nonhuman generations 
could be included, or whether the future extinction of species is an 
issue of justice. Furthermore, even if we would assume that justice is 
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an appropriate concept in these cases there are two major issues that 
come up when we consider applying justice to future nonhuman 
generations. The first is the issue of harms versus benefits, and the 
second is the non- existence problem.
As in the general literature on climate change justice, there are cases 
of countries potentially benefiting from global warming (such as Russia 
or Finland); we can also find in the nonhuman case that some organisms 
will be harmed by climate change and that others will potentially 
benefit from altered climatic conditions. The discrepancy of potential 
impacts on different individuals undermines the validity of merely 
focusing on clear cases of harm (such as polar bears) and ignoring cases 
where beings are benefiting or will likely benefit from climate change 
(such as mosquitoes) (see Palmer 2011, Cripps 2013). For example, 
are we going to weigh the numbers of beings that benefit against the 
numbers that will suffer, or are we prioritising different kinds of beings 
according to their importance for ecosystems, human interests and the 
like in order to decide whether climate change embodies an injustice? 
If we would choose such a ranking system, how would we take into 
account scientific uncertainty? As argued previously in Chapter 2, such 
a prioritisation should not be based, however, on a ranking of moral 
significance based on, for example, a ranking of cognitive complexity. 
Yet, even without drawing on the claim that the wellbeing of some 
entities matters more than the wellbeing of others, we could draw 
on other further morally relevant factors such as the instrumental 
importance of some living being for enabling the wellbeing of others 
in order to make prioritisation decisions.
However, these questions seem to be beside the point in the context 
of justice. When considering the harms versus benefits problem, it 
seems to matter that in the case of climate change or biodiversity loss 
more generally, the harming actions might not be fully intentional 
but could potentially be avoided (even if only at great cost), and 
that following from these harming actions the benefits received by 
other living beings are merely accidental. As we have conceptualised 
ecological justice to wild nonhumans, it is primarily a matter of not 
inhibiting the flourishing of nonhumans rather than actively aiding 
and thereby benefiting their wellbeing. Consequently, the benefits 
incurred are not of primary interest. And thus, it seems warranted to 
focus on the harm done – which might be a potential injustice – and 
exclude the potential benefits that might occur from anthropogenic 
climate change. Moreover, considering that climate change is only one 
of many human- induced changes on nonhuman habitats, it seems that 
most of these changes have very low numbers of benefiters – at least 
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on a relevant time scale (Nolt 2011) – in contrast to the number of 
living beings harmed, such as via clearances of forests for agriculture. 
Similarly, anthropogenic- induced species extinctions can also create 
winner species that can populate ‘vacant’ or ‘newly created’ ecological 
niches, but it seems odd – from a non- utilitarian perspective  – to 
overstretch this beneficial side effect in light of the antecedent harm 
to other living beings.
Regarding the different kinds of organisms that are affected by climate 
change, Clare Palmer (2011, p.  285) considers the ‘simplification 
worry’ while assuming that the number of living beings is going to 
be stable over time, which she regards to be a likely outcome. That 
total numbers of living beings will be stable over time makes sense in 
the context of a long time frame, but short- run fluctuations including 
large decreases in numbers can and should nevertheless be a worry.1 
Similarly, what also seems problematic is the loss of species disparity 
which measures the ‘morphological variance’ of the body of species 
(Powell 2011). But returning to Palmer’s worry according to which 
more complex (that is, conscious) organisms matter more than less 
complex ones; climate change will likely decrease the numbers of the 
former and potentially benefit the latter, thereby leading to an overall 
‘simplification’ of organisms. This implies that climate change would 
lead to an overall ‘devaluing’ because there will be fewer polar bears but 
more mosquitoes, for example. Again, there is scientific uncertainty 
about whether climate change will really lead to such a simplification 
(while keeping all other human impacts constant). However, more 
importantly from a non- ranking biocentric position, this does not 
worry us much if moral significance is reflected by intrinsic value. If 
that is the case, then how complex an organism is does not affect its 
value and thus a simplification is not reflected by a devaluing. And 
because non- ranking biocentrism grounds my account of ecological 
justice, the simplification worry is not relevant in this context. After 
all, from this perspective a polar bear and a mosquito are quite distinct 
beings, but both are living beings that can flourish in their own way. 
Even if it would be the case that, on average, simpler organisms like 
mosquitoes will benefit from climate change and more complex beings 
such as polar bears will lose out, this is not the issue at heart of the 
injustice that we are looking for.2
Even if we assume that most currently existing species will most 
likely decline in population numbers or become extinct, what would 
this mean on the individual level? Meaning that in what sense are 
individual beings harmed via causes such as climate change that lead 
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individuals that have been born into fairly stable conditions and then 
suffer from the changing climate while alive (for example because 
their habitat is changing); individuals that have come into existence 
after considerable climatic changes which have likely causally affected 
their coming into existence in the first place, but which nevertheless 
suffer from its consequences; and individuals that will never be born 
due to climate change or other anthropogenic causes.
It seems that the first group can be covered by an account of present 
justice such as the one developed so far. Regarding the second group, 
the problem is that climate change (or other human causes) will affect 
which beings will come into existence – a nonhuman nonidentity problem 
(Palmer 2011) – and based on this the issue is whether a being can be 
harmed by something that causally affected its coming into existence. 
For example, climate change will force many species to migrate into 
different territories. The offspring of individuals that meet in these 
new territories will be composed of individuals that exist because of 
the forced migration which makes it more difficult to claim that these 
individuals are harmed by climate change, even though they likely 
suffer under its consequences. Palmer considers this a challenge for a 
non- consequentialist perspective that is interested in the harm done 
to specific individuals because climate change constitutes a necessary 
condition for the existence of exactly these specific individuals. 
The non- identity problem is, however, only a major problem if one 
assumes a counterfactual conception of harm because, for example, a 
conception of harm that is based on thresholds would circumvent this 
discussion and focus instead on whether the harm- threshold for these 
individuals has been exceeded (see O’Neill, J. 2010). As indicated in 
Chapter 3, such a conceptualisation of harm might be too limited 
but could be recast in terms of a flourishing threshold. Nevertheless, 
even more intriguing and relevant for the issue of biodiversity loss is 
the last group which is constituted by individuals that will never be 
born due to climate change; more specifically individuals that have not 
been born because they belong to a species that has become extinct 
due to climate change or other anthropogenic factors. That is the 
non- existence problem.
The non- existence problem
To reiterate, when considering the specific issue of whether biodiversity 
loss is a form of injustice to individual beings, the initial question that 
arises is whether undermining the opportunity of many potential 
individual living beings to come into existence constitutes harm in 
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the relevant sense and therefore embodies an injustice. That is the 
non- existence problem of harming beings that will never exist – the 
harm therefore never becoming fully actualised. Facing this problem, 
any account of justice to never- existing nonhuman beings would have 
to be based on some controversial premises (more controversial than 
the ones that we are relying on already) and, thus, does not appear to 
be an ideal route for making a plausible case for the injustice involved 
in biodiversity loss.3 Regarding the justice relationship, for example, 
it would have to be shown that preventing a particular version of the 
present human- future nonhuman justice relationship to come into 
being would constitute an injustice by removing the possibility of some 
nonhuman individuals (instead of others) to come into being. Avoiding 
this problem for which I have not found a satisfactory solution so far, 
one possible line of argument is to frame the issue of biodiversity loss 
as an injustice towards currently living organisms.
For example, it might be useful to think of species as genetic (and 
in the case of humanity as several cultural) narratives that extend over 
time and space, and evolve (see for a similar point Rolston III 1985). 
It might be not too much of a stretch to think of the flourishing of 
individual species’ members in reference to this overall narrative. If 
we consider that it is part of many individual organisms’ life projects, 
or rather a condition of their flourishing, to have an opportunity to 
pass on their genes to the next generation, then this goal makes most 
sense in the context of a species. A species provides the framework in 
which genes evolve and get passed on from generation to generation 
and thereby tie together individual beings loosely under the roof of a 
species. Accordingly, it seems that the existence of an overall species 
matters to the (current) individual’s flourishing to some extent and 
this provides the species (and its future members) with some derivative 
protection of justice. Put differently, the passing on of genes in the 
nonhuman sphere seems to provide a relational connection between 
current and future beings. That is somewhat analogous to the human 
context where the life- projects of current humans provide a reason 
to take into account future human generations (on intergenerational 
justice see O’Neill, J.  1993a). However, this line of argument that 
regards species as narratives relevant for justice faces several problems. 
For example, even though from a big picture perspective it makes more 
sense to pass on genes in the context of an ever- evolving species, rather 
than without the species contextualisation, it is not clear why this 
should really matter to the flourishing of an individual (and potentially 
unconscious) being. Recall Chapter 2 in which we saw that it is not 
straightforward to determine what constitutes the flourishing of an 
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individual. Especially because this would imply that, for example, a 
neutered cat would never be able to flourish fully even though it might 
live a happy life in consideration of all its other needs.
A second line of argument that keeps the focus on the wellbeing 
of currently living organisms is to focus on the need of an individual 
being to be immersed in a healthy population with which it can 
interact. As each population consists usually of several generations 
living simultaneously, with each generation often performing different 
social functions, this multi- generational feature of populations might 
generate a derivative protection of future beings via the importance of 
populations for the wellbeing of their currently living members. Yet 
while this argument might appear convincing at first glance, it also 
comes with its own set of problems. For example, some individual 
organisms are able to flourish without having to interact with other 
members of its species. Moreover, even if we would grant that the 
passing on of genes is necessary for the flourishing of individuals, there 
are types of plants and animals that are able to reproduce (without 
human interference) via asexual vegetative reproduction which means 
that the offspring of such an organism has the same set of genes as its 
parent. Potato plants and sea anemones are examples of organisms that 
are able to reproduce in this manner. If such organisms do not need 
to interact with other species- members in order to reproduce, nor 
are they the kinds of organisms that display social group behaviour, 
it appears that an individual being of such a species is able to flourish 
independently of any population. Therefore, this line of argument 
seems to only apply to some beings – mainly animals that live in 
more complex social structures – and hence it is also not able to 
support the blanket claim that a species extinction caused by humans 
is generally an injustice.
Given the absence of a satisfactory solution to the non- existence 
problem that allows future nonhumans that will never exist to become 
admitted into the community of justice, it might alternatively be the 
case that biodiversity loss as an injustice to future individual beings 
can only be part of a human- focused theory of intergenerational 
justice. As for example in Martha Nussbaum’s (2006) version of the 
capabilities approach, one dimension of a flourishing human life is the 
interaction with and immersion in a rich natural environment. The 
biodiversity loss that is likely to follow from climate change and other 
anthropogenic factors is going to undermine this capability. Similarly, 
Joel Feinberg notes that ‘[w] e do have duties to protect threatened 
species, not duties to the species themselves as such, but rather duties 
to future human beings, duties derived from our housekeeping role as 
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temporary inhabitants of this planet’ (Feinberg 1974 (2007), p. 413). 
Additionally, besides the deprivation of important interactions or 
richness of future human life, thereby generating an ‘age of loneliness’ 
(Wilson 2016, p. 20) which might be quite a low consideration on the 
list of priorities regarding human wellbeing, it has also been argued 
that the continued existence of most species is needed for ecological 
stability, which in turn is important for human survival and general 
wellbeing – for example in order to prevent the possibility of humanity’s 
‘autodestruction’ (Bendik- Keymer and Haufe 2016). Moreover, many 
species also have known or as- yet- unknown medical or agricultural 
benefits. Because of these reasons, a precautionary principle seems to 
be a reasonable approach towards species conservation even from a 
purely anthropocentric perspective, especially given the high scientific 
uncertainty regarding ecosystem interactions, and the large estimated 
number of still unknown species (see Wilson 2016).4
Nevertheless, not all species have the same instrumental importance 
for human wellbeing. Some might be only protected because they 
enrich human life (mainly large mammals that are perceived to be 
charismatic) and some might only be protected because they are key 
species in certain ecosystems (often plants, bacteria and less cuddly 
animals). Furthermore, some species might even be fully dispensable. 
In their case, their potential protection via justice merely hinges on the 
scientific uncertainty that surrounds the ecological systems that support 
human life. Unfortunately, this then leads to the conclusion that the 
consideration of biodiversity loss in general as an injustice does not 
piggyback very robustly onto doing justice to future human generations 
because it hinges strongly on scientific uncertainty, which does not seem 
to be a robust enough reason to ground claims of justice. The important 
distinction in this context seems to be between biodiversity loss in the 
general sense which could involve the extinction of a few species only, 
and biodiversity loss in terms of a mass extinction. The problem is that 
the reasons cited in the previous paragraph indicate that biodiversity 
loss constitutes an injustice to future humans if it takes the shape of a 
mass extinction which would have a considerable impact on the ability 
of future humans to live their lives. So, causing a mass extinction event 
can be conceived as injustice towards future human generations. Yet, 
that does not ground the blanket claim that anthropogenic species 
extinctions are unjust because it does not cover biodiversity loss of 
less magnitude and impact on human lives. In consequence, it seems 
that focusing on individual beings, either human or nonhuman, and 
either currently living or yet to live, is not very helpful for grounding 
a robust conception of biodiversity loss as injustice. Therefore, the 
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focus may need to lie instead on species themselves in order to frame 
anthropogenic biodiversity loss as an injustice.
Accordingly, an alternative to considering biodiversity loss as injustice 
towards future individual beings is to consider it as an injustice towards 
species themselves. It might seem intuitively plausible – at first – that 
causing species extinctions while being able to do otherwise constitutes 
an injustice. In contrast, however, justice is not an adequate concept 
to be applied to species, as already noted in Chapter 2. For one thing, 
species are not necessarily the delineated entities as which we often 
think of them. They evolve into new species and their borders are 
not always clear – neither through time nor their classification into 
different species, races and so on. That is not necessarily a major 
problem, but an additional issue is that, most plausibly, a species should 
be understood as an abstract entity; a ‘class’ (Delord 2007). Hence, 
doing justice to a species would mean including a non- material entity 
into the community of justice (which contrasts with the materiality 
of individuals and ecosystems for example).5
Moreover, a species is clearly not the kind of entity that is alive even 
if we treat it as an ‘individual’ (Powell 2011). Being alive is even less 
applicable to species than to ecosystems and, accordingly, nothing is 
due to species directly under my framework because they cannot be 
attributed the kind of moral considerability that follows from having 
a wellbeing. Not considering species to be alive (and to not attribute 
them moral considerability or inherent worth as ends in themselves) 
is not particularly controversial despite being subject of debate. For 
example, many environmental ethicists would agree with Ronald 
Sandler (2012) that they lack interests because species are not goal- 
driven entities and therefore lack the ‘etiological’ basis to have their own 
good. A comparable argument could also be based on organisational 
accounts of life (recall Chapter 2).
Of course, that does not preclude species from having moral value (for 
an overview of the different values that species might hold see Sandler 
2012), such as – most famously – some form of ‘natural historical 
value’ (Rolston III 2001). On Holmes Rolston III’s account of natural 
historical value, the extinction of species ‘shuts down the generative 
processes, a kind of superkilling’ and ‘to superkill a particular species is 
to shut down a story of many millennia and leave no future possibilities’ 
(1995, p. 523), because ‘a biological species is not just a class. A species 
is a living historical form […] propagated in individual organisms, that 
flows dynamically over generations’ (1985, p. 721). This notion of a 
‘superkilling’ might be what we are after when intuitively judging the 
extinction of a species morally problematic, but the killing analogy 
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does not do the same argumentative work if we understand a species 
as a non- living class. In any case, without moral considerability such 
claims about the value of species are neither sufficient nor necessary 
to generate justice entitlements more specifically.
The relevance of anthropogenic causation
So far, we have not reached any satisfactory solution to how biodiversity 
loss relates to justice, but before moving on to a more promising 
framing, I briefly want to consider whether it actually matters, morally 
speaking, that the extinction of a species is caused by humans. It 
might not make a difference that humans cause extinctions via climate 
change, habitat destruction and so on, instead of these just being a 
natural occurrence (for example, due to an asteroid impact or a volcano 
eruption) as has been the case for previous mass extinction events on 
Earth. Even though it might appear intuitive to many people that 
causing the extinction of a species has a different moral standing than 
extinctions independent of any human cause have, it has been argued 
by Russell Powell that ‘the degree of “badness” that is added to some 
state of affairs because of its “wrongness” that is, because it implicates a 
culpable moral agent, seems minimal and should not significantly affect 
our conservation priorities’ (2011, pp. 620– 1). According to Powell, this 
is because ‘[i] f a species is extrinsically valuable, then (ceteris paribus) 
its extinction is morally undesirable, regardless of whether it is caused 
directly, indirectly, or not at all by human action’ (2011, p. 621).
In other words, Powell’s main point is that it does not matter very 
much to humans how a species becomes extinct, but it does matter 
that they have become extinct. Regarding its practical implications 
that might well be the case, yet it seems to matter nevertheless with 
regard to a species and the individuals it comprises that it has become 
extinct because a group of moral agents has acted in a certain way 
even though they had the possibility to do otherwise, particularly in 
the context of justice. The insertion of having the ‘possibility to do 
otherwise’ needs some qualification. Similarly to the issue of climate 
change more broadly, the actions of an individual have little effect 
on the worsening or amelioration of the mass extinction crisis or 
the extinction of any particular species more specifically. On climate 
change, a lot of thought has already been dedicated to this individual 
agency problem but I will exclude this line of enquiry here. What is 
important is whether humans acting collectively could do otherwise. 
Some evidence suggests that we cannot. Then humanity – instead of 
committing an injustice – would be merely a ‘cancer’ on the biosphere 
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(Cafaro 2015). As Philip Cafaro claims – and I think he is correct – 
this understanding of human agency should be rejected and is usually 
rejected by people who, at large, ‘want and need to believe that people 
are capable of freely choosing a better future for ourselves and our 
children’ (2015, p. 391). Relatedly, and highly simplified, humanity 
might actually be able to act on this problem but we just choose 
collectively to do otherwise. As John Nolt (2011, p. 706) points out, 
how to mitigate climate change is fairly clear, what is only missing 
is ‘moral and political will’ which does not constitute a sufficient 
justification for avoiding moral responsibility. The action- gridlock 
is, of course, more complex than that but that does not rule out the 
possibility of, to a degree, free agency that has led to and upholds the 
detrimental status quo.
We also have other reasons for distinguishing between anthropogenic 
and non- anthropogenic extinctions. For example, even if the killing 
analogy does not hold, we can still consider species extinctions to be 
potentially lamentable in all cases as analogically would be the death of 
any living being in the sense that some value appears to be lost, but as 
death appears inevitable for all life, also extinction appears the inevitable 
destiny of all species at some point in time. So, the causation of that end 
does the relevant normative work. Particularly, the distinction between 
positive and negative duties appears to do some important work here, 
because there might be a negative duty not to cause extinctions, but 
the corresponding positive duty does not make much sense in this 
context. If the extinction of a species is inevitable, and therefore it is 
also inevitable that the value it embodies will be lost as well at some 
undetermined point in time, then it would appear nonsensical to 
assign a positive duty to protect that value indefinitely – analogous to 
keeping an individual alive forever. The example Powell employs to 
show that human action does not make much of a difference for our 
duties obscures this distinction. He claims that ‘[o] ur duty to contain 
a preventable outbreak of infectious disease is equally weighty whether 
it is caused by bioterrorism or “natural” microbiological evolution. To 
conclude otherwise would be to confuse the culpability of the actor 
with the badness of the consequences that he or she brings about’ 
(2011, p. 621). For a consequentialist the cause might indeed not be 
important if that infectious disease sickens humans, and a deontologist 
would agree that there are duties at the institutional level to protect 
people from disease of whatever origin if possible. However, as argued 
in Chapter  3, the distinction between harming and letting harm 
happen is highly important regarding the human justice relationship 
with the rest of wild nature where a form of culpability is necessary 
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for generating the badness of injustice. If ecological justice is about not 
inhibiting the flourishing of other living beings, then the conclusion 
follows that what matters in the context of anthropogenic extinctions 
of species is that they are caused by humans, rather than how much 
value is lost from a human perspective.
Even if it is the anthropogenic element of species extinctions that 
makes them interesting in terms of interspecies justice, we have not 
established so far whether biodiversity loss can be framed as an injustice 
at all besides constituting a good candidate of injustice to future human 
generations when it reaches the magnitude of a mass extinction crisis. 
Until now, it seems that neither considering individuals (human or 
nonhuman) nor species themselves brings any results regarding less 
dramatic levels of biodiversity loss besides implying that biodiversity 
loss cannot be easily included into an ecological justice framework. 
However, maybe the intuition that there is something unjust about 
species extinctions is not based on biodiversity loss being an injustice 
per se but rather that it is an indicator for injustices that have occurred 
in the past (that is, prior to the extinction of the species in question). 
Species extinctions do usually not happen by killing some currently 
non- existing future beings, but by impeding on the flourishing and 
survival abilities of currently living organisms which then accumulate 
to the consequence that no future beings of their kind will exist 
(putting aside the possibility of ‘de- extinctions’ with biotechnology 
and the previously mentioned hypothetical case of causing an 
extinction without harming any individual beings, for example). 
Hence, biodiversity loss is foreshadowed by present (and past) injustice. In 
other words, biodiversity loss is an outcome of injustice rather than 
an injustice itself.6
Because the extinction of a species is usually not caused by single 
actions of individuals but is the outcome of an accumulation of 
unjust actions and practices, the anthropogenic extinction of a species 
indicates – although it does not prove by itself – that severe injustice 
has been done to a particular group of nonhumans by heavily and 
repeatedly impeding their flourishing and ability of survival. This 
shows that anthropogenic biodiversity loss does not merely indicate 
that some injustice has been done but that severe injustice has been done 
to a particular group of nonhumans, in the sense that repeated actions 
and practices have undermined the flourishing of a whole kind of life 
in such a way that even their ability to survive has been undermined. 
Put differently, human- caused extinctions are markers of injustice, but 
by themselves not enough to be robust indicators that this amounts 
to an all- things- considered injustice as we saw in Chapter 5, and as 
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will be illustrated further in Chapter 9, because an extinction is not 
always an indicator of injustice under all circumstances. Nevertheless, 
the anthropogenic extinction of a species is at least morally tragic in 
all circumstances.
In light of these considerations, the intuition that there is something 
unjust about species extinctions can be salvaged because it reflects that 
species extinctions caused by humans are the outcome of injustice, 
even though the injustice is not located in biodiversity loss itself. In 
practice, this means that avoiding anthropogenic biodiversity loss is a 
prerogative of justice and corresponding conservation policies are a 
potential tool for mitigating and avoiding severely unjust practices – 
as long as these conservation practices do not themselves constitute 
unwarranted intrusions into the flourishing of individuals.
Biodiversity versus bio- proportionality
So far, I have used the terms biodiversity loss and species extinctions 
synonymously. Yet there is a sizeable body of literature that analyses 
the notion of biodiversity and its normative implications. Especially 
because biodiversity loss is of central concern to advocates of the Half- 
Earth proposal which aims to ‘set aside’ half of the Earth for nonhumans 
(Wilson 2016) which we will analyse in Chapter 9, it seems necessary 
to engage more deeply with its relevance. Especially interesting in this 
context is the contribution of Freya Mathews (2016) who argues that 
‘we owe the earth, we are morally in biological and hence territorial 
deficit to the earth and other species’ (2016, p.  147, emphasis in 
original) which implies, according to her, that certain areas need to 
be protected due to our moral duties towards nonhumans. Mathews 
does not explicitly sign up to the Half- Earth proposal but refers to 
E.O. Wilson’s 2016 book on the issue. However, although Mathews 
approves of the distributive implications, she is critical of the concept 
of biodiversity being central to the current discourse surrounding 
biological conservation. She sees an underlying anthropocentric bias 
in the discourse surrounding biodiversity- based conservation which 
allows for setting only minimal conservation targets, which in turn 
has implications for conservation practices and campaign messages. 
As she observes:
There seems to be a missing argument at the heart of 
such campaigns, an argument simply for the entitlement 
of existing terrains of life to their continued existence. 
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Campaigners instead resort almost exclusively to arguments 
framed in terms of extinctions, endangerment and the 
necessity to maintain viable populations of species and 
samples of vegetation communities. (Mathews 2016, p. 141)
In order to remedy this discursive weakness of conservationists, 
Mathews proposes an ‘ethic of bio- proportionality’ as a basis for 
biological conservation, instead of the current focus on biodiversity. 
According to Mathews, this would provide conservation efforts with 
a non- anthropocentric base that could aim to set more than merely 
minimal targets. As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the discursive 
repertoire of conservation activists is in dire need of supplementing 
with stronger ethical concepts than are currently used or available. 
Mathews’ proposal goes exactly in that direction, but is substituting the 
centrality of biodiversity with ‘bio- proportionality’ the most effective 
solution? I agree with many of Mathews’ claims, even though she does 
not use a justice framework, but I  am sceptical regarding whether 
it is really necessary to throw out the biodiversity concept with the 
anthropocentric bathwater.
For example, Mathews states that ‘[b] iodiversity conservation tends 
to be understood, at its core, as the preservation of viable populations 
of species in their natural surroundings. But viable here implies a 
minimum’ (2016, p. 141, emphasis in original). The focus on viable 
populations indeed points towards minimum baselines that are aimed 
at by conservation practices and rhetoric, but these minimal standards 
are not ethically problematic under all circumstances. In Chapter 5, 
I argued for sufficientarian principles of ecological and environmental 
justice  – that is, justice focused on what is minimally required  – 
based on, among other things, a hands- off non- harming approach 
regarding the treatment of nonhuman wild beings. Depending on what 
circumstances of scarcity we find ourselves in, the minimal baseline for 
what can be considered a just distribution shifts. Accordingly, setting 
minimal standards is not anthropocentric in itself:
• if it constitutes what could maximally be asked for in terms of justice 
in circumstances that present a set of limitations on what can be 
achieved;
• and if sufficientarian ecological justice principles are developed in 
conjunction with non- anthropocentrically adjusted environmental 
justice goals that, for example, do not start from the hubristic claim 
that humans have an original ownership or occupation rights to the 
Earth (see Chapter 8).
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Based on these considerations, a focus on viable populations is not, in 
all circumstances, a sign of an anthropocentric bias. Under conditions 
that are less abundant than moderate scarcity, it is not just allowed but 
also prudent to focus conservation efforts to protect viable populations 
of endangered species, thereby focusing on biodiversity.7 Especially 
under conditions of severe scarcity, conservation efforts should aim 
to minimise anthropogenic species extinctions, which seems more 
adequately captured by a focus on viable populations than Mathews’ 
‘relative abundance’ (2016, p. 146). Hence, the main issue does not seem 
to be minimal baselines – if they fulfil certain criteria – but the lack 
of accepted entitlement of nonhumans that Mathews also highlights.
Population sizes
Still, what Mathews seems to have in mind regarding her ethic of 
bio- proportionality appears to be in many ways compatible with my 
justice framework. When Mathews argues for optimising population 
numbers of all species, she understands this as a ‘supplementary 
principle’ to a ‘hands- off attitude to nature’ (2016, p. 146). Thereby 
she aims to ‘optimise’ populations in two ways. Firstly, her focus for 
nonhuman populations lies primarily on increasing their population sizes. 
Despite that this is on the first view compatible with my account, it 
goes beyond what I have sketched as distributive justice to present wild 
living beings. Within my framework, this ‘supplementary principle’ 
could either be seen outside of the realm of justice as constituting a 
different kind of moral demand, or it could be framed primarily as a 
matter of restitutive or reparative justice for past harm. Moreover, in 
any case, not just ‘ecological stability and health’ (2016, p. 146) should 
be taken into account in this regard, but also the overall situation of 
scarcity, which limits how much a certain population can be increased. 
Let us sketch some preliminary thoughts on this matter by looking at 
two examples.
Firstly, does ecological justice require that humans actively increase 
the population of wild living rhinos, which initially decreased due to 
anthropogenic factors, such as poaching and habitat loss? In particular, 
the two Sumatran and Javan rhino species only counted around 
162 individual animals in total at the end of 2015 (Save the Rhino 
International 2017). At first glance, the declining population numbers 
of these species appear to be an indicator of injustice. As argued 
regarding species extinctions in general, the human- caused decline of 
a certain population is preceded by an undermining of the ability of 
individual members of that population to flourish and survive, which 
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results in a lower ability of that population to keep on reproducing. 
Thus, declining population numbers precede the extinction of a species 
and thereby also embody a potential marker of injustice. Based on this, 
from an interspecies justice perspective there is a primary duty to stop 
causing the deterioration of population numbers if it is possible to do 
otherwise. However, this might not be sufficient. Besides questions 
about reparations for historic injustice, not to inhibit the flourishing 
or survival of nonhumans might also require, as a more immediate 
compensation, the active support of populations that have suffered 
under anthropogenic causes. The purpose of this support would be to 
bring these back to population numbers that are minimally sufficient for 
the maintenance of a stable population to counteract other simultaneous 
anthropogenic harming influences (by reducing the overall cumulative 
anthropogenic harming influence), assuming that these are matters of 
ecological space distribution. That would, at least, open the window 
of opportunity for currently living individuals in these populations to 
survive and potentially flourish if individuals of the species in question 
need to be immersed in a fairly stable population in order to even have 
the potential to flourish or at least survive. Besides other potentially 
opposing considerations of justice, this also will often not be the case 
and, accordingly, distributive ecological justice to presently living 
beings on its own will not be enough to generate stringent and clear 
duties to engage in conservation projects to increase already diminished 
populations. At this point, distributive ecological justice needs to be 
supplemented with, among other things, an account of reparative 
justice (regarding ecological space use and degradation), potentially 
also accounts of the (intrinsic, instrumental and relational) value of 
the existence of such populations and their species, and additional 
perspectives such as environmental virtue ethics.
The second example is the mosquito case which generates a very 
different set of questions if we focus on the few cases of mosquito 
species that are highly anthropophilic (that is, have a preference for 
human blood). Can there be a duty of ecological justice – or would 
it at least allow – to decrease the mosquito population numbers that 
have increased due to anthropogenic causes such as growing human 
populations over the last decades (see Rochlin et al 2016)? Prima facie 
there is nothing problematic about such a case of very high population 
numbers of a certain species. If the increase in population numbers 
has anthropogenic causes, then the question becomes whether there 
are knock- on effects that inhibit the flourishing or survival of other 
beings. If it is true that the steep population increase of mosquitoes is 
linked to the increase of the human population – that is, an increase of 
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ecological space used by mosquitoes – then it might be framed as an 
issue of ecological justice. From such a perspective, the wellbeing of 
beings that suffer from this rise (such as humans and other mammals) 
is confronted with the wellbeing of beings that gain from this rise 
(mosquitoes and their predators) in front of the background issue that 
humans hold some kind of causal responsibility. However, the mosquito 
case should be rather understood as an issue falling into the humans as 
prey category in terms of self- defence – as argued in Chapter 5 – which 
is a separate set of considerations from cases falling under interspecies 
justice. Furthermore, this also indicates that such mosquitoes that have 
co- evolved with humans in a particular way do fall into a different 
category of human- nonhuman relationships – potentially some version 
of ‘liminal’ nonhumans when borrowing Donaldson and Kymlicka’s 
(2011) terminology. Maybe more interesting from an interspecies 
justice angle are questions about whether it would be acceptable if 
there is human causation at play to kill certain groups of nonhumans 
in order to protect a different group of nonhumans – for example 
controlling population numbers of deer in Britain or killing all rats in 
New Zealand. But these again appear to be cases where the issue is 
one of reparation and not (primarily) of distribution in the sense of 
non- interference, while at the same time introducing considerations 
about human- nonhuman relationships that go beyond focusing on 
nonhumans that are (more or less) wild.
Returning to Mathews and her second claim regarding human 
population numbers, ‘optimisation’ means for Mathews to advocate 
‘dramatic (though of course consensual) reduction’ (2016, p.  146). 
This demand is reflected by the overarching demand of green 
distributive justice operating in the background that I introduced in 
Chapter 5. A reduction of global human population numbers as part 
of sensible, long- term sustainability policies would be one (partial) 
strategy to contribute to the goal of moving up on the scarcity scale 
to circumstances of more benign abundance. Yet, because of the 
controversial and problematic nature of population ethics broadly (as 
well as, more pragmatically, the debates about its empirical effectiveness 
and desirability), more needs to be said about what that would imply. 
Of course, as pointed out by Elizabeth Cripps, it seems that instating 
any kind of population policies ‘will involve acting against some moral 
presumption’ (2015, p.  22). Moreover, it is also important to note 
that the moral burden for reducing population numbers should not 
contribute to the ‘feminisation of environmental responsibility’ (Weller 
2017) that can be found in the sustainable consumption discourse and 
is criticised by feminist scholars. For example, Jade Sasser (2017) terms 
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the dual empowerment and moral burdening of women to control 
population growth as ‘sexual stewardship’. Thus, population reduction 
proposals should not be romanticised as a ‘beautiful and compassionate 
mandate’ for ‘today’s fertile women’ (Crist 2014, p. 8), but as a measure 
of last resort that needs to be sensitive to these gender-related problems 
to avoid morally worse consequences.
Apart from perspectives that do not do justice to the gender 
dimension, some arguments in favour of population control are also 
highly problematic from a global justice perspective. There is an 
interesting sub- debate within environmental ethics that was sparked 
by Rolston III in 1996 with an article in which he asks whether, 
morally speaking, there are cases where ‘saving’ nature should be 
prioritised before ‘feeding people’. He then comes to the conclusion 
that ‘[r] egrettably, sometimes, the answer is yes’ (Rolston III 2003 
(1996), p.  459). Criticism and responses followed (see Attfield 
1998, Brennan 1998, Rolston III 1998, Siurua 2006, Davion 2007) 
and I will not provide an overview of the debate. Yet importantly, 
the misanthropic conclusion of letting people starve for reasons 
of environmental protection is not and cannot be the outcome of 
thinking about distributive justice in a scarce world, because bringing 
biocentric ecological justice into the equation does not devalue claims 
of environmental justice. This position has three implications which 
we will return to in Chapter 9. For a start, demands of ecological 
justice are held against humans as a whole and not merely against 
some less wealthy groups who happen to live in areas that still have 
high levels of biological diversity. Next, if human settlements in 
certain areas are problematic for reasons of ecological justice, then 
environmental justice demands that the cost of protecting these areas 
is shared justly, and not primarily borne by groups that use very 
small shares of ecological space (for a related point see Sterba 2005). 
These two implications point towards very important questions 
about burden sharing, responsibility and just implementation (see 
Chapters  9 and 10). And thirdly, the demands of justice change 
depending on the overall level of scarcity of ecological space. But if 
scarcity is brought to the extreme where it would be impossible to 
fulfil the most minimal demands of environmental and ecological 
justice, it seems that we find ourselves outside the circumstances of 
justice. In my account, in the realm where justice is still useful to 
aid us to make normative decisions, the most minimal demand of 
environmental justice would require that fundamental human needs 
of all humans could be fulfilled as part of a broader just compromise 
between human and nonhuman needs.
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Of course, it has to be granted that high human population numbers 
put a strain on conservation and social justice efforts. Already John 
Stuart Mill raised related concerns about the welfare of future 
humans. This is how he envisioned a bleak future with high human 
population levels:
Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating the world 
with nothing left to the spontaneous activity of nature; 
with every rood of land brought into cultivation, which is 
capable of growing food for human beings; every flowery 
waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or 
birds which are not domesticated for man’s use exterminated 
as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree 
rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub 
or flower could grow without being eradicated as a weed 
in the name of improved agriculture. (Mill 1909 (1848), 
Book 4, Chapter 6.8)
Hence, population policies and ethics retain relevance for debates on 
sustainability more generally, and for distributive justice in particular, 
because population growth is one of the mechanisms that can aggravate 
scarcity. However, even though population ethics is relevant for 
questions of intergenerational justice (see Cripps 2015), it cannot 
provide an answer regarding how to deal justly with existing levels 
of scarcity, and the debate is therefore not very helpful for finding an 
answer to this particular problem.
Overall, returning to Mathews (2016), our proposals have a lot of 
commonalities, but I maintain for pragmatic reasons, which Mathews 
also has in mind, that a biocentric theory of justice able to point 
towards injustices is a more effective rhetorical tool than a more general 
biocentric ethic. Thus, if Mathews’ proposal is supplemented with my 
understanding of ecological justice it gets – figuratively speaking – more 
teeth to defend its stance in the ethical discourse surrounding questions 
of conservation. Furthermore, it seems that from a justice perspective 
it is not necessary to fully overturn the centrality of biodiversity within 
conservation practice and discourse but to merely re- align it, so that it 
is seen as a concept promoting ecological justice under circumstances 
of scarcity, rather than as an end in itself.
In summary, an anthropogenic species extinction might not be an 
injustice towards certain (future or current, human or nonhuman) 
individuals or species per se, but it is the outcome of injustices towards 
individual nonhumans. Accordingly, the extinction of a species is an 
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indicator for injustices that have been committed towards a group of 
nonhumans in the past. In the end, a biocentric account of interspecies 
justice helps to decide what practices are more acceptable than others 
by considering how much injustice is done or can be avoided by a 
specific conservation scheme. Moreover, its more general contribution 
to the issue is that it provides one more pressing reason why preventing 
species extinction via environmental conservation and other means 
is important and should therefore be high on the political agenda. It 
does so by showing that each anthropogenic extinction is a memorial 
for past injustices.
Notes
 1 Yet, the conceptual difference between the current anthropogenic mass extinction 
to previous mass extinction events (Aitken 1998) at least questions whether we 
can rely on the assumption of such a long- term stability.
 2 In contrast, as pointed out by Palmer (2011), the simplification worry would be 
a problem for biocentric accounts that are non-egalitarian and allow for different 
degrees of ‘moral significance’. Recall for this the difference between moral 
considerability and moral significance (Goodpaster 1978) discussed in Chapter 2.
 3 See Robin Attfield (1995) for a consequentialist position that indicates otherwise.
 4 For an argument against this understanding of stability and the precautionary 
approach see Powell (2011).
 5 It should be noted that this is a contested claim and that, in contrast to this 
understanding of species, there are positions that consider species as historical 
entities akin to individuals (for example Hull, D. 1978) and that some environmental 
ethicists argue that species are morally considerable as ends in themselves (as Rolston 
III 1985, 2001). See Ronald Sandler and Judith Crane (2006) for a critical assessment 
of the possibility of considering a species a living being, and of the species’ moral 
considerability.
 6 This view seems to be also shared by Nussbaum (2011).
 7 Whether the concept of viable populations is useful in practice is a different matter. 













In which ways is nonhuman life excluded from deliberations about 
justice by not being considered relevant, if considered at all? As 
we have seen, a recent development in political philosophy has 
been an extension of theorising to include acknowledging the 
existence of nonhuman beings and considering their wellbeing – 
usually with a focus on animals. However, generally speaking, the 
environment is still predominantly considered only as property in 
liberal theorising about justice (Bell 2015). Here I would like to 
consider a sub- question to this broader area of enquiry and focus 
on the problematic notion of humanity’s original ownership of the 
Earth, which surfaces throughout the history of political thought 
since the 17th century.
As mentioned earlier, this is an important question for my argument 
insofar as not all accounts of environmental justice are compatible 
with my framework of interspecies justice. One implication of 
aiming for compatibility is to refrain from grounding an account of 
global environmental justice on some notion of humanity’s original 
ownership of the Earth. Situated in posthumanist philosophical 
developments, I  see the critique of this notion as an extension of 
the critical investigation of some environmental ethicists on the 
relationship between ownership and animals (see Cochrane 2009), as 
well as contributing to a necessary ‘denaturalisation’ of assumptions 
within political thought that ‘Otherise’ the nonhuman (see Plumwood 
2002). Attributing original ownership of the Earth to humans only 
creates a similar problematic power asymmetry between agents that 
matter and objects that cannot own and can potentially even be 
owned. In other words, the notion of humanity’s original ownership 
opens the door to a form of methodological misrecognition. Such 
philosophical theories exhibit a form of theoretical exclusion of an 
Other, which is nonhuman living beings in this case. The problem 
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is that such perspectives exclude nonhumans from mattering in 
theory which can then translate into not mattering in practice. In a 
similar vein, but without referring to the notion of ecological justice, 
Marcel Wissenburg has argued that ‘if one is interested in protecting 
nature against human (over- )exploitation, then the best way to think 
of original ownership is in terms of the orthodox notion of non- 
ownership’ (2017, p. 67).
In the common usage, asserting that a person A owns an entity X 
means that person A  legally owns entity X in the context of some 
property regime usually enforced by state power. A owns X which 
makes X the property of A and gives A a set of property rights over 
X. However, this is not what I am focusing on. My aim is not to deny 
people ownership of parts of the Earth under positive law.1 Rather, 
what I am interested in is whether it can be justified that humans have 
ownership claims to the Earth understood as natural rights or original 
ownership prior to any actual legal property arrangements. In the first 
section I will provide a short background to the history and meaning 
of the original ownership of the Earth idea. Then in section two we 
will turn to two reasons for rejecting the idea because it is incompatible 
with a commitment to interspecies justice as it involves a problematic 
exclusion prior to original acquisition, and because it is conceptually 
able to also extend to the ownership of living beings. In the final section 
we will look at why I deem the solution of an originally unowned 
Earth more fruitful than the alternative of attributing ownership rights 
to nonhumans.
Historical and conceptual background
Different versions of the idea that humanity owns the Earth have 
been around for a while. For example, in the Christian Bible we can 
find the claim that ‘[t] he heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord’s: but 
the earth hath he given to the children of men’ (Bible, King James 
Version, Psalm 115:16). The notion of human ownership of the Earth 
is also not new in Western political philosophy literature. Among 
many others, Immanuel Kant claimed in Toward Perpetual Peace that a 
‘stranger’ has the right to ‘visit’ foreign territories due to ‘the right of 
possession in common of the earth’s surface’ (Kant 1996 (1795), p. 329). 
John Locke also discussed the issue of Earth ownership in his Second 
Treatise of Government in which he provided his famous justification 
for private property from a Christian starting point that ‘God gave 
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The earth and all that is therein is given to men for the 
support and comfort of their being. And though all the 
fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong 
to mankind in common, as they are produced by the 
spontaneous hand of nature; and nobody has originally a 
private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of 
them as they are thus in their natural state; yet being given 
for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to 
appropriate them some way or other before they can be of 
any use or at all beneficial to any particular man. (Locke, 
J. 2002 (1689), p. 12)
This ‘state of nature’ where the Earth is commonly owned by all 
‘men’ can be left by creating private property, according to Locke.2 It 
is because a person owns herself that she can appropriate commonly 
owned natural goods by ‘mixing her labour’ with them and thereby 
exclude other people from the use of these goods, as long as such 
appropriations fulfil Locke’s ‘provisos’ that regulate just acquisitions 
(one of which we analysed in Chapter 5).
Like Locke, Hugo Grotius provides an account of collective 
ownership of the Earth by grounding it in the religious belief that 
God gave the Earth to all humans in common. He reaches a slightly 
different conclusion, however, which is that ‘the first one taking 
possession would have the right to use things not claimed and to 
consume them up to the limit of his needs; and any one depriving him 
of that right would commit an unjust act’ (Grotius 2012 (1625), p. 36; 
for a discussion of Grotius see Salter 2001). These are not the only 
historical discussions of Earth ownership but they are contributions 
of some of the most well- known theorists to cover the issue. During 
the last decades, the idea of ownership of the Earth has resurfaced 
reinvigorated and – outside of libertarian circles where the idea is 
often discussed as ‘world ownership’ as separate from self- ownership 
(for example Fisher 2015) – Mathias Risse (2012) is one of its most 
well- known advocates.3
The idea of humanity’s original ownership of the Earth does not by 
itself specify the type of its ownership status, but it is usually considered 
as a common or collective kind of ownership held by all humans 
together prior to any actual ownership backed by laws, that is, in a state 
of nature. Most commonly, three different types of ownership (that is, 
property arrangements) are identified – even though their labelling can 
differ from author to author. These are common, collective, and private 
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by a particular original ownership view. Note that it is usually not 
the Earth per se which is considered to be the owned entity but the 
resources, spaces and benefits provided by its ecosystems – even though 
the ownership status of ecosystem benefits is usually not discussed but 
merely implied.4 Moreover, with regard to the original ownership of 
these resources, spaces and benefits, property rights seem to be often 
understood in terms of usage rights - that is, not necessarily as full 
ownership but rather as weak ownership, or as having an incomplete 
set of property rights only. As will become clearer, it matters how these 
natural property rights are understood.
Common property or common ownership is held by several people, 
all of whom have a claim to use what is held in common. Therefore, 
co- owners cannot be excluded from its use. But this also implies 
that rules are necessary to enable all co- owners to use their property 
to a fair extent. However, this type of ownership does not require 
the explicit consent of all co- owners in order to allow the usage of 
the owned property by one of its members. In contrast, collective 
property or ownership requires some kind of joint decision- making 
by its co- owners. Lastly, there is the option of private property where 
an individual owner holds all the decision- making authority (within 
boundaries) over the owned entity (see for a more extensive explanation 
Waldron 1988, 2004). In the case of original Earth ownership this 
would mean that in the first two cases all humans own the Earth 
together and that in the last case each human would privately own one 
piece of the Earth: if all humans have the same claim then everyone 
would probably own an equal amount of land, resources and ecosystem 
benefits in the private ownership case (for the latter see Steiner 1994). 
The alternative to these ownership types is that there is no original 
ownership relationship at all – meaning that humans do not own the 
Earth in any natural law sense. We will now see why this alternative 
seems persuasive.
Against original ownership: a green critique
Despite its rich history and potential theoretical usefulness for making 
claims about global justice (for example Steiner 2011, Fisher 2015), 
I maintain that rejection of any view of humanity’s original ownership 
of the Earth is the correct position to take in order to avoid problematic 
implications for nonhumans. This holds for all positions that take 
ecological justice (or justice to nonhumans in one form or another) 
seriously, irrespective of whether they only argue for the inclusion of 
some sentient animals or all living beings into the community of justice. 
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Accordingly, my claims here do not hinge on the specific account of 
interspecies justice that I am defending. Because our specific target of 
critique is a (1) common human (2) natural (3) property right to the 
Earth, I would like to start with some further clarifications on each of 
the three elements of this position. Firstly, the property right is held 
by all humans, which – for the purpose of this argument – includes 
all three types of property arrangements mentioned earlier: common, 
collective and private ownership. Meaning that the target here is all 
kinds of property arrangements as long as all humans and only humans 
are attributed ownership status. However, some arguments only hold 
against the common and collective kind of ownership claims, and I will 
also address the possibility of partial ownership where nonhumans are 
also attributed ownership claims.
Secondly, the right in question is a natural or original property right, 
which means that it exists prior to any legal rights (as for example in 
a state of nature) and also prior to any original acquisition which then 
generates property rights. How these second stage property rights 
can legitimately be generated (for example by satisfying the Lockean 
provisos) and what form they take (that is, the thicknesses of the 
ownership) varies from theory to theory. It is important, however, 
that these rights are distinct from the original property rights that are 
supposed to precede their coming into existence.
Thirdly, the natural right in question is a property right. Hence, this 
is not an argument against natural rights per se but against one specific 
kind – original property rights. To make matters difficult, property 
rights have been understood in a multitude of ways. Therefore, I hope 
that the following account of an original property right to the Earth 
is both sufficiently general, and sufficiently specific. Following Wesley 
Hohfeld’s (1919) analysis of rights, they are, in general, understood 
to be composed of four incidents  – a privilege, a claim, a power 
and an immunity. The same applies to property rights and, hence, 
humanity’s natural property right to the Earth can be analysed based 
on this understanding of the structure of rights. As we will see, the 
original ownership view is also problematic if it does not include a full 
property right where all four Hohfeldian incidents can be identified. 
Accounts of weak property rights on which theories of original 
ownership are usually based, or where ownership is merely used in a 
rhetorical sense rather than to constitute an actual ownership right, 
are also problematic because, in practice, they further the human 
versus nature dualism discourse that undermines ecological justice 
(regarding the latter recall Chapter 2).
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Original acquisition
From a non- anthropocentric perspective, the first problem arises 
regarding all types of original ownership views, whether common, 
collective or private property, and independent of whether original 
ownership claims are genuine (full or weak) or rather rhetorical 
ownership rights. The issue is that it seems counterintuitive that 
natural property rights are understood as existing prior to any original 
acquisition, because original acquisition implies that it is the first/ 
earliest acquisition that takes place. However, natural property rights 
are supposed to already exist before such an original acquisition that 
generates property. Thus, a (metaphorical) pre- original normative 
acquisition must have taken place that legitimised humanity’s natural 
property rights. Political theories that justify such a pre- original 
acquisition of the whole Earth by humanity (based on a gift from 
God, human self- ownership or the like) are highly anthropocentric 
by either discounting or not considering nonhuman claims in 
the most fundamental layer of their argument. Especially from an 
ecological justice perspective this theoretical starting point is highly 
problematic because interspecies justice itself requires a different (non- 
anthropocentric) understanding of the world and how ownership of 
it can come into existence.
As Ned Hettinger (1998) puts it, ‘Earthen nature is a common 
heritage of all the earth’s communities of life. No individual, nation, 
or species has lordship over the nature in its possession and under its 
control’. A theory that allows space for considerations of ecological 
justice needs to allow nonhumans to legitimately originally acquire 
parts of the Earth (in the sense of usage at least), but a theory where 
humans have ‘called dibs’ on the Earth even before original acquisition 
is not able to accommodate fully any interests other than humanity’s. 
This is because in any such theory nonhumans are left to the mercy 
of the human original owners of the Earth, and nonhuman claims 
are relegated to the realm of charity – where they have often been 
located by theories of social justice – and denied access to justice. This 
normative dibs calling embodied by theories attributing ownership 
rights pre- original acquisition adds up to a naturalisation of the 
exclusion of nonhumans in many theories of justice. Similarly, Val 
Plumwood argues that ‘[d] istributive injustices to non- humans fostered 
by the Othering framework include the use of so much of the earth 
for exclusively human purposes that non- humans cannot survive or 
reproduce their kind’ (2002, p. 117).
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One might want to reply to this point by arguing that, in contrast, 
it might be possible to construct an original ownership of the Earth 
view that is compatible with ecological justice. It might be that not 
all views of humanity’s ownership of the Earth are incompatible with 
ecological justice, but that a view that claims that humans only own 
their fair share of the Earth would be consistent with doing justice to 
nonhumans. In other words, a reasonable alternative might be to defend 
that humans only have partial original ownership of the Earth. Indeed, 
such an alternative original ownership view that merely considers the 
natural ownership rights to parts and not the whole Earth might be 
theoretically possible, but at least the following two points give reason to 
reject it nevertheless. First, partial ownership does not seem compatible 
with the underlying anthropocentric intuition that appears to ground all 
other original ownership positions (for example, in the strongest sense 
some version of humans as the masters of the Earth). If one substitutes 
this anthropocentric starting point with a grounding that breaks up 
the human versus nature dualism, such as non- ranking biocentrism 
(Chapter 2), then it becomes even more difficult to conceive why the 
language of ownership is supposed to be the appropriate framework 
for the relationship between humans and the environmental goods 
that support their lives. Hence, a good argument is needed to explain 
the need to talk about ownership in the first place – an issue we will 
return to in a moment.
The second reason for rejecting partial ownership is that if one 
wants to defend a position of partial ownership of the Earth then one 
needs a theory of ecological justice that determines which part or 
parts cannot be owned (and hence used) by humans, because even the 
weakest conception of original ownership also includes usage rights. 
Partial ownership would then imply that there are parts of the Earth 
towards which humans hold no usage claims. Such a theory would also 
need to have an answer to the situation where not all (basic) human 
needs can be satisfied with the parts of the Earth owned by humans, 
for example because there are too many people in proportion to the 
owned resources. Would it not be the case that humans would also be 
able to make reasonable claims to goods they do not own based on 
the point that each individual human’s fundamental needs are morally 
relevant? This would then in turn undermine the claim that there are 
resources, spaces and ecosystem benefits on the Earth that are shielded 
in all circumstances from human usage. If that is the case then once 
again it does not seem to make much sense to frame it as an issue of 
ownership – even if it is only partial, usage- focused ownership - if 
usage can potentially spill over into what is unowned.
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Here partial ownership of the Earth by humans can imply either 
that the other not human- owned part remains unowned, or that it 
is owned by nonhumans. In the former case, the point stands that if 
owning and using are strongly connected, and it is possible to use what 
is unowned, then the question arises about what purpose ownership 
fulfils. The latter case constitutes an example of a non- anthropocentric 
partial ownership view which would not leave these parts of the Earth 
unowned but ascribe their ownership to nonhumans. Regarding this 
scenario, a property theorist might argue that in the case of dire human 
need the property right of the nonhumans might be weakened. Yet 
this weakens the concept of ownership – too much, especially if one 
understands the notion of original ownership as an inherently weak 
version of property rights. Moreover, in such a case, nonhumans 
probably also have fundamental needs at stake. If nonhumans are in dire 
need as well, then there might be little non- biased reason (from within 
the ownership account) to suggest that humans could be prioritised 
nonetheless if one starts with such an account of ownership. That is 
because the identified owner should at least have a ‘certain priority when 
it comes to’ the ownership incident(s) at stake (Cochrane 2009, p. 427, 
emphasis in original). We will return to this question of why attributing 
original ownership rights to nonhumans is not a satisfying solution.
Owning living beings
A second additional problem of bestowing humanity natural (common, 
collective or private) ownership over the Earth is that it enhances the 
power asymmetry between humans and nonhumans, as nonhumans 
are left to the mercy of the human owners of the Earth. Even though 
this is compatible with the notion of human stewardship of the Earth, 
it seems to sit less comfortably with positions in environmental ethics 
that put more emphasis on the intrinsic value or moral considerability 
of nonhumans as ends in themselves or reject ‘any way of thinking 
about or acting toward nonhuman nature that reflects a logic, values, or 
attitude of domination’ (Warren 2014 (1990), p. 66).5 This suspicion is 
strengthened when one considers that original ownership of the Earth 
claims might be extended to include not only resources, ecosystem 
benefits and spaces but also the ownership of the creatures that inhabit 
it. Ownership of non- sentient beings such as plants might be already 
implied in original ownership accounts. Moreover, when developing 
his version of original ownership of the Earth, Risse explicitly states 
that in his theory ‘wildlife’ is excluded ‘from collectively owned 
resources, but including it would be conceptually unproblematic’ 
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(Risse 2012, p. 109). It seems that if one argues for the former then 
the latter would be the logical next step. From a human ownership 
of the Earth standpoint the case could be made especially strongly 
for including the group of beings that contribute substantially to the 
workings of ecosystems – that is, certain plants, animals, bacteria, fungi 
and so on – into the body of naturally owned property. To consider a 
living being as property at least in the natural (pre- positive) law sense, 
however, seems to stand in opposition to all perspectives that take some 
version of the idea of having respect for nature seriously.6 Hence, from 
a more general environmental ethics point of view rather than just an 
ecological justice perspective, it seems difficult to accept humanity’s 
ownership of the Earth if one simultaneously accepts the idea that 
nonhuman beings have moral standing, or takes a stance against the 
domination of vulnerable nonhuman beings.
That a case for naturally owning nonhumans can be made from 
an original ownership of the Earth perspective illustrates the link 
between this kind of methodological misrecognition and the 
misrecognition that excludes nonhumans from the realm of moral 
considerability. As Plumwood puts it, these different kinds of moral 
exclusions add up to:
a broad and deep gulf between those who can own and 
those who can be owned and exchanged as property, a 
division of the world in to human and non- human, subject 
and object, consciousness and mechanism, intrinsic and 
instrumental value, respect and use, those to whom the 
protection of justice can be accorded and those from whom 
it is withheld. (2002, p. 146)
Accordingly, from a non- anthropocentric perspective there is good 
reason to reject theories that are conceptually compatible with 
assigning natural property rights to humans over other living beings. 
Holding legal ownership over a stretch of forest or a flock of pigeons 
might be beneficial for these individual living beings, and might be 
compatible with treating them ‘justly’ (Cochrane 2009), but such 
property arrangements under positive law should not be confused with 
the normative domination implied in an original ownership account 
where living beings are degraded to property. Such legal ownership 
over nonhuman beings might also ultimately amount to a form of 
(benevolent) domination that is problematic and can amount to a kind 
of ‘coverture’ like a husband historically would have had dominion 
over his wife (see Plumwood 2002).
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An unowned earth
It seems reasonable to suggest that claim rights are at the core of a 
Hohfeldian constructed property right. If that is the case, then the 
normative (not necessarily practical) ability to exclude others from 
usage of one’s own property is a distinctive feature of a property right 
(see Nozick 1974, Becker 1977). Based on this reasoning, one might 
conclude that humanity’s common or collective ownership of the 
Earth, if interpreted as a property right, implies that all humans have 
(in common) a privilege to use the Earth (for example occupy, reap its 
benefits and so on) and a claim against nonhumans using the Earth. In 
addition, this right also includes a power to waive their claim against 
nonhumans and immunity against others altering their claim against 
nonhumans. Note that I  am focusing here on the collective and 
common versions of original ownership, because in the case of private 
ownership it is possible to identify human agents that would have a 
duty to refrain from using a certain part of the Earth. However, when 
considering common/ collective property rights, usually only humans 
are taken into account as those against whom the property right is held, 
and consequently, theorists arguing for a human common/ collective 
ownership of the Earth do not claim that their ownership right includes 
a claim against nonhumans. How can common or collective ownership 
of the Earth claims therefore be understood as a property right?
One possibility is that humanity’s common/ collective ownership of 
the Earth is understood to imply only or primarily a claim against other 
humans insofar as it generates a duty for each human to acknowledge 
everyone else’s status as an owner. However, in this case the exclusionary 
feature of ownership would have no force because there would be no 
duty holders that are not simultaneously also claim right holders. If all 
people have a claim right and simultaneously the correlative duty, then 
there is no one left who would have a duty to refrain from using the 
property in question – that is, the Earth – and, hence, no one would 
have the correlative right to exclude anybody from the property either. 
Using ownership language to merely express humans’ common and 
equal standing seems odd. The use of ownership vocabulary – especially 
if associated with the notion of property – asks for the identification 
of non- owners that have duties that match the owner’s claim right. 
Nonhumans, however, are rightly not identified as duty bearers because 
most (but arguably not all) nonhumans lack moral agency. In other 
words, if common ownership is understood as a property right then it 
raises the question of who is the duty bearer that links to the property 
holder’s claim right. If all humans are simultaneously claim right holders 
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and duty bearers then it raises the question of whether it is a proper 
instance of ownership, because the claim right to exclude others is 
usually an important identifier of a property right. Consequently, 
common or collective original ownership claims cannot be considered 
to entail a full property right. This limitation seems to be reflected 
in early common or collective original ownership accounts – such as 
Locke’s (2002 (1689)) and Grotius’ (2012 (1625)) versions – where the 
focus lies on the privilege to use the Earth. These are weak original 
ownership accounts, because they do not fit neatly into a Hohfeldian 
constructed property right.
Due to this thin conception of ownership, the common human 
original ownership of the Earth might not be understood as a genuine 
instance of ownership but rather as a common access right. This 
is how Arabella Fisher (2015) seems to read Risse’s contemporary 
account of common ownership in his On Global Justice (2012).7 
According to Fisher, it is necessary to distinguish between common 
use and common property, and it is the former that Risse’s discussion 
of common ownership of the Earth seems to amount to according to 
her.8 The former is:
common use under which it is not permitted to privately 
appropriate anything at all, but it is permissible to use the 
common resources without seeking the consent of others 
[…] as long as one does not prevent others from using them. 
(Fisher 2015, pp. 602– 3)
And the latter is common ownership under which:
resources continue to be the property of all, where private 
appropriation is permissible but does not create full property 
rights in the appropriated resource. This is because the only 
thing which can generate full private property rights is the 
act of production. (Fisher 2015, p. 603)
If Fisher is right, then it seems that the language of ownership merely 
becomes a matter of rhetoric if understood in terms of common use 
instead of presenting a genuine natural property right claim. Using 
ownership language does not seem very useful in this context, especially 
when considering its uneasy relationship with green perspectives.
Related to this point, Jack Winter argues about the common property 
concept more generally – as discussed by Jeremy Waldron – that it does 
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it either refers to common access rights or ‘common stewardship’ (2015, 
p. 156). According to Winter, common access rights do not fall into 
the property rights category because they do not entail ‘the capacity to 
exclude non- owners from accessing a resource’ (2015, p. 156), which 
is exactly why I think that such a weak common ownership account 
does not actually entail any ownership claim. Furthermore, according to 
Winter (2015), the common stewardship version of common property 
is a form of collective rather than common property. This distinction 
implies that collective property retains the potential to be a genuine 
property right. However, all humans being collective property holders 
appears to lead again to the claim- duty problem described earlier. 
Regarding Risse’s conception of common ownership, it seems that 
his account is one of common access rights, since he insists that his 
account is one of common and not collective property (Risse 2012), 
which translates only into a common access right based on Winter’s 
distinction. What I have tried to briefly illustrate here is that what the 
concept of original ownership entails is not straightforward or obvious. 
It either seems to indicate a rather weak natural property right, or it 
can be understood as a common use or access right which adopts the 
language of ownership rather as a rhetorical tool. Besides the two 
reasons against such ownership accounts discussed previously, I would 
like to now further illustrate why both options are less preferable than 
a no ownership account.
The alternative to attributing natural ownership rights to humanity 
is to claim that the Earth is unowned before initial acquisition and, as 
claimed earlier, that this should be the starting point of considerations 
of global environmental justice that are sensitive to the material needs 
of nonhuman life. Moreover, a conception of humanity’s original 
ownership of the Earth is also not necessary for the consideration 
of issues of environmental distributive justice. Instead, it seems that 
considering ownership is an argumentative detour from considering 
that all humans have needs that refer to a specific and limited set of 
resources and ecosystem benefits that are (so far) only available on 
Earth. Yet, it does not necessarily follow, in contrast to Fisher’s claim, 
that ‘the “no ownership” status is the position of right- wing libertarians 
that permits unlimited first- grabbing’ of natural resources (Fisher 2015, 
p. 602).9 Put differently, a right- wing libertarian might understand 
the originally unowned status of some resource as a justification for 
an individual to take as much as she likes. My point is that something 
being unowned (that is, no one has an original ownership claim 
towards certain resources, spaces and benefits) is not a justification to 
appropriate in itself but rather a state that requires justification for all 
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appropriation because of the absence of ownership claims. This would 
require, for example, a theory of appropriation that invokes a Lockean 
style proviso to regulate what is just appropriation (Chapter 5). Such a 
theory differs from Locke’s own account, however, because it is about 
the just appropriation of originally unowned goods, and not about 
how originally commonly owned goods can be privatised. My position 
therefore differs, for example, from left- libertarians, who invoke a 
Lockean proviso to ‘leave enough and as good’ in order to argue for 
entitlements to equal shares of environmental resources based on ‘equal 
original property rights’ (see Steiner 1994, pp. 235– 6). The main point 
is that to understand the Earth as unowned and existing for all life is 
not the same as understanding it as a heap of resources that is waiting 
for someone to come along and appropriate without consideration of 
anybody or anything else. In this context, Wissenburg (2017) makes 
the distinction between something for all and something up for grabs 
to which no rules apply. Therefore, the starting point of an originally 
unowned Earth towards which Lockean style provisos apply that are 
sensitive to all forms of life disposes itself of the ‘inbuilt assumption 
of coverture of nature’ (Plumwood 2002, p. 214) found in Lockean 
accounts of property.
An objection to this point might be to ask why nonhumans are not 
included in the community of owners – for example part of an account 
of common original ownership of the Earth by all life – instead of 
fully dismissing the idea of original ownership. This brings us back 
to question of partial ownership. To some degree this would indeed 
solve the problem of methodological misrecognition, as the main 
problem with the human original ownership of the Earth claims lies 
in their human focus. John Hadley (2015) makes a proposal in such a 
spirit by attributing property rights to (wild) sentient animals which 
he understands as ‘rights to habitat’. More specifically he argues that 
these wild animals ‘have an interest in using natural “goods” (trees, 
vegetation, grasses, rocks, waterways, soils and so on) to meet their 
basic needs’ which grounds their property rights (2015, p. 1). In turn, 
he understands these property rights as ‘rights to habitat’ which entail 
access and usage rights of the ‘natural goods’ in the animals’ territory 
as well as ‘a right to exclude means preventing deleterious human 
intervention into animal habitat’ (2015, p. 9, emphasis in original). 
However, Hadley especially emphasises the right to use in his theory. 
Similarly, also Steve Cooke (2017) develops a related argument in 
favour of attributing collectives of animals’ usage- focused property 
rights to their habitat including a remedial right to secession. And 
even Martha Nussbaum touches on this issue when expanding her 
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capability approach to include nonhuman animals. She has argued 
that the analogue to property rights in the human realm would be 
the ‘respect for the territorial integrity of their habitat’ (2006, p. 400) 
in the case of animals in order to enable their capability to be able to 
control their environment.
Regarding Hadley’s theory, Josh Milburn worries that ‘perhaps Hadley 
isn’t really proposing property rights at all; perhaps he is proposing a 
system for recognising and protecting animals’ legitimate interest in 
access to their habitat/ territory and the free use of the natural goods 
contained therein. Perhaps “property” is shorthand’ (2017, p.  151, 
emphasis in original). Milburn appears to be right with his analysis, 
but that need not trouble us here; nor should it worry us at this point 
that Hadley considers only sentient animals. That is because Hadley’s 
account of property rights is not an account of original ownership. 
In Hadley’s words ‘[t] he theory of property rights developed in [his] 
book is set against the background of the contemporary institution of 
property’ (2015, p. 3). Hence, his focus lies on property rights post- 
original acquisition, which makes his account in principle compatible 
with acknowledging that the Earth is originally unowned.
In contrast, common original ownership of the Earth by all life 
would imply that a theory of ecological justice would have to be 
grounded in natural ownership rights, and I am reluctant to accept 
this implication for two reasons. First, when considering how to justly 
distribute the Earth’s goods and benefits provided by its life- supporting 
systems, such an ownership view would provide the same amount of 
insight as conceiving the Earth as originally unowned. In other words, 
claiming that all living beings own the Earth together, and therefore 
need to be taken into account when considering how to distribute the 
Earth’s goods and benefits, does not seem to give more information 
on how to distribute these shares other than merely claiming that 
when considering how to justly distribute access to these goods and 
benefits one needs to consider all beings that need the Earth’s goods 
and benefits in order to survive and flourish. From an interspecies 
justice perspective, what would be the benefit of choosing the more 
complex ownership starting point? The benefits of an account that 
attributes legal property rights to wild nonhumans do not carry over 
to accounts of natural property rights.
Second, the aforementioned partial ownership problem resurfaces: if 
all living beings on Earth own the Earth together, does that mean 
that every individual being or group gets assigned a fixed fair share of 
the Earth? If, for example, the human species is deemed to exceed its 
share – which seems a reasonable suggestion – this could justify draconic 
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consequences for human individuals. Hence, one might be reluctant to 
accept that humans in total can be assigned a fixed share. Then again, 
if shares are not assigned to groups in terms of species but to individual 
beings then the information issue arises again; if one is interested in 
determining how to distribute the limited earthly goods and benefits to 
a range of different individual living beings, each with specific needs, 
then a blanket claim that all these living beings are owners of these 
goods and benefits does not provide much insight on how to weigh all 
these different needs and ownership claims. For that purpose, we still 
need complementary accounts of environmental and ecological justice, 
and the idea of ownership does not appear to do any conceptual work. 
Based on this reasoning, a common usage right as a shorthand for the nexus 
of interspecies and environmental justice entitlements held by all life 
is conceptually more parsimonious than a common ownership right. 
That is because a common usage right is more straightforwardly linked 
to why one would want to argue for rights in this context in the first 
place. Usage rights can be grounded in needs and interests – as using 
what is needed – which is one less argumentative step than to argue 
for owning what is needed. Ultimately, a distinction remains between 
common ownership of the Earth by all life and common usage by all 
life, even if they amount to the same outcome in practice. If stepping 
over this theoretical divide from using to owning means taking on 
the theoretical baggage of property rights without much theoretical 
benefit (even if original ownership accounts only constitute very weak 
property rights or do not refer to property rights at all), then such an 
argumentative move should be avoided.
Common use could be understood as usage of unowned goods that 
are appropriated in parts by the user during use, thereby excluding 
others from using those particular parts of the goods, but without 
implying that such a usage process necessarily generates private 
property, nor implying that these goods were held in common in any 
sense of ownership. Recall here Tim Hayward’s (2015) distinction 
between using, commanding and occupying ecological space which 
embodies how I understand the Earth’s goods, spaces and ecosystem 
benefits. In the context of commonly using the Earth, it could mean 
that all human and nonhuman beings with needs that require the 
usage of some ecological space commonly use the Earth. In this 
case, common use does not indicate an ownership relationship but 
merely the (initial) non- excludability of others’ use of these goods 
for which they have similar needs.10 In the end, this appears to be 
very similar to the intuition of many modern theorists expressing 
common ownership views. The only fundamental difference is that 
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nonhumans are not excluded from the start which is important in 
order to avoid the methodological misrecognition implied in human 
original ownership views.
Such an ownership- free version of common use could then ground 
a theory of environmental justice that does not refer to a conception of 
natural collective/ common Earth ownership but merely to the strong 
link between human needs and ecological space. Based on such an 
understanding of common use, a conception of legitimate original 
appropriation – that is, legitimate use and exclusion of others – can 
be grounded. Such a resulting theory would then be compatible with 
acknowledging the needs of nonhuman beings that refer to ecological 
space, and consequently be compatible with acknowledging distributive 
duties of ecological justice. This is in line with Derek Bell’s (2015, 
p. 11) position who points out that an ‘ecologically aware theory of 
justice […] seems likely to endorse limited and carefully specified use 
rights’. Moreover, this version of common use interprets the discourse 
surrounding the ‘global commons’ not as humanity’s common natural 
heritage but rather as the basis for life in common.
Overall therefore, all four possible accounts of original ownership 
should be rejected in favour of a no ownership account to describe 
the relationship between humanity and the Earth before the advent 
of property rights under positive law. Meaning that human original 
ownership in terms of full property rights, weak property rights, 
common use rights or as partial ownership are conceptually and/ 
or normatively problematic, if one is committed to doing justice to 
nonhuman living beings. The upshot is that if one understands nature 
as more than a heap of resources to be distributed, or if one advocates 
some form of ecological justice, then one requires a theory of (social) 
justice that starts from the premise that humans do not hold any (full 
or partial) original ownership over the Earth.
Notes
 1 For an environmental philosophical discussion of ownership in the sense of 
constituting a social institution see Markku Oksanen (2020).
 2 For a different reading of Locke that points out that Locke’s position on the 
ownership status pre- original acquisition is fuzzier that presented here see 
Wissenburg (2017).
 3 Of course, that does not include all libertarian theories. Some theorists such as 
(right) libertarians like Robert Nozick (1974) assume that the Earth is originally 
unowned.
 4 This is obvious for older theories like Locke’s theory of acquisition but also true 
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 5 Arguably, the notion of human stewardship of the Earth might necessitate that 
humanity originally owns the Earth as is indicated by its Christian origins and – as 
a secularised version – by the lack of an authority that appointed humanity as the 
Earth’s manager or caretaker.
 6 For a discussion of the respect for nature thesis see Holmes Rolston III (2012) 
or Paul Taylor (1986). Regarding ownership specifically, Oksanen acknowledges 
this perspective by stating that ‘the idea of owning nature is problematic for those 
environmental ethicists who consider ownership to reflect our self- glorified attitude 
toward the rest of nature and who thus think it is wholly incompatible with the 
ethics of respect for nature and the idea of ‘biospheric egalitarianism’ (1998, p. 193). 
However, Oksanen also claims that there is an ‘ecological argument’ for supporting 
ownership, although he does not argue for original ownership as considered here 
but for ownership as ‘primarily a social system’ which might exist post- original 
acquisition (Oksanen 1998).
 7 Risse’s (2012) theory of global distributive justice is a good example of a theory 
that bases claims of justice on the idea that humanity has original ownership claims 
to the Earth. For a debate on whether Risse’s argument grounding his common 
ownership view succeeds, see Arash Abizadeh (2013) and Risse (2013). For a 
detailed discussion of his notion of common ownership, see Michael Blake and 
Risse (2009) and Risse (2012, 2014). See also Anna Stilz (2014) for an interpretation 
of Risse’s use- focused right as a weak version of ownership.
 8 See Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom (1992) for a discussion of the distinction 
between ‘open access’ and ‘common property’ with regard to natural resources.
 9 For an example of such a libertarian view see Jan Narveson (1998).
 10 This has some similarities to the Franciscan theologian and philosopher William 
of Ockham’s claim that there was no property (which he understood as ownership 
under positive law) in the garden of Eden, but Adam and Eve had natural usage 
rights (which are distinct from property rights) to use whatever they liked (see 
Garnsey 2007, Spade and Panaccio 2016). Ockham argued this in his The Work 
of Ninety Days which resulted from a political dispute between the Franciscan 
order and Pope John XXII on the subject of the Franciscan view of poverty 












Now that we have looked at rather abstract considerations surrounding 
the idea of global ecological justice, I would like to bring these different 
issues together by exploring a more applied dispute about biological 
conservation that is entangled in a web of empirical and normative 
debates. That is the so- called Half- Earth proposal that I am using as 
a case study to see what my account of interspecies justice has to say 
about it. The Half- Earth proposal was put forward most prominently 
to a non- expert audience by biologist Edward O. Wilson (2016) in 
support of the already existing Nature Needs Half community. Its central 
idea can be found in earlier work that observed that an average of 50 
per cent of every region needs to be protected to conserve biodiversity 
(for example Noss 1992, Noss and Cooperrider 1994) which is meant 
as a partial solution to the current mass extinction event on Earth. 
It is suggested that this crisis can be mitigated somewhat by ‘setting 
aside’ half of the Earth’s land and half of sea spaces for nonhuman 
living beings. Currently, however, this proposal is fiercely contested 
between its supporters and critics that draw on a range of different 
scholarly backgrounds.
This proposal is particularly interesting because the disagreements 
it highlights uncover different visions of what just conservation 
should look like.1 Different framings highlight different problems 
that need to be prioritised, and I would like to investigate how the 
normative side of these disagreements can be accounted for by the 
environmental- ecological justice framework that I  have developed 
thus far. The proposal highlights the conflictual nature of conservation 
where human and nonhuman needs are at stake. In that sense it is a 
classical distribution conflict between humans and wild nonhumans 
while at the same time also uncovering important intra- social justice 
issues. Accordingly, I  would like to investigate whether the Half- 
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between the demands of justice held by humans and nonhuman beings 
against the backdrop of scarcity which materialises in the current mass 
extinction crisis.
As we will see, whether the proposal constitutes what is required by 
justice or stands in opposition to doing justice is highly contingent on a 
multitude of empirical and normative considerations and commitments. 
This will become clearer when taking into consideration, on the one 
side, the enormous practical difficulties of putting anything close 
to the Half- Earth proposal into practice and, on the other side, the 
complicated nature of entangled and overlapping kinds of injustice that 
a commitment to global justice for both fellow humans and nonhumans 
generates. It is not a straightforward endeavour to find the path that 
would be all- things- considered just, because there are many issues to 
consider. However, we will look primarily at what could constitute a 
just distribution in this context when considerations of environmental 
and ecological justice to wild nonhumans are taken into consideration 
(Chapter 5). As previously discussed, biodiversity loss can function as 
a marker of injustice (Chapter 7), but that is conditional on different 
circumstances of scarcity which in turn will influence our assessment 
of the Half- Earth proposal. Moreover, besides distributive justice to 
present human and nonhuman beings, we will see that also questions 
of restorative justice and issues of just implementation, among other 
justice dimensions, are highly relevant for assessing the proposal.
As discussed in Chapter  4, ecological space functions as an 
appropriate distribuendum for the ecological- environmental justice 
nexus. Accordingly, one can think about the just distribution of 
ecological space in general, but it is also possible to think about the 
just distribution of the different dimensions of ecological space and 
inquire how these interact. Meaning that we will focus here on what 
would constitute a just distribution of physical space in terms of habitat 
which is a subordinate question to this broader realm of enquiry, 
because the Half- Earth proposal focuses on the distribution of the 
Earth’s physical spaces which is only a subcategory of the broader 
concept of ecological space. An obvious but central fact in this context 
is that the Earth is a finite planet: its resources are currently becoming 
scarcer, its ecosystems are being put under increasing pressure and its 
spaces are growing more and more crowded. That said, some spaces 
such as the seas are getting emptied by pollution, overfishing and so 
on, but then again other spaces such as large monocultures are rather 
full in the sense that they do not leave much space for life that is non- 
instrumental for immediate human purposes. It is the scarcity of viable 
physical spaces – that is spaces for human and nonhuman life – which 
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constitutes a central normative problem that accounts of distributive 
ecological and environmental justice need to address.
Note that I use ecological or interspecies justice here as a shorthand 
for my biocentric account. This appears compatible with the scope of 
the Half- Earth proposal which aims to counteract species extinctions 
in general and not just of animals in particular, despite its focus lying 
more on animals (in terms of examples used). However, it would also 
be possible to normatively assess the proposal from more narrow animal 
rights or broader ecosystem perspectives and adjust the following 
conclusions accordingly. In the first section, I will introduce the Half- 
Earth proposal and some of the critique it has attracted, and then in 
the second section give a rough overview of the justice landscape 
of habitat conservation. Based on all these considerations, we will 
then assess whether the proposal has the potential to embody a just 
compromise in the final section. We will see that the proposal can 
only embody a distributively just compromise between ecological and 
environmental justice if it fulfils a range of conditions such as severe 
scarcity of habitat and the need to justly implement collective but 
unequally held duties of justice.
The proposal
Against the backdrop of the current extinction crisis, all the dimensions 
of current and increasing levels of scarcity in general, and how they 
impact on species extinctions in particular, are an important area of 
concern for environmental philosophy and political theory. As put by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC):
[d] uring the course of this century the resilience of many 
ecosystems (their ability to adapt naturally) is likely to be 
exceeded by an unprecedented combination of change in 
climate, associated disturbances (e.g. flooding, drought, 
wildfire, insects, ocean acidification) and in other global 
change drivers (especially land- use change, pollution and 
over- exploitation of resources), if greenhouse gas emissions 
and other changes continue at or above current rates. (Parry 
et al 2007, p. 213)
Although climate change is the most prominent environmental issue in 
the public discourse and it has severe implications for habitat loss, the 
less prominent global change drivers, especially land- use change, are 
claimed to be the main causal driver of habitat loss, and consequently 
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species extinctions and biodiversity loss. Conservation biologists have 
lamented therefore that:
[a] n exclusive focus on global climate change, the current 
rage, may obscure other pressing conservation problems 
and divert funding from combating them. As a direct 
global threat to species and ecosystems, climate change 
is currently dwarfed by land- use change in response to 
human population growth and conversion of wild lands to 
agricultural use. (Noss et al 2012, p. 3)
Such considerations are part of the rationale for the Nature Needs 
Half idea. As mentioned earlier, Wilson (2016) argues for setting 
aside half of the Earth for species other than humans. Because 
habitat destruction is the most important (although not sole) factor 
contributing to species extinction (Brooks 2010, Pimm and Jenkins 
2010), Wilson proposes setting aside half the Earth as an emergency 
solution to the problem of rapidly declining biodiversity. The proposal 
is merely meant to mitigate, rather than avoid, the anthropogenic 
extinction of species on a mass scale, because this crisis is already 
in progress (Ceballos et al 2015). While Wilson (2003, 2016) is the 
most prominent figure promoting the Half- Earth proposal, the idea 
has been supported and developed by several conservation biologists, 
conservationists, social scientists and philosophers (see Sylven, 
2011, Noss et al 2012, Locke, H. 2014, Kopnina 2016, Cafaro et al 
2017, Dinerstein et al 2017, Kopnina et al 2018). In practice, the 
crucial claim here is that realising the Half- Earth proposal would 
make it possible to protect more than 80 per cent of all species 
(Wilson 2016). Setting aside means that these areas receive some 
level of protection. The International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) identifies six categories of protected areas:  strict 
nature reserve, wilderness area, national park, natural monument, 
habitat/ species management area, protected landscape/ seascape and 
managed resource protected area (Dudley and Stolton 2008). Some 
proponents of the Half- Earth proposal (such as Kopnina et al 2018) 
have suggested that a mixture of all these six categories of protected 
areas – which differ in how much human activity they allow – can 
fulfil the conservation demands of the proposal.
It is put forward that, not only how much space, but also which 
particular spaces are protected, matters. Five priorities for protection 
are focused on:
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• Protected areas need to cover all different existent ecosystems and 
be large enough that native species can be maintained ‘in natural 
patterns of abundance and distribution’, as well as to ‘maintain 
ecological processes such as fire and flooding, and maintain resilience 
to short- and long- term environmental change’ (Locke, H. 2014, 
p. 365, also Sylven 2011). This quantifies as 25– 75 per cent of a 
‘typical region’ (Noss et al 2012).
• Protect at least half of ‘wilderness’ areas that are still ‘mostly intact’ 
(Nature Needs Half 2017).
• Protect remaining ‘biodiversity hotspots’ with high concentrations 
of endangered species (Wilson 2016).
• Protected areas should be linked with ‘corridors’ that allow animals 
to roam, enable gene flow and climate change adaptation (Noss et al 
2012, Locke, H. 2014).
• Some protected areas will need biodiversity restoration (Wilson 
2016). One – arguably effective, but also controversial (Kopnina 
2016)  – strategy to achieve this is ‘rewilding’ where, among a 
range of other activities (see Lorimer et al 2015), certain species 
are reintroduced into ecosystems. Big predators and herbivores 
in particular serve important biological functions and, thus, their 
reintroduction serves to counteract the ‘trophic downgrading’ of 
ecosystems (Sylven 2011). For example, one of the current projects 
of the Rewilding Europe Foundation is aiming to reintroduce bison 
into most of Europe, and in the United States grey wolves were 
reintroduced into the Yellowstone National Park in 1995.2
However, for now I will exclude rewilding projects (and ecological 
restoration more broadly) because they generate additional normative 
questions such as about restorative justice and about the risk involved in 
each intervention due to it being, in essence, an experimental approach 
(see Lorimer et al 2015). Moreover, there is also a conceptual debate 
about the relationship between restoration and rewilding and in- how- 
far rewilding is new and different from restoration (for a philosophical 
overview of the rewilding concept see Gammon 2018). We will return 
to the backwards- looking nature of restoration later, but considering 
that parts of the Earth might be already too degraded for conservation 
efforts, or are mainly used (and necessary) for human purposes, realising 
these goals would be ambitious – especially when comparing them to 
the current international conservation regime that includes the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) with its Strategic 
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Besides posthumanist developments in philosophy which include 
a move towards thinking about our moral responsibility towards the 
environment in terms of justice, we can also observe a recent trend of 
discussing the need for justice to nonhumans and humans independently 
from, as well as with particular reference to, the Half- Earth proposal in 
social sciences and humanities circles (Shoreman- Ouimet and Kopnina 
2015, Kopnina 2016, Kopnina et al 2018, Washington et al 2018) more 
broadly. Yet, in light of criticism of the claim that Nature Needs Half 
constitutes a just solution – that on the contrary it might even lead 
to considerable injustices (Fletcher and Büscher 2016, Büscher et al 
2017a, Büscher et al 2017b) – the proposal is still in need of further 
philosophical discussion.
The critique
The Half- Earth proposal has been met with considerable criticism 
due to the social implications of the proposal and the rather weak 
understanding of the social realities and processes found in its most 
prominent call for support by Wilson (2016). Most notably, Büscher 
et al (2017a) claim that ‘[t] he Half- Earth proposal, in short, is infeasible, 
and will have dangerous and counter- effective consequences if 
implemented. The only logical conclusion of the Half- Earth proposal 
would be injustice on a large scale without effectively addressing the 
roots of the ecological crisis’ (p. 408, emphasis added). This critique 
can also be found in Fletcher and Büscher (2016), who damningly 
conclude that Wilson’s proposal ‘would entail forcibly herding a 
drastically reduced human population into increasingly crowded urban 
areas to be managed in oppressively technocratic ways’. If such points 
of critique are accurate, then the Half- Earth proposal might be far off 
from constituting a just solution. In particular, Büscher et al claim that 
the Half- Earth proposal is deficient in a range of issues regarding the 
problem of overconsumption, the ‘social impact’ of such a division of 
the Earth, and the social and political sustainability of the conservation 
areas, and leaves us with no ‘agenda for the biodiversity in a human 
half of Earth’ (2017a, p. 408). The alternative they propose is a focus 
on de- growth economics and addressing (global and social) inequalities 
which would tackle ‘the root causes of environmental degradation’ 
while simultaneously benefiting humans (2017a, p. 409).
Their critique holds some power and Wilson’s (short) description 
of how to put the Half- Earth proposal into practice should be 
found wanting by any social scientist. For instance, Wilson (2016) 
demonstrates a strong belief in the capacity of a free market and 
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technological innovation to reduce human environmental impact. 
In contrast, several ecological economists (such as Spash 2010), for 
example, are considerably more sceptical about the ability of markets 
to deal with environmental problems, and Wilson’s proposal lacks any 
engagement with the debates on this issue.4 Moreover, it is not clear 
what Wilson understands to be a free market. For example, ‘cap and 
trade’ schemes are proposed as a market solution to environmental 
problems – such as climate change – but such schemes steer and create, 
rather than free, markets. Maybe Wilson believes that free markets 
should be allowed to put monetary values on environmental goods 
such as biodiversity that are currently not traded – for example via 
‘biodiversity offsets’ (see O’Neill, J. 2015). However, this again does 
not seem to be what he has in mind because such an approach sits 
uncomfortably with the implicit and explicit respect for nature displayed 
by the broader literature in favour of the Half- Earth proposal, which 
sees more than merely instrumental value in nonhuman beings. Finally, 
Wilson’s belief that ‘intensive economic growth’ (2016, p.  49) can 
simultaneously reduce consumption and increase human welfare rests 
on little evidence. It is already a point of contention what relationship 
economic growth has with consumption alone – see debates on ‘green 
growth’ versus ‘de- growth’ versus a ‘steady- state’ economy (see Daly 
2013, Jacobs 2013, Lorek and Spangenberg 2014, Cosme et al 2017) as 
well as the ‘limits to growth’ debate (see Meadows et al 2004). Hence, 
it is understandable that Büscher et al (2017a) claim that the better 
alternative to the Half- Earth proposal would be to focus instead on the 
economy, and to pursue a de- growth strategy to reduce biodiversity 
loss, considering the environmentalists’ often- displayed scepticism 
regarding economic growth.
Nevertheless, it should be said that Wilson does not represent the 
whole range of scholarly perspectives in support of Nature Needs Half. 
In reply to critics, supporters of the proposal have further substantiated 
their stance and critiqued Wilson’s market- based solution. Cafaro 
et al (2017) and Kopnina et al (2018) point out that they are in full 
agreement with the critique of the neoliberal growth paradigm and 
that the proposal to protect half of the Earth is merely a necessary, not 
sufficient, condition for reducing rates of extinction. Hence, a de- 
growth economic strategy could potentially provide a complementary 
course of action in order to achieve the goals of the Half- Earth proposal 
(for a reply to Cafaro et al 2017 see Büscher et al 2017b). Overall this 
provides some indication that support for the proposal is not logically 
linked to a support of capitalist structures, nor to a dismissal of the 
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issues involved, we will further explore the latter point on social justice 
in a moment.
One problem, several perspectives
The previously mentioned distinction between ecological space and its 
different dimensions is a first step to illuminate the debate on the Half- 
Earth proposal. The Half- Earth and the ‘de- growth’ perspectives – as 
shorthand for the critique by Büscher et al (2017a) – seem to differ 
along an important dimension in this regard. Meaning that it seems 
as though these two proposals accentuate different questions. On the 
one hand, the Half- Earth proposal tries to answer the question of how 
much physical space is required by nonhuman nature (for its own and 
humanity’s sake), and on the other hand, the de- growth perspective 
asks how to create sustainable societies and promote human wellbeing. 
Hence, from a justice perspective, a more holistic approach is called 
for that merges these two considerations of justice into one practical 
proposal, instead of prioritising one dimension over the other. Because 
of these different angles, the two conservation proposals also emphasise 
different dimensions of ecological space (without using that specific 
terminology). On the one side, the Half- Earth proposal is mainly 
interested in the distribution of actual physical space and its effect 
on biodiversity loss. The de- growth perspective, in contrast, is more 
concerned with human practices that use non- renewable and renewable 
resources and, in this manner, implicitly occupy access to and degrade 
potential benefits provided by ecosystems (that is, the social- ecological 
metabolism). Accordingly, the two perspectives address different 
distributional problems of ecological space. In order to achieve a just 
distribution of ecological space neither problem is less relevant than 
the other, and neither could be substituted for the other.
Relatedly, even though neither approach is philosophically grounded, 
it seems that the reasoning behind the Half- Earth proposal often aligns 
with an interspecies justice perspective, and in contrast, the de- growth 
perspective rather aligns with an emphasis on environmental justice, 
even though both proposals exhibit characteristics of both spheres 
of justice. In consequence, rather than constituting theoretically 
incommensurable positions (regarding their core commitments rather 
than in the form of all their respective supporting authors), these 
different perspectives highlight different normative and empirical 
elements that matter when thinking about what would be all- things- 
considered just if one is simultaneously committed to doing justice to 
fellow humans and to fellow living beings.
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The justice landscape of habitat conservation
Having said that, one might also not be very convinced of the gravity 
of the normative disagreement about the Half- Earth proposal when 
drawing on the so- called convergence thesis – or convergence hypothesis – 
about attitudes to the environment that has been primarily originated 
and defended by environmental pragmatist Bryan Norton. Norton’s 
main interest lies in ‘unifying environmentalism’ by showing that 
ecocentric (broadly understood) and anthropocentric approaches have 
similar practical interests. In his words, ‘[e] nvironmentalists believe 
that policies serving the interests of the human species as a whole, in 
the long run, will serve also the “interests” of nature, and vice versa’ 
because ‘all things in nature are interrelated’ (1991, p.  240). This 
means in practice that it does not matter whether one makes policies 
with human or nonhuman interests in mind because, ultimately, both 
approaches also support the interests of the other. According to Norton 
(1991, p. 240) this functions as an empirical hypothesis as well as ‘an 
article of environmentalists’ faith’.
From this perspective, the problem of how to justly distribute 
ecological space and habitat more specifically under conditions that are 
less ideal than moderate scarcity might not appear very problematic. In 
fact, from this perspective it seems that there might not be a problem 
at all, that is, in the long run and from an aggregate perspective. If 
an anthropocentric focus – that is, being only concerned with issues 
of environmental justice  – should lead to the same outcome as a 
biocentric focus – that is, being concerned also (or only) with issues 
of ecological justice – then the conflict between environmental justice 
and ecological justice dissolves. Ecological justice would not even be 
needed to protect the interests of nonhumans. Their interests would 
be catered for simply by humans acting in their own best interest.
Even though at first sight, this perspective seems fairly promising, 
it has of course been met with criticism. Three main issues stand out. 
Firstly, it seems reasonable to be more sceptical about anthropocentrism’s 
ability to support environmental goals – in particular regarding its ability 
to support conservation practices that protect nonhumans (see Katz 
1999, Mathews 2016). Secondly, a related point is the question of how 
much human welfare really depends on the wellbeing of nonhumans. 
Shoreman- Ouimet and Kopnina summarise this issue:
Partially stemming from this idea of unity it is often assumed 
that the protection of the natural world is in the interests of 
humans. Yet, caution needs to be exercised not to assume 
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that human interests always correspond with those of nature. 
There is enough empirical evidence that mass extinctions 
can occur without any apparent effect on human welfare. 
(2015, p. 323, emphasis in original)
Considering that arguments have frequently been made to show that 
ambitious environmental conservation projects have negative effects 
for the world’s poorest people (see Büscher et al 2017a), it is doubtful 
how close the interests of humans and nonhumans really are. This is 
especially the case because, thirdly, the convergence thesis makes a 
claim about long- term and aggregate interests and is therefore unable 
to provide any insight for more imminent conflicts between humans 
and nonhumans. Thus, even if the convergence thesis is correct, it is 
unable to answer how a just distribution of ecological justice should 
look under current circumstances. Accordingly, ecological justice needs 
to be added to environmental justice considerations to address the ‘how 
much nature’ question. This remains the case despite the fact that an 
account interested only in human wellbeing has to partially address 
the needs of nonhumans because some kind of ‘healthy’ environment 
remains a precondition for social justice (as argued in Holland 2008). 
This means that, to some degree, the question addressed by the Half- 
Earth proposal logically precedes but does not replace the objective 
of social justice.
But note that the convergence thesis is not identical to the compatibility 
thesis between social justice (between humans) and environmental 
sustainability or environmental conservation which is also a matter of 
debate. As said, here I assume that some kind of a healthy environment 
is needed for social justice, but the relationship between environmental 
protection and social justice is complex. At least some evidence (see 
Mikkelson et  al 2007) suggests that there is a correlation between 
economic inequality (that is, a form of social injustice) and biodiversity 
loss (that is, a marker for potential ecological injustice as I have argued 
in Chapter  7). That, in turn, would support the claim that social 
justice is also needed for environmental protection (Plumwood 1998a). 
Accordingly, the environmental- ecological justice relationship has areas 
of convergence and conflict and seems to be driven by feedbacks which 
add an additional level of complexity.
Putting this additional dimension aside for now, in our specific 
context at hand it is important that the Half- Earth proposal should not 
be put into practice in a manner that causes large- scale injustices towards 
the poor and marginalised, such as imagined by Fletcher and Büscher 
(2016) and Büscher et al (2017a). However, the alternative cannot be 
VISIONS OF JUST CONSERVATION
187
to ignore the large- scale injustices that are already committed towards 
nonhumans (Kopnina 2016). A combination of these two proposals 
could potentially avoid many such injustices, and in the residual cases of 
conflict remains only the careful weighing up of the different options. 
In cases of more than moderate scarcity it is impossible that no one or 
nothing loses out (in contrast to the convergence thesis), because the 
satisfaction of all needs is rendered unobtainable in such circumstances.
Just global distribution of habitat
In order to assess the validity of the claim that the Half- Earth proposal is 
required by justice, two main questions about distributive justice, which 
have so far remained unanswered, must be addressed before one can turn 
to further – but not less important – considerations of justice about its 
implementation. First: is the proposal merely a pro tanto requirement 
of justice in the sense that it might be necessary to fulfil our duties of 
ecological justice, or can we claim that when taking into account global 
ecological and environmental distributive justice the Half- Earth proposal 
embodies a just solution? Second: if that were the case, under what 
conditions would the Half- Earth proposal be such a just solution? This 
is because, in my account, the principles of distributive justice change 
depending on the conditions of scarcity in which they apply. Thus, the 
question becomes under which circumstances of scarcity the Half- Earth 
proposal satisfies the principles of environmental and ecological justice, 
if at all, and whether such circumstances of scarcity accurately describe 
the current situation of life on Earth.
For our purposes here it suffices to subdivide different scenarios of 
scarcity or abundance of physical space into five categories that take 
into account the demands of humans and nonhumans modelled on 
the different scarcity scenarios that we discussed in Chapter 5. These 
are all- things- considered descriptions of scarcity that account for the 
needs of humans and nonhuman entities globally:
• full abundance:  all needs and wants can be (and potentially 
are) satisfied;
• moderate scarcity:  all needs but not necessarily all wants can 
be satisfied;
• significant scarcity: all basic/ fundamental needs can be fulfilled, but 
not much more;
• severe scarcity:  not all (human and nonhuman) beings can 
simultaneously satisfy their most basic needs;
• full scarcity: societal and ecological collapse.
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Under conditions of severe scarcity it becomes impossible, in practice, to 
guarantee the survival or endurance of all entities that are relevant for an 
account of environmental and ecological justice (while excluding prey-
predator relationships and so on as previously discussed), even if very 
effective distribution mechanisms were in place. In such circumstances, 
the maximum that distributive ecological justice can demand of human 
agents of justice is a duty to minimise anthropogenic species extinctions. 
That the Half- Earth proposal only aims to drastically lower the rate of 
anthropogenic extinction rather than to stop anthropogenic biodiversity 
loss altogether implies that it might be a solution that applies to the 
severe scarcity scenario. Therefore:
• if it is empirically the case that we find ourselves in circumstances 
of severe scarcity;
• and if the Half- Earth proposal would lead to a minimisation of 
anthropogenic extinctions without violating the environmental 
justice principle that applies to severe scarcity requiring that all 
humans should have the opportunity to satisfy their basic needs;
• and if setting aside at least half of the available physical space on 
Earth, in particular, is the most effective solution for minimising 
anthropogenic extinctions rather than focusing more on setting 
aside different dimensions of ecological space;
then implementing the Half- Earth proposal is an all- things- considered 
requirement of distributive green justice. All- things- considered refers 
here to the point that demands of distributive environmental justice 
have already been taken into account and, thus, cannot weaken the 
nonhuman justice entitlements a posteriori.
In contrast to circumstances of severe scarcity (the first condition), 
under more benign conditions such as significant scarcity – where 
all living beings could theoretically satisfy their minimal needs  – 
the Half- Earth proposal would not be ambitious enough, because 
under such conditions ecological justice could demand a zero- rate 
of anthropogenic extinctions – independently of which also exists a 
natural rate of extinctions which is greater than zero. Alternatively, if 
we find ourselves in conditions that are scarcer than severe scarcity then 
we have left the realm in which considerations of justice make sense 
or could be useful. As discussed in Chapter 5, it is important that this 
scarcity- contextual safeguarding of human basic needs under conditions 
of severe scarcity is built on a non- ranking biocentric perspective that 
can acknowledge the relevance of different justice relationships without 
having to rely on a hierarchical species ranking.
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The third condition is essential because setting aside ecological space 
in general does not necessarily involve setting aside actual physical space. 
Proponents of the Half- Earth proposal make empirical claims about the 
importance of physical space for biodiversity conservation and thereby 
underline the importance of this ecological space dimension. However, 
as pointed out earlier, physical space is not the only dimension that 
matters with regards to distributive justice or sustainability, and it is 
an empirical question how the usage of this dimension of ecological 
space interacts with the usage and degradation of other types of 
ecological space.
Just implementation
The second condition also needs further clarification in order to 
address the worry that the Half- Earth proposal would mainly affect 
the already marginalised. In contrast to important considerations 
about the just resolution of local (that is, specific) conservation 
conflicts that take into account human and nonhuman wellbeing 
(such as discussed in Vucetich et al 2018), my focus here lies on the 
implications of humanity’s duties of global justice towards nonhumans. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, demands of ecological justice are held 
against humanity as a whole and not merely against some less wealthy 
groups who happen to live in areas that still have high levels of 
biological diversity (see also Baxter 2005). Put simply, environmental 
justice demands that the cost of protecting these areas is shared justly, 
particularly when taking into account additional considerations of 
historical responsibility. In practice that means that the burden of 
change has to be primarily borne by the wealthy who occupy large 
amounts of ecological space (which is problematic for environmental 
and interspecies justice considerations).
In other words, the second condition raises important questions 
about just implementation of requirements of justice which appears to 
be the area where the Half- Earth proposal becomes most problematic 
while also remaining fairly vague (for some practical issues to take into 
consideration see Ellis 2019). So far I have implied that such duties of 
justice are held by individual moral agents, but more accurately these 
are collectively but not equally held duties. They are held collectively by 
most of humanity, but they are not held equally due to the unequal 
current and historical responsibility for usage and degradation of 
ecological space, and more specifically habitat. Similar arguments have 
already been raised in the climate justice/ ethics literature to distinguish 
between the distinct responsibilities between, very generally speaking, 
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the citizens of early-industrialised high-income countries, and those 
of low- income countries – the former of which have emitted and 
benefited more from past emissions (for an overview of the issue 
of historical emissions for climate ethics see Meyer and Sanklecha 
2017). A  further complication arises because these unequally held 
collective duties are in tension with an unequally distributed global 
demandingness of the proposal. Putting aside rewilding attempts in the 
US and Europe, a lot (but not all) of focus of the Half- Earth proposal 
appears to lie on protecting high biodiversity areas in the Global 
South which does not match up well with the reality that the duties 
of global distributive ecological justice rest primarily on moral agents 
in the Global North, generally speaking and highly simplified. This 
is again similar to considerations of climate justice where there is a 
mismatch between emissions and benefits, on the one side, and impact 
of and vulnerability to climate change, on the other. Because of that, it 
becomes pertinent to think about how to justly implement interspecies 
justice, particularly because historically the creation of national parks, 
for example, but also conservation more broadly has sometimes been 
accompanied with social injustices in the form of forced removal of 
human communities from areas, and problematic (that is, colonial) 
notions of wilderness (see Plumwood 2006, Ward 2019).6
Regarding such potential conflicts between local communities and 
conservation goals, justice in terms of recognition seems to be a useful 
complement to distributive justice considerations in order to ease 
conflicts (see Martin et al 2016). However, by itself it will not be able 
to fully alleviate the material dimension of the unequal impact of the 
global demandingness of the proposal. For example, Schleicher et al 
(2019) estimate that at least one billion people would be affected. This 
does not imply that demands of global distributive ecological justice 
should not be fulfilled, but it does imply that if the Half- Earth proposal 
turns out to be a requirement of distributive ecological justice then 
the question of just implementation needs to be addressed urgently, 
because such justice considerations might alter what would truly be 
all- things- considered just. One dimension that needs to be addressed 
in this regard is about how to situate humanity’s collective but not 
equally held duties within the context of an international community 
with a complex structure of global, national and local institutions and 
the socio- economic context at large. Accordingly, even though such 
an enquiry goes beyond the scope of the theoretical framework that 
I have laid out so far, it should be stressed that such duties also need 
to be put into conversation with considerations about injustices at 
the international level relating to trade, international negotiations and 
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the legacies of historical injustices, because if not carefully addressed, 
the proposal could contribute to the reproduction of international 
relations of domination. This links, for example, to the discussion on 
de- growth mentioned earlier due to the link between the displacement 
of communities and global capitalist structures (see Napoletano and 
Clark 2020) and also further supports the need to critically examine 
the widespread, but inefficient, use of agricultural land by growing 
feed crops for the global meat and dairy production (see Tscharntke 
et al 2012).7 Moreover, this also links back to the aforementioned 
suggestion about the relationship between social justice and 
environmental protection (see also Vucetich et al 2018). Global social 
justice in economic and ecological space use terms appears to be a 
necessary component for the possibility of the just implementation 
of duties of interspecies justice. A  lot more will therefore have to 
be said about this area of enquiry, and we will return to a few more 
theoretical considerations about just implementation in Chapter 10.
A distributively just compromise?
To reiterate, whether the Half- Earth proposal is a requirement of green 
distributive justice depends on (1) the interplay between environmental 
and ecological justice and (2)  a number of empirical factors. Two 
questions need to be addressed to assess whether the current situation 
of life on Earth would be such that the proposal might constitute a 
requirement of distributive justice, thus requiring further considerations 
about just implementation:
• Do we find ourselves in circumstances of severe scarcity?
• Does the Half- Earth proposal maximise (or contribute to 
maximising) nonhuman survival (without encroaching on human 
fundamental needs)? That is, does it minimise species extinctions?
Only if we can answer both questions affirmatively does the Half- Earth 
proposal fulfil the distributive ecological and environmental justice 
requirements and, then, under these specific circumstances, would the 
Half- Earth proposal embody a distributively just compromise regarding 
the distribution of physical space. This requires that an empirical 
case has been made for that at least half of physical space on Earth in 
particular – and not merely ecological space in general – would need 
to be set aside for nonhumans to provide the most effective (partial) 
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Moreover, the answer to what constitute human fundamental 
needs highly influences whether the first question can be answered 
positively. A very demanding theory of human wellbeing would 
easily push the interspecies community out of the realm of 
justice. For example, a position that considers a Western lifestyle 
as a minimal baseline for human wellbeing would create human 
entitlements so demanding in a world of seven billion people that it 
would bring us into the realm of full scarcity, where justice can no 
longer provide a meaningful solution. As suggested in Chapter 5, 
an environmental virtue ethic might here be an appropriate remedy 
by providing an account of human flourishing that is intrinsically 
linked to a non- anthropocentric outlook which situates humans as 
part of the biotic community.
Even if the Half- Earth proposal satisfies all these different demands, 
setting aside physical space does not have to turn into a dystopian vision 
with the ultimate goal of creating prison- like human cities, industrial 
and agricultural areas on the one side and untouched wilderness and 
no- go areas for humans on the other – even though there is a real 
danger that it does when combined with problematic perspectives on 
wilderness and of the human- nature relationship. More generally, in my 
account, the just distribution of ecological space is more fluid and does 
not resemble a red line literally painted across the Earth’s continents in 
such a way that some housemates might fairly divide their fridge- space, 
as some might interpret the global 50 per cent target (which is an image 
driven by a certain reading of Wilson 2016). That humans are part of 
nature is a necessary building block of understanding the essence of 
ecological space (Chapter 4). Thus, if realised, the Half- Earth proposal 
needs to be part of situating humans in nature rather than separating 
humans from nature, and that entails the insight that nonhumans also 
need to be able to have access to physical spaces. Often these spaces 
can be close by, or even be the same spaces used by humans, and thus 
more attention will have to be given to cultural landscapes and land 
sharing farming practices. Yet, other nonhumans will require more 
isolation (which should not be confused with a conceptual human- 
nature dualism). It should be clear that even though the Half- Earth 
proposal often only gets associated with the image of big, wild and 
human- free spaces, that is not the full story. In order to be consistent 
with the dual demands of distributive ecological and environmental 
justice it would have to embody a way of giving nonhumans space 
among, and not merely from, ourselves. As Val Plumwood puts it, ‘[i] n 
the current situation where nature is hard- pressed, allocating some 
areas for nonhuman priority is justifiable if we are to begin sharing the 
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earth fairly between species’ (2006, p. 137), that is, between humans 
and nonhumans.
In contrast to worries about misanthropic implications, this 
conditional conclusion might not satisfy all supporters of the Half- 
Earth proposal, who might deem it not sufficiently demanding. But 
recall the argument in Chapter 7 in favour of a sufficientarian approach, 
because setting minimal standards is not ethically problematic under 
all circumstances. To reiterate, depending on what circumstances of 
scarcity we find ourselves in, the minimal baseline for what can be 
considered a just distribution shifts. Accordingly, setting minimal 
standards is not anthropocentric in itself, if it constitutes what could 
maximally be asked for in terms of justice in circumstances that present 
a set of limitations on what can be achieved; and if sufficientarian 
distributive ecological justice principles are developed in conjunction 
with non- anthropocentrically adjusted environmental justice goals that, 
for example, do not start from the hubristic claim that only humans 
hold occupation rights to the Earth (Chapter 8).
In the end, the demands of Nature Needs Half are only an emergency 
solution, rather than a vision of the most vibrant and abundant version 
of life on Earth, and Freya Mathews (whose position we discussed in 
this context in Chapter 7) also acknowledges that ‘[t] he goal would 
be to seek relative abundance for all species, within ecological parameters’ 
(2016, p. 146, emphasis added). Under conditions of severe scarcity, 
the Half- Earth proposal seems the maximum of what can be asked 
by ecological justice for the just distribution of habitat. Moreover, we 
are also still left with a further demand of distributive green justice 
in terms of interspecies, as well as environmental justice. Recall that 
if we do not currently live in the benign circumstances of moderate 
scarcity, a strong justice mandate remains to pursue policies geared 
towards sustainability in order to move up on the scarcity scale to more 
benign circumstances that would provide more material support for 
wellbeing (Chapter 5).
I hope that it has become apparent by now that the Half- Earth 
proposal is not intrinsically just or unjust, as some of its discussions 
might suggest, but whether the Half- Earth proposal constitutes 
what is required by justice depends on a multitude of empirical and 
normative questions that have to be addressed. Even if these can all 
be answered satisfactorily, it can only ever be one demand of justice, 
because it needs to be complemented with strategies – such as the 
de- growth perspective for  example – regarding how it could be made 
feasible in practice. Moreover, recall that the use of habitat is only one 
distributional problem. The reformulation of the Half- Earth proposal 
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as something addressing one particular dimension of ecological 
space within an even broader account of global environmental and 
ecological justice gives it more philosophical consistency by allowing 
for a more nuanced normative account of the problem at hand – the 
extinction crisis. Only by drawing on this – or a similar framework – 
does one get the necessary philosophical underpinning to make 
a strong normative case that uses the language of justice that the 
proposal’s supporters want to use in its favour. But the consequence 
is that in order to gain a nuanced account we are left with a broad 
set of considerations to consider.
So what can we say about the question posed initially about whether 
the Half- Earth proposal could constitute a distributively just compromise 
globally between the demands of justice held by humans and nonhuman 
beings on a finite planet? As mentioned earlier, what would constitute 
a just distribution is conditional on a range of circumstances, such 
as how scarce the relevant good in question is and a range of other 
questions. Because the proposal is meant as a solution to problems 
that were triggered by scarcity in the first place (that is destruction of 
habitat), scarcity becomes the main, but not sole, indicator with which 
stands or falls the claim that the Half- Earth proposal is a demand of 
distributive justice. So, (only) when assuming that (1) most of the 
empirical claims that Nature Needs Half draws on are broadly accurate 
and (2)  that a complementary philosophical and practical account 
of just implementation can be devised, then there are good grounds 
to consider the Half- Earth proposal a just compromise between the 
dual demands of environmental and ecological justice if the current 
situation of life on Earth resembles what I have called severe scarcity. 
Despite that this might look like a very modest insight, recall that 
scarcity and the needs of nonhumans are not usually considered by 
accounts of distributive justice. Thus, to even begin to situate the Half- 
Earth proposal within justice, an extensive rebuilding of how justice 
is theorised is required.
Of course, some open questions remain because Nature Needs 
Half is situated within the intersection of several spheres of justice 
and justice relationships. For example, more theoretical development 
is needed in order to provide a fuller account of the normative 
dimensions involved in deliberating about just conservation, such as 
more consideration of the temporal dimensions of ecological justice 
in particular, and how justice to wild nonhumans interacts with 
considerations about the justice relationship between humans and 
more domesticated nonhumans. An example that generates questions 
regarding both of these dimensions is the rewilding projects proposed 
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as part of Nature Needs Half. These cannot fully be accounted for 
by considerations of intragenerational distributive justice alone. If 
successful, rewilding projects seem to be mainly relevant for questions 
of compensatory justice as reparatory practices for historic injustices, 
or as a measure of intergenerational justice towards future human and 
nonhuman generations.
Another related realm of enquiry is the relationship between 
justice to wild nonhumans that we have focused on here and justice 
to domesticated nonhumans such as farm animals and plants. As 
previously discussed, these two justice relationships will differ 
regarding how justice is conceptualised and what principles follow if 
applicable, but this theoretical addition will be helpful to provide a 
more complete analysis of what could be all- things- considered just. 
That is not only the case because these beings matter in their own 
right (and, thus, trigger considerations about just treatment which 
links to debates in the animal rights literature on issues such as 
veganism), but also because agricultural practices cannot, in general, 
be reduced, in terms of justice, to the relationship between humans 
and the farmed domesticated organisms (that is, animals and plants) 
only. For example, agricultural monocultures clearly cut across and spill 
over several different human- nonhuman relationships. Also the Half- 
Earth proposal remains fairly silent on the relationship of mitigating 
biodiversity loss of wild nonhumans and large- scale farming practices 
of domesticated nonhuman animals and plants, but as said, how 
we understand and share cultural landscapes, for example, is highly 
relevant for providing a more in- depth analysis of the proposal. Thus, 
the Half- Earth proposal is merely a puzzle piece rather than a complete 
answer to what just conservation would require. For that purpose, 
an account of ecological and environmental justice would also have 
to be put into conversation with other existing justice relationships.
Notes
 1 On the one side, this can be linked to related broader discussions about just 
biological conservation that extend considerations of justice to nonhumans in the 
conservation context (Vucetich et al 2018, Washington et al 2018, Treves et al 2019). 
On the other side, alternative proposals such as the idea of ‘convivial conservation’ 
(Büscher and Fletcher 2019) rather highlight the centrality of economic and political 
issues from a political ecology perspective in their response to the extinction crisis. 
My own position shares some similarities with, but is also in some respects different, 
to these proposals. However, I cannot elaborate on most of these here, as I cannot 
represent appropriately the diverse literature on conservation in the natural and 
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 2 See for details regarding the bison plans www.rewildingeurope.com/ bison- 
rewilding- plan/ and regarding the developments in Yellowstone see William Ripple 
and Robert Beschta (2012).
 3 At the time of writing, preparations have begun for a post- 2020 global biodiversity 
framework.
 4 For an overview of different positions on the relationship between environmental 
problems and markets see John O’Neill (2015).
 5 For a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between the Half- Earth proposal 
and capitalism from an Eco- Marxist perspective see Brian Napoletano and Brett 
Clark (2020).
 6 See Kim Ward (2019) and Andrea Gammon (2018) for an important distinction 
between ‘wildness’ and ‘wilderness’ and see Plumwood (2006) for an important 
distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘wilderness’.
 7 The latter point on meat production is an issue that Paul Taylor (1986, p. 288) 
already urged as a means of habitat protection in line with his ‘principle of minimum 
wrong’.
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We started with the current mass extinction as the practical and 
theoretical catalyst for the arguments developed in the last chapters. 
The upshot is that we have duties of justice to wild living beings 
because we are standing with them in a global distributive justice 
relationship. But as we have seen, what these duties entail is conditional 
on what circumstances of scarcity we find ourselves in; meaning that 
the extinction of a species functions as an indicator of injustice, but 
it is not sufficient on its own to make that case because in very dire 
circumstances an extinction is not necessarily caused by any distributive 
injustice. Yet, even in circumstances of severe scarcity it is required 
by ecological justice to at least minimise anthropogenic species 
extinctions, which already takes into account the duties of distributive 
environmental justice we have towards fellow humans. Based on this 
we have good grounds to believe that we have a duty of justice to avoid 
species extinctions whenever possible. What is possible is, on the one 
side, based on empirical contingencies about how we can change the 
modes that our societies operate in to be more sustainable and, on the 
other side, contingent on what we consider materially necessary for a 
flourishing, or at least decent, human life. In a nutshell, what I have 
presented here amounts to an account of global non- ranking biocentric 
distributive ecological/ interspecies justice to wild nonhuman beings. Based 
on this theoretical framework, the human takeover of the Earth’s 
ecological space – its resources, ecosystem benefits and actual spaces – 
that ultimately leads to species extinctions constitutes an injustice; it 
should be discussed and responded to as a matter of justice.
The notion of justice is attributed particular weight in Western 
modern political philosophy, the mainstream of which has retained 
a very anthropocentric outlook until recently. Yet, I hope that it has 
become clear by now that the anthropocentrism in a lot of political 
thought stems from justice- independent assumptions and that it is 
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consequently possible, and in light of the current mass extinction crisis 
urgently needed, to defend an account of justice towards nonhumans 
that speaks to the material realities of life in common on a shared Earth. 
It seems that one main objection to the idea of interspecies justice 
regards the conflicts it creates between humans and nonhumans. In 
fairness, accounts of justice to nonhumans have not been effective in 
addressing these conflicts so far, but I have tried to show that engaging 
with the overlap between environmental and ecological justice is one 
route to deal with such conflicts by finding a just compromise between 
their different demands. Of course, a lot more will have to be said on 
this matter as the field of ecological justice is still in its infancy and 
requires extensive development in several areas, as do many ideas that 
I have started to develop in this book.
We have also seen that these duties and the respective entitlements 
of distributive green justice to present humans and nonhumans will 
have to be put into conversation with a further range of demands of 
justice in order to inquire what would be all- things- considered just. 
These demands are generated by different justice communities such 
as between humans and domesticated nonhumans; by different types 
of justice in addition to distribution such as what would be required 
in terms of recognition; and by different time dimensions of justice 
such as justice as restoration and justice to future generations. Yet, 
assuming that, all- things- considered, our duties of distributive justice 
to wild nonhumans come out intact, we will need to consider how we 
can discharge such duties of justice. We have already touched on this 
issue in Chapter 9, but a lot more will need to be said on the matter. 
Thus, I would like to present some initial considerations about what it 
means to discharge our duties of global interspecies justice. These are 
by no means meant to be adequate enough to cover the question, but 
I would like to point to some areas that will need further consideration 
as well as some bodies of literature on global justice, citizenship and 
democracy that are already more advanced in this regard.
Responsibility and citizenship
A promising feature about justice is that it applies to collective action 
at the institutional level and accordingly allows us to make large- 
scale normative assessments (Chapter 1). Yet that also makes it more 
complicated for an individual who wants to discharge her collective 
but unequally held duties of global justice. As we have seen, these 
duties are held collectively by humanity and thus need to be acted 




equally globally due to different historical and present responsibilities 
for the injustices at hand. Discharging duties of distributive interspecies 
justice becomes a matter of just implementation which in turn is 
driven by intra- social justice considerations. Accordingly, it becomes 
necessary to consider how certain distributions of ecological space – 
such as physical space for  example – can be made possible in a world 
already pervaded by a range of injustices and where the demands of 
global justice do not easily match up with the mosaic of duties and 
entitlements we find on a local level. When taking into account 
the diversity of human lives, cultures, political institutions and 
responsibilities it becomes clear that the simplification of humanity 
is no longer appropriate when we want to disentangle how to justly 
implement commonly held duties of justice to nonhumans. There 
are clearly participatory and recognitional justice elements that play 
an important part in this regard to protect from narratives that might 
shift the burden of implementation onto communities that share to a 
lesser degree the collective duties to nonhuman living beings.
As indicated in Chapter 9, the climate justice literature is already well 
acquainted with a mismatch of (different conceptions of) responsibility 
for and vulnerability to climate change in addition to different capacities 
to act in terms of mitigation and adaptation; as implied, for example, 
in the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ principle part of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). 
Accordingly, some of the insights of this body of work will be helpful 
in further analysing this particular problem of interspecies injustice.1 
To clarify, there are at least three different relevant elements in the 
distributive interspecies justice case about habitat distribution (which 
is one of several dimensions of ecological space) which make this a 
particularly complicated global justice issue. For one, there are clearly 
differentiated historical responsibilities that influence the current status 
quo of use of, and power over, ecological space. Moreover, there is the 
present uneven use of ecological space by humans globally mediated by 
different economic and social institutions. Also in this regard there is 
a sense of unevenness of responsibility for interspecies injustices. And 
finally, regarding some aspects of ecological space there is an unevenness 
in local capacity to protect biodiversity as we have seen regarding 
habitat in the Half- Earth case discussed in Chapter 9. This kind of 
capacity is not identical to financial capacity to pay for compensation 
and adaptation which more closely tracks use of present and historical 
ecological space. This means that places where there is the most 
potential for protecting biodiversity are often the same places where 
people live who do not share much of the overall historical or present 
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responsibility of ecological space usage more generally. Accordingly, 
capacity has a dual meaning here which would be obscured if it were 
only understood in terms of monetary and political power. In the 
context of biodiversity conservation there is also a more contested 
but implicit sense of capacity as being disproportionately subjected 
to the material burden of a more broadly held duty of humanity 
towards other living beings by living in close proximity to a broad 
diversity of nonhuman lives. In that sense, the term capacity obscures 
a problematic distance between the material burden and the primary 
duty holders. This is one way in which the biodiversity case differs in 
an important regard from the climate change issue because here the 
practical implications of the general interspecies duty is what causes 
primary discomfort rather than the unequal distribution of the actual 
negative impact of the environmental problem itself, which might be 
an additional source of worry. Accordingly, in the ecological justice 
case responsibilities conceived as either backward- looking responsibility, 
current contribution and participation in the status quo or as capacity 
to act do not match up as easily as in some other global justice cases. 
Because of that, the problem concerns particularly how to implement 
duties of justice that are shared unequally but whose implementation 
has the potential to lead to a pattern of demandingness – in terms of 
areas to protect, for  example – that does not track these duties fairly 
and adding to a historical legacy of injustices.2 Putting it differently, 
the implementation of distributive interspecies justice seems to be 
troubled by a twisted version of what Val Plumwood (1998a, p. 87) 
calls ‘consequential remoteness’.
As this is not purely a moral but also a political issue, a body of 
literature that will be helpful in this regard is the work on ecological 
and environmental citizenship. For example, Andrew Dobson’s 
(2003) ‘post- cosmopolitan’ account of citizenship that refers to 
ecological space already explicitly acknowledges ‘asymmetrical’ 
citizenship responsibilities based on justice leading to an obligation 
to have ‘sustainable’ ecological footprints (Chapter 4). Some of that 
will be up to individual ‘consumer choices’ and ‘lifestyles’ (Dobson’s 
‘private’ sphere; but for a convincing argument to keep citizenship 
and consumption separate see MacGregor 2006). However, primarily 
(for me) this will again be a matter about systemic issues in which 
individual lives are embedded (Dobson’s ‘public’ sphere). Accordingly, 
a ‘green citizen’ that takes her duties of interspecies justice seriously 
will search for political means to influence what can only be resolved 
by collective action via political institutions and so on. As Sherilyn 




for political action and resistance’ (2018, p. 3, emphasis in original). 
In that sense ecological justice plays two roles. On the one hand, it 
generates collective duties towards nonhumans but, on the other hand, 
interspecies justice can also function as a rhetorical tool that should 
be engaged by green citizens that renounce the solitary future towards 
which we are heading.3 Such considerations about citizenship, in turn, 
also link to discussions about responsibility in the context of structural 
injustice in the climate change and global justice literatures more 
broadly. For example, as part of the latter Iris Marion Young’s (2011) 
Responsibility for Justice is a useful starting point in this regard to help to 
further theoretically substantiate the role of the green citizen. In this 
influential book she provides a detailed analysis of the differentiated 
responsibilities individuals hold for addressing injustices with particular 
reference to the case of how we collectively uphold the existence of 
sweatshops.4 Similarly we might ask about how the current rate of 
species extinctions is being upheld collectively. Building on Young’s 
work, within the realm of environmental political theory some thought 
has already been given on the link between climate change, structural 
injustice, responsibility and power (see particularly Eckersley 2016). 
Likewise, regarding the particular interspecies justice case at hand 
more will also need to be said about the relationship between my 
analysis of interspecies injustice, structural injustice and the nature of 
the responsibilities held by green citizens.
Citizenship is also interlinked with thinking about deliberative and 
participatory democracy which has become a central theme in green 
political thought and political institutions more generally in the sense 
of ‘greening’ the state (see Eckersley 2004), as a way to engage with and 
live in accordance with demands of interspecies justice. Within broader 
theoretical engagement with the deliberative aspect of democracy 
and its general relationship with environmental protection, one line 
of argument is to rethink democracy in a more inclusive way that 
accounts for nonhuman interests and needs which is sometimes called 
ecological democracy or, simply, ecodemocracy. For example, David 
Schlosberg calls for ‘a form of citizen deliberation that is inclusive of 
environmental and ecological points of view, positions and interests 
that are traditionally excluded. At a minimum, […] such participation 
requires […] a type of democratic and ecological reflexivity’ (2007, p. 189, 
emphasis in original). That is in turn dependent on cross- species 
communication in the sense of humans ‘listening’ to ecological systems 
as a crucial part of such ecological reflexivity (Dryzek and Pickering 
2019). On top of that, several theorists argue for the representation of 




ECOLOGICAL JUSTICE AND THE EXTINCTION CRISIS
2007). Of course, this is based on a range of different contested claims, 
such as regarding which nonhumans can hold interests and how we 
can epistemically determine these interests, which are issues which we 
touched upon in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, besides that this seems to 
be a promising vehicle for making issues of interspecies justice heard 
within the political deliberative process, the deliberative democratic 
process itself can also function as an arena where different dimensions of 
justice that are not necessarily easily commensurable or converging can 
put be into conversation (as a place where substantive and procedural 
justice meet).
Other lines of argument focus more broadly on the state itself as the 
primary political institution via which – due to practical necessity – 
interspecies justice needs to be institutionalised at the national and 
international level (see Low and Gleeson 1998, Baxter 2005, Donoso 
2017). For example, Brian Baxter argues in favour of constitutional 
protection for nonhumans and looks to the prospect of establishing an 
‘International Court of Ecological Justice’ (2005, p. 183). This links, in 
turn, to the development of Earth jurisprudence – the representation 
of nonhuman interests in national constitutions, legislation and, 
consequently, court cases (for a position that links judicial resolution 
to doing justice to nonhumans see Treves et al 2019; and for a focus 
on the related but distinct process of conservation conflict resolution 
see Vucetich et al 2018). Previously mentioned prominent examples 
are the case of the Ecuadorian constitution which has included the 
rights of nature since 2008, or the case of the Whanganui River in 
New Zealand, which was given legal personhood in 2017. This realm 
of legal rights is clearly a further promising route for implementing 
ecological justice entitlements (Chapter 1), despite that so far, the 
attribution of legal rights to different environmental entities often only 
indirectly and imperfectly tracks justice entitlements. Nevertheless, 
such legal rights can play their part in the broader project of greening 
the state.
Coming to an end, these are only a few glimpses of some promising 
areas of environmental and political philosophical literature that can 
help spell out more clearly how to implement the environmental 
and ecological justice nexus. Taking our duties of justice to fellow 
humans and nonhuman living beings seriously is neither a matter of 
taking sides nor a reason to despair in light of the conflictual nature 
of sharing one planet. Rather the aim should be to think about what 
it means to be committed to doing justice on one Earth on which 




 1 The philosophical literature on climate change is very extensive and provides 
nuanced insights to which I cannot give appropriate consideration here.
 2 See also related discussions on responsibilities and justice in John Dryzek and 
Jonathan Pickering (2019) and particularly regarding biodiversity conservation 
in Baxter (2005). For a more pragmatic (anthropocentric) take that differentiates 
between different relevant actors in this context see Bram Büscher and Robert 
Fletcher (2019).
 3 Of course, the literature on ecological and environmental citizenship has been 
met with criticism, which points to the need to incorporate feminist and 
postcolonial insights more centrally into green Western theories of citizenship 
(see MacGregor 2018).
 4 For sympathetic critical discussions of Young’s account see Robyn Eckersley (2016) 
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